Pakistan's Blue Economy: Vast Offshore Resources in Exclusive Economic Zone

Pakistan has a 1,000 kilometers long coastline on the Arabian Sea with maritime sovereignty over 200 nautical miles deep Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) and 150 nautical miles of Continental Shelf. This adds 290,000 square kilometers of sea or about 36% of the country's land area open for tapping vast resources in it.

Pakistan's "Blue Economy" in this extended economic zone includes seafood and energy resources as well as international trade connectivity with the rest of the world. It offers opportunities for water sports, recreation and tourism in the coastal areas of Pakistan. One sign of the recognition of Pakistan's blue economy is the ongoing three-day International Maritime Conference organized on the theme of ‘Global Geopolitics in Transition: Rethinking Maritime Dynamics in the Indian Ocean Region’ under the auspices of National Institute of Maritime Affairs.

Offshore Energy Resources:

A Pakistan Basin Study conducted in 2009 found that the country has six onshore and two offshore basins; offshore basins being the Indus basin and the Makran basin in the Arabian Sea.

Top 3 Offshore Drilling Sites in Asia-Pacific. Source: Bloomberg

The Indus offshore basin is a rift basin that geologists say developed after the separation of the Indian Plate from Africa in the late Jurassic period. It is believed to be the second largest submarine fan system in the world after the Bay of Bengal with high probability of hydrocarbon discoveries.

The Makran Offshore basin is separated from the Indus Offshore basin by Murray ridge, according to Syed Mustafa Amjad's report in Dawn. It is an oceanic and continental crust subduction zone with deepwater trenches and volcanic activity. The basin consists of oceanic crust and periodic emergence of temporary mud islands along the coast suggesting strong evidence of large hydrocarbon deposits.

American energy giant Exxon-Mobil has joined the offshore oil and gas exploration efforts started by Oil and Gas Development Corporation (OGDC), Pakistan Petroleum Limited (PPL) and Italian energy giant ENI, according to media reports.

Each company has 25% stake in the joint venture under an agreement signed at the Prime Minister’s Secretariat in May 2018 among ExxonMobil, Government Holdings Private Limited (GHPL), PPL, ENI and OGDC.

Exxon-Mobile's entry in Pakistan brings deep offshore drilling technology, its long experience and financial resources to the country. It is expected to accelerate exploration and more discoveries.

CPEC and Trade:

Pakistan has built Gwadar as its third major deep sea port after Karachi and Port Qasim. Gwadar port's planned capacity when it is completed will be 300 to 400 million tons of cargo annually.  It is comparable to the capacity of all of India's ports combined annual capacity of 500 million tons of cargo today.   It is far larger than the 10-12 million tons cargo handling capacity planned for Chabahar.

"We believe Gwadar is following in the footsteps of Shenzhen which represented a historic population rise, from a population of 30,000 in 1980 to 11 million people in 2017. Gwadar is poised to see massive population growth due to incoming industries, and we expect this to be one of the most strategic cities in South Asia." Hao-Yeh Chang,  China Pak Investments Corporation

To put Gwadar's scale in perspective, let's compare it with the largest US port of Long Beach which handles 80 million tons of cargo, about a quarter of what Gwadar will handle upon completion of the project. Gawadar port will be capable of handling the world's largest container ships and massive oil tankers.

Gawadar port is being built in Pakistan by the Chinese as part of the ambitious $46 billion China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) that will eventually serve as Hong Kong West for  growing Chinese trade with the Middle East and Europe.  CPEC will also enable Pakistan to bypass Afghanistan to trade with Central Asia through China across China's borders with Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan.

The volume of Gwadar property searches surged 14-fold on Pakistan’s largest real estate database, Zameen.com, between 2014 and 2016, up from a prior rate of a few hundred a month. “It’s like a gold rush,” said Chief Executive Zeeshan Ali Khan to an Express Tribune newspaper reporter. “Anyone who is interested in real estate, be it an investor or a developer, is eyeing Gwadar.”

Chinese private investment company China Pak Investment Corporation has recently announced it is acquiring 3.6 million square foot International Port City project in Gwadar. It plans to develop a $150 million gated community to handle the influx of 500,000 Chinese professionals expected in Gwadar by 2022.

Seafood Industry:

Pakistan’s fishing industry is very small relative to its vast potential. Pakistani fishermen own small fishing boats and their catch is very limited. The industry contributes only 0.4% of the country's $315 billion GDP.   However, the nation's seafood exports are growing, In fiscal year 2017-18, seafood exports increased 27.94% to 198,420 tons, earning $451.026 million.

Pakistani finishing industry is in  need of major modernization to make it more productive. China’s infrastructure investments in Pakistan are opening up the local fisheries sector on the Arabian Sea, with a major Chinese power station builder completing a fishing port as a “gift” to local people, according to a report in SeafoodSource. State-owned China State Power Investment Corp., which is building several power plants in Pakistan, said a new fishing port in Lasbela region on the Arabian Sea would aid the economy and increase the efficiency of the local fishing community in Baluchistan Province (of which Lasbela is part), says the report.

Summary:

Pakistan is beginning to focus on tapping vast resources in its 290,000 square kilometers of sea or about 36% of the country's land area.  Fishing industry is being modernized with Chinese help and Exxon has begun exploring offshore oil and gas reserves. Gwadar has been built as the third deep sea port and a major new metropolis is being built t hat could one day rival Chinese city of Shenzhen.

Related Links:

Haq's Musings

South Asia Investor Review

US EIA Estimates of Oil and Gas in Pakistan

Gwadar to Rival Shenzhen

Exxon Exploring Offshore Oil and Gas in Pakistan

Why Blackouts and Bailouts in Energy-Rich Pakistan?

Riaz Haq's Youtube Channel

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  • Riaz Haq

    Why fears of a Chinese naval base at Pakistan’s Gwadar port are overblown

    https://www.scmp.com/comment/opinion/article/3231705/why-fears-chin...


    China’s continued investment in the port, despite its lacklustre performance, has raised suspicions that it is intended for use as a Chinese navy base
    However, despite its strategic location, the port is not as attractive as the ones in Karachi and Ormara, nor does Islamabad seem interested in a permanent Chinese naval presence

    By Riaz Khokhar


    On August 14, a roadside bomb targeted a convoy carrying Chinese engineers in Gwadar, Pakistan. While none were injured, the continued presence of Chinese workers in Gwadar, despite recurring terrorist attacks, might puzzle casual observers.
    By accepting Pakistan’s 40-year lease proposal for the Gwadar port’s construction and operation in 2013, Beijing also signed up to the inherent risks of working in Balochistan, a province marred by insurgency. The choice underscored a prioritisation of strategic interests over purely economic ones.
    Despite Gwadar Port operating since 2008, it has seen minimal economic activity. While trade activity at Karachi Port and Port Qasim averaged 41 and 48 million tonnes respectively between 2020 and 2023, Gwadar Port reported under 100,000 tonnes.
    This disparity, combined with persistent Chinese investment despite obvious risks, has bolstered the idea that Beijing may be helping Pakistan construct a larger naval facility at Gwadar for potential access and use by the Chinese navy.

    In the early 2000s, Pakistan began reaching out to China to help build a naval base at Gwadar. By 2005, Pakistan’s naval chief had envisioned it as the nation’s third naval base, complementing the Karachi base and the Jinnah base at Ormara.
    Gwadar is seen as a probable location for a Chinese naval base due to its strategic position near the Strait of Hormuz and ability to host large warships. It is anticipated that Chinese navy warships will dock at Gwadar for repairs and replenishment, as they have in Karachi in the past. This would address China’s ability to sustain a fleet in the Indian Ocean and may allow Beijing access to regional maritime data.
    However, to what extent will this potential be realised? Key considerations include the nature of China’s intelligence operations concerning US naval activities and whether Pakistan would allow the Chinese navy permanent access to its bases.

  • Riaz Haq

    Why fears of a Chinese naval base at Pakistan’s Gwadar port are overblown

    https://www.scmp.com/comment/opinion/article/3231705/why-fears-chin...

    Intelligence gathering by Chinese entities or navy personnel at such facilities is hardly new. US Navy Lieutenant Commander Joseph McGinnis’ research highlighted the Karachi and Jinnah naval bases as primary choices for the Chinese navy due to their “superior repair, logistics, and military facilities”. If China were to use Pakistan-based facilities for overseas operations, these two bases would be prioritised.

    Besides, Pakistan hosts most of its naval assets – much of them Chinese-supplied – at the Karachi and Jinnah bases. Chinese technicians have been present at the former for years and are likely to be at the latter too, given the relocation of strategic assets there since 2011.
    Beijing would probably have been gathering intel on US naval activities in the Persian Gulf through its assets and personnel at these bases. If the US had reservations, it would have exercised its leverage over Pakistan to address them.
    Additionally, such surveillance is hardly unique. Chinese firms operating ports in over 50 countries similarly monitor naval operations, according to Isaac B. Kardon and Wendy Leutert in their 2022 International Security article, “Pier competitor: China’s power position in global ports”.
    Pakistan is likely to accept this trade-off in return for Chinese naval transfers, given the constraints on obtaining military equipment from the US and Europe. Islamabad aims to increase its intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities not only against India but against terrorists, who have previously targeted Pakistan’s naval strategic assets.

    The Pakistani cabinet’s recent nod towards renewing the Communications Interoperability and Security Memorandum of Agreement with the US after its 2020 expiration indicates Islamabad’s interest in US military tech integrated with ISR features. If China offers similar tech, it might understandably want access for regional data collection.
    Yet, this is vastly different from the Chinese navy deploying surveillance ships directly on the Pakistani coast. Currently, the Chinese navy primarily utilises its Djibouti base for noncombat and anti-piracy missions near the Gulf of Aden and Red Sea, up to North Africa. Having a foothold in Pakistan’s southwestern shores would significantly aid operations extending to the Persian Gulf.

  • Riaz Haq

    Why fears of a Chinese naval base at Pakistan’s Gwadar port are overblown

    https://www.scmp.com/comment/opinion/article/3231705/why-fears-chin...


    Islamabad has previously allowed port calls by the Chinese navy, including submarine visits. Pakistan’s chief of naval staff recently indicated an openness to more such visits, including from Chinese aircraft carriers.
    Still, the primary role of the temporary deployment of Chinese navy personnel and warships on these bases has been to offer training to Pakistani navy officers and improve interoperability on Pakistan’s warships of Chinese origin. To date, the Chinese navy hasn’t established a consistent naval presence on Pakistani bases.

    Pakistan would be wise to avoid granting the Chinese navy access to its bases for contingency operations, as this could one day translate into regional military actions or coercive diplomacy.
    Instead, Islamabad seems to be leveraging the possibility of such port calls to secure support from the US. For example, the US has approved a US$450 million F-16 sustainment sale and supported an International Monetary Fund loan package.

    There are two scenarios in which Pakistan might allow permanent Chinese navy deployments at its bases.
    One, Washington’s support for Islamabad diminishes and punitive actions against Pakistan increase, coupled with amplified backing for India’s defence capabilities and potential military campaigns against Pakistan. In other words, unless Pakistan anticipates an irreversible breakdown in its strategic relationship with the US, it would be reluctant to permit a permanent Chinese naval presence.
    Two, if China supersedes the US in economic, military and diplomatic dominance, and Pakistan secures guarantees from Beijing, then Pakistan’s expectation of US benefits or penalties may diminish, enabling more latitude in its decisions.
    Riaz Khokhar is a research analyst on geopolitics and security of the Indo-Pacific region and a former Asia studies visiting fellow at East-West Center in Washington