Comment by Riaz Haq on October 12, 2017 at 8:10am

THE EXPRESS TRIBUNE > PAKISTAN
Can India destroy Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal?

By Naveed Ahmad Published: October 12, 2017


https://tribune.com.pk/story/1529367/can-india-destroy-pakistans-nu...


“As far as IAF is concerned, it has the ability to locate, fix and strike and that is not only for tactical nuclear weapons but also for other targets across the border,” he (IAF Chief) had said during the annual Air Force Day press conference on IAF response to Pakistan’s store of tactical nuclear weapons.

The Indian air chief is not the only one to hurl such warnings and publicly acknowledge the existence of Cold Start doctrine (CSD). On January 4, India’s Chief of Army Staff Bipin Rawat made a similar hawkish claim.
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Despite throwing B-52s Tomahawk cruise missiles, the US could merely hit Scud storage areas and factories. Over 2,000 sorties and missile attacks failed to take out Iraq’s Scud mobile launchers. Thus, the tall claim of locating, fixing and destroy is trashed as nothing more than a shallow brag. India’s dream of ‘Great Nasr Hunt’ has quite many chinks to remedy.

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One of the key impediments for India is obsolete but large military hardware while Pakistan is much smaller but more recent and constantly updated.

From its tanks, armoured vehicles to artillery as munitions, everything is to be replaced. The soldier morale has been hit hard by draconian powers with officers to sack them as well as a feeling of being ignored when it comes to basic needs such food (ration) and health. For an offensive operation of the scale, being crowed the Indian military Cold Start doctrine pre-requisites magical mix of 30% cutting military hardware, 40% existing technology and 30% obsolete munitions. Its war stamina from supplies and logistical perspective is less than two weeks, 10 days to quote exactly from Indian estimates.

At the operational level too, India lacks 1.5 to 1 numerical superiority. Its divisions deployed along the Pakistani border are predominantly infantry with limited offensive capacity. Islamabad has been investing rightly in its mechanised infantry which gives its army sharp teeth to bite. Though BrahMos cruise missile range has been extended to 600 kilometres after joining Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), it is yet to be properly integrated into the force structure.

Comment by Riaz Haq on December 13, 2017 at 8:31am

What Good Are the Indian Navy's Aircraft Carriers Against Pakistan?
Just how useful will India’s carriers be in a potential future war with Pakistan?


By Robert Farley
December 12, 2017

https://thediplomat.com/2017/12/what-good-are-the-indian-navys-airc...

The Indian Navy is devoting enormous resources to the development of an effective, multi-ship carrier force. It remains unclear, however, precisely how the Indian Navy would use that force in the event of a rekindled war with Pakistan. A recent Naval War College Review article by Ben Wan Beng Ho sheds some light on the problems that India’s carrier force might have in taking the fight to Pakistan. Long story short, India’s carriers would face enormous risks in undertaking offensive operations, with very uncertain benefits.

Ho argues that the need for self-defense, combined with limited deck space, make it very difficult for INS Vikrant and INS Vikramaditya, either separately or in tandem, to threaten Pakistani land installations. Pakistan’s A2/AD network, including submarines, aircraft, and surface ships, poses a credible threat to the carriers, making their use in offensive operations very risky. Conceivably, Pakistan could even attack Indian carriers with tactical nuclear weapons, if the war developed in that direction. The Indian carriers would struggle to execute a close blockade of Pakistani ports, destroy the Pakistani surface fleet, or do much damage to Pakistani military targets on land.

Ho suggests that the carrier fleet would be better employed as a decisive late-war weapon, after Indian Air Force assets had worn down Pakistani defenses. This would have the benefit of enabling India to bring its entire carrier force to bear. Ho also argues that the carriers could play a productive role in sea lines of communication (SLOC) protection, which might also allow them to threaten Pakistani lines of communication.


Ho details the problems associated with small-deck carriers, especially the limited number of aircraft to share offensive and defensive missions. The need for self-protection is not entirely problematic; Indian carriers will undoubtedly receive a great deal of attention from potential opponents, drawing resources away from other military operations. Other Indian naval forces could either use this misdirection to conduct offensive operations, or could rely on the defensive umbrella provided by the carriers.

But some core problems remain. Indian naval strategy envisions three operational carrier battle groups undertaking more or less the same tasks. But Indian naval procurement has produced a plan to acquire three carriers with radically different capabilities, meaning that the actual utility of the carrier battle group in crisis conditions will depend upon which carrier is operational at a given time.

We also have no clear idea regarding the reliability of the two existing ships. Vikramaditya is an old Russian hull that underwent controversial late-life transformation into a STOBAR carrier; Vikrant is a purpose-built STOBAR carrier, but will be the largest warship ever constructed in India, with all of the potential reliability issues that this entails. The two ships are similar but not identical, meaning that maintenance and flight procedures will vary in potentially consequential ways. This makes sharing aircraft and pilots a dicey proposition.

Moreover, as Ho notes, the reports we have regarding readiness in the naval aviation program are not great. The MiG-29K has been a carrier aircraft for less than a decade, and has never been subjected to a demanding, up tempo set of combat operations. Anecdotes from the Russian experience do not suggest optimism.

While Vikrant and Vikramaditya will provide important opportunities for learning, the Indian Navy may need to wait for the commissioning of INS Vishal, projected in the 2030s, to have a real offensive capability against Pakistan. By that time, however, the lethality of Pakistan’s A2/AD umbrella may have significantly increased.

Comment by Riaz Haq on January 8, 2018 at 7:47am

Pakistan Tests An Indigenously Developed Anti-Ship Cruise Missile
Pakistan introduces the Harbah, a cruise missile with anti-ship and land-attack roles.

https://thediplomat.com/2018/01/pakistan-tests-an-indigenously-deve...


By Ankit Panda
January 08, 2018

Last week, the Pakistani Navy carried out the first-ever test launch of its Harbah anti-ship and land-attack cruise missile (LACM/ASCM). The test was carried out in the North Arabian Sea on January 3, according to a press release from Pakistan’s Inter-Services Public Relations (ISPR).

“The successful live weapon firing has once again demonstrated the credible fire power of Pakistan Navy and the impeccable level of indigenization in high tech weaponry achieved by Pakistan’s defence industry,” ISPR noted in a statement. “The missile accurately hit its target signifying the impressive capabilities of Harbah Naval Weapon System.”

The Harbah is thought to be derived from Pakistan’s Babur family of cruise missiles. Pakistan has tested multiple Babur variants, beginning with the ground-launched Babur-I to the submarine-launched Babur-III, which was first tested last January. Though ISPR made no comment on the missile’s payload capabilities, its origin in the Babur family would suggest that it could be converted for both conventional and nuclear payload delivery.

According to Pakistani media reports, Pakistan’s Ministry of Defense Production had planned to develop a missile system for the PNS Himmat by October 2018. According to the Ministry’s 2014-2015 yearbook, the Directorate General of Munitions Production (DGMP) had been tasked with “the indigenous (sic) developing of ship-borne system with Land Attack Missile [LACM] and Anti ship Missile” by that date.

The missile was launched from an Azmat-class fast attack craft, PNS Himmat. PNS Himmat was commissioned into the Pakistan Navy last summer after extensive sea trials. Along with PNS Himmat, PNS Azmat and PNS Deshat are likely to also operate the Harbah ASCM once the system is declared operational.

Pakistan’s test-firing of the Harbah came shortly after U.S. President Donald Trump threatened to end U.S. military aid to the country in a tweet. While U.S. aid does not go toward Pakistan’s indigenous strategic weapons research and development, the ISPR statement noted that Pakistan’s chief of naval staff, Admiral Zafar Mahmood Abbasi, said that Pakistan needed to “reduce reliance on foreign countries” and “emphasized the need to capitalize on indigenous defense capabilities.”

Comment by Riaz Haq on February 15, 2018 at 10:05am

#India's #defense budget (US$52.5) breaks into world's top 5: #UK report. #Modi
https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/indias-defence-bu...

India's defence budget broke into the world's top five, beating the UK for the first time, a new report by a London-based global think-tank has said, signalling a key shift in the military balance between the two countries. 

India overtook the UK as the fifth-largest defence spender in the world in 2017 at $52.5 billion, up from $51.1 billion in 2016, according to the 'Military Balance 2018' report by the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS). 

In contrast, the UK's defence budget fell from $52.5 billion in 2016 to $50.7 billion last year. 

"This represents a key shift in the military balance between India and the UK, with India allocating more capabilities to develop its regional resources than the UK in a global context," said IISS Senior Fellow for South Asia, Rahul Roy-Chaudhury. 

The report notes that while India continues to modernise its military capabilities, China " with the world's second-largest .. 

Read more at:
//economictimes.indiatimes.com/articleshow/62929343.cms?utm_source=contentofinterest&utm_medium=text&utm_campaign=cppst

Comment by Riaz Haq on February 20, 2018 at 10:58am

#McMaster of War: #American #tanks were several generations ahead of T-72s of his #Iraqi opponents. #Abrams have depleted uranium armor... and carry anti-tank munitions tipped with depleted uranium penetrators with significantly longer range. #Trump

https://www.lrb.co.uk/blog/2018/02/19/dave-lindorff/mcmaster-of-war/

A number of military experts – including the defense secretary, James Mattis – have warned that a US war against North Korea would be hard, incredibly destructive and bloody, with civilian casualties in the millions, and could go badly for US forces. But Lt. Gen. Herbert Raymond McMaster, President Trump’s national security adviser, is apparently insistent that ‘a military strike be considered as a serious option’.

One of Gen. McMaster’s claims to fame is a Silver Star he was awarded for a tank ‘battle’ he led in the desert during the so-called Gulf War of 1991. As a young captain leading a troop with nine new Abrams M1A1 battle tanks, McMaster destroyed 28 Iraqi tanks in 23 minutes without losing any of his own or suffering any casualties.

McMaster’s exploit (later embellished with a name, the ‘Battle of 73 Easting’) was little more than a case of his having dramatically better equipment. His tanks were several generations ahead of the antique Russian-built T-72s of his Iraqi opponents. They were protected by depleted uranium armour – a dense metal virtually impenetrable by conventional tank shells, anti-tank rockets and RPGs – and carried anti-tank munitions tipped with depleted uranium penetrators, which can punch through steel armour as if it were cardboard. They then ignite a tank’s interior, exploding any ordnance inside and incinerating the crew. The Abrams main cannon also has a significantly longer range than the tanks McMaster was confronting, meaning he and his men were able to pick off the Iraqi tanks while the shells fired back at them all fell short.

McMaster also fought in the Iraq War of the following decade. In 2005, running counter-insurgency operations in Tal Afar, a northern city of 200,000 people, McMaster ordered up a massive ground assault and aerial bombardment that levelled 60 per cent of the buildings in the old city centre. His experiences in Iraq raise concerns that Trump’s national security adviser may misperceive war as a one-sided affair in which an invincible US, with its super-powerful war machine, can smash its enemies with impunity.

I spoke to Lawrence Wilkerson, a retired army colonel who was chief of staff to Colin Powell when he was George W. Bush’s secretary of state. ‘McMaster knows very little about the [Korean] peninsula, period,’ he told me. ‘Thus far, his comments and – I must assume – his counsel to the NSC and its head, Trump, reflects that ignorance.’ Asked whether McMaster may be underestimating the risks of attacking North Korea, Wilkerson said: ‘That could be said of almost any US flag officer and reinforced with any who had combat experience in Iraq in 1990-91 or 2003.’

Comment by Riaz Haq on February 25, 2018 at 10:08pm

Indian Military Modernization
and Conventional Deterrence in
South Asia
WALTER C. LADWIG III
Department of War Studies, King’s College London, UK


http://www.walterladwig.com/Articles/Conventional%20Deterrence%20in...

ABSTRACT In recent years, headline grabbing increases in the Indian defense
budget have raised concerns that India’s on-going military modernization
threatens to upset the delicate conventional military balance vis-à-vis Pakistan.
Such an eventuality is taken as justification for Islamabad’s pursuit of tacticalnuclear
weapons and other actions that have worrisome implications for strategic
stability on the subcontinent. This article examines the prospects for Pakistan’s
conventional deterrence in the near to medium term, and concludes that it is
much better than the pessimists allege. A host of factors, including terrain, the
favorable deployment of Pakistani forces, and a lack of strategic surprise in the
most likely conflict scenarios, will mitigate whatever advantages India may be
gaining through military modernization. Despite a growing technological edge in
some areas, Indian policymakers cannot be confident that even a limited resort to
military force would achieve a rapid result, which is an essential pre-condition for
deterrence failure.

Some Indian analysts have argued
that the significant amount of money Pakistan is spending on its own
military modernization program – assisted by China and the United
States – is actually eroding India’s ‘slender conventional edge.’

----------

this vein, several retired Indian generals have recently argued that their
military lacks conventional superiority over Pakistan as well as the
ability to achieve a quick and decisive result against its neighbor.20
Despite the dramatic increases in defense spending, Indian analysts
contend that the military — in particular the Army — faces numerous
capability shortfalls that would hinder military operations against
Pakistan. The large number of obsolete tanks, armored vehicles, and
artillery pieces, not to mention critical shortages of ammunition and
air-defense assets, raise serious questions whether India can undertake
large-scale military operations at all, let alone whether ongoing
defense modernization really is sharply shifting the conventional
balance in its favor.21 In this vein, Arun Sahgal and Vinod Anand
have damningly written that India’s military modernization is primarily
designed to address the obsolescence of existing platforms ‘rather
than part of a well thought out force transformation strategy that
takes into account the changing nature of war.’ 

Comment by Riaz Haq on February 25, 2018 at 10:09pm

Pakistan’s (Non-Nuclear) Plan to Counter ‘Cold Start’
Tactical nuclear weapons get most of the attention, but Islamabad is also building up conventional capabilities.

By Meenakshi Sood
March 25, 2017

https://thediplomat.com/2017/03/pakistans-non-nuclear-plan-to-count...


While Pakistan’s nuclear response to CSD (Cold Start Doctrine) has dominated the narrative, it is the conventional response that was devised first. In the last few years of General Musharraf’s presidency, especially between 2004 and 2007, India and Pakistan were engaged in backchannel negotiations and came tantalizingly close to finding a solution to the Kashmir issue. Then the 2007 Lawyers’ Movement forced Musharraf out of power and a new leadership took charge. With General Kayani as the new chief of army staff, the threat from India came back into focus, and so did the perceived risk of CSD. Given India’s military capability and its declared Cold Start Doctrine, Kayani believed that Pakistan could not afford to let its guard down as the country prepared according to “adversaries’ capabilities, not intentions.” He went on to give his assessment of the timeline by which India would be able to operationalize CSD — two years for partial implementation and five years for full — betraying the urgency he attached to a counter-response.

Between 2009 and 2013, the Pakistan Army conducted military exercises codenamed Azm-e-Nau to formalize and operationalize a conventional response to CSD. At its conclusion, Pakistan adopted a “new concept of war fighting” (NCWF) that aims to improve mobilization time of troops and enhance inter-services coordination, especially between the Army and the Pakistan Air Force (PAF). To this end, Pakistan Air Force’s aerial exercise High Mark was conducted alongside Azm-e-Nau III in 2010, which saw the participation of over 20,000 troops from all services in areas of southern Punjab, Sialkot, and Sindh along Pakistan’s eastern border with India. The 2010 exercises were the largest conducted by the Army since 1989. PAF’s exercise High Mark, conducted every five years, synchronizes the Air Force’s response with Army maneuvers, covering a vast area from Skardu in the north to the Arabian Sea in the south. As per military sources, with the implementation of the NCFW, the Pakistan Army will be able to mobilize even faster than India. This should worry India as CSD’s raison d’etre lies in the short reaction time it requires to launch an offensive. If Pakistan is indeed able to mount a counter-offensive even before India fires the first shot, literally and figuratively, it blunts the effectiveness of the Indian military doctrine.

Comment by Riaz Haq on February 25, 2018 at 10:09pm

Pakistan’s new war strategy
It is an overstatement — or perhaps a relative truth that Indian military forces are far superior to Pakistan’s

Muhammad Ali BaigMuhammad Ali Baig

FEBRUARY 26, 2018

https://dailytimes.com.pk/207360/pakistans-new-war-strategy/

What is Pakistan’s New Concept of War Fighting (NCWF)? Why and how is it a conventional response to Indian Cold Start Doctrine (CSD)? The conventional doctrinal destabilisation caused by India in 2004 in the form of CSD had to meet a response in the form of NCWF of Pakistan. With former Pakistan Army Chief General Mirza Aslam Beg’s Zarb-e-Momin military exercise conducted in 1989 – Pakistan started to adopt an offensive-defensive mode of security and presented a credible response towards Indian military’s Operation Brasstacks. Similarly, in response to Indian Cold Start Doctrine – Pakistan envisaged New Concept of War Fighting.

It is an overstatement or perhaps a relative truth that Indian Military Forces are far more superior to that of Pakistan. Both militaries share a common history and military culture due to their shared foundations in the British Indian Military traditions, nevertheless, while keeping in view many aspects of state, national and latent power – Indian Military Forces have an advantage over Pakistan. However, the four limited wars and countless border skirmishes between the two raise serious questions over the perceived and rhetorical superiority of the Indian Armed Forces in relation to Pakistan Armed Forces. A British scholar Walter Ladwig argued that Indian conventional military superiority is exaggerated since now the Indian edge over Pakistan is declining in terms of numbers, equipment, technology and training. It can be averred that now with NCWF – the doctrinal advantage is also equalised.

Pakistan while keeping in view the threat stemming from Indian Cold Start Doctrine – started to prepare its counter. In 2004 India moved away from Sundarji Doctrine and formulated Cold Start Doctrine which is a dangerous military instrument primarily due to its philosophical and theoretical foundations in German Blitzkrieg of the Second World War. Nevertheless, Indian Armed Forces especially the Indian Army used it to ward off the criticism it had to face at the backdrop of Indo-Pak military standoff and the failed Operation Parakramin 2001-02. Consequently, in 2007 former Pakistan Army Chief Gen. Kayani believed that CSD would require five years to operationalise fully and for that matter Pakistan Armed Forces conducted four Azm-e-Nau joint military exercises from 2009 to 2013. General Kayani famously said that ‘we plan on adversary’s capabilities, not intentions’. Azm-e-Naumilitary exercises were principally aimed to achieve synergy among the various branches of forces so that combined arms would strive for one objective with complete coordination and synchronisation along with enhanced mobility and speed. At the end of these exercises in 2013 – Pakistan Armed Forces formalised a doctrine named as New Concept of War Fighting (NCWF). The National Defence University, Islamabad played a vital role in the creation of NCWF since the majority of the simulated war gaming was conducted there.

Comment by Riaz Haq on March 8, 2018 at 9:00pm

Defeat is an Orphan: How Pakistan Lost the Great South Asian War (Book Review)
Adnan Qaiser - March 8, 2018

https://www.globalvillagespace.com/defeat-is-an-orphan-how-pakistan...


...Myra MacDonald’s scholarship, Defeat is an Orphan: How Pakistan Lost the Great South Asian War, records events shaping-up in India and Pakistan between 1998 and 2016. The author bestows lavish praises, levels blind accusations, makes flawed conclusions and renders erroneous judgements in favour of “a rising world power” (India) against what she calls a “near-failing state” (Pakistan) (27).

However, she cannot be faulted. Having been Reuter’s correspondent for nearly thirty years with specialization in South Asian politics and security – most probably based out of New Delhi – Ms. MacDonald’s India-bent justifiably pervades and parades. Never mind, it brings her otherwise great research effort into disrepute.


---
Dedicating her first chapter to Indo-Pakistan nuclear issues, Ms. MacDonald claims the nuclear weapons “accelerated [Pakistan’s] downfall [as it gave the country] a false sense of inviolability [to] unleash militant forces that it could no longer fully control” (27). Endorsing the claim of Pakistan as “insufficiently imagined” by Salman Rushdie, the disgraced author of The Satanic Verses in the Muslim world, Ms. MacDonald believes “Opposition to India bind[s] Pakistan together” (30, 170).

----
Discussing events leading to Indo-Pakistan nuclear tests of May 1998, the author justifies India’s “nuclear restraint,” but conveniently forgets it was Indian leaders’ threatening and provocative statements that had forced Pakistan to carry-out its own nuclear tests. However, she considers Pakistan to have “lock[ed] itself inside a house on fire … by making itself impregnable” (44).

In chapter two, Ms. MacDonald expediently overlooks India’s clandestine takeover of Siachen Glacier beyond bilaterally accepted point NJ9842 in April 1984 and denounces Pakistan’s Kargil operation, which was carried-out in the similar fashion in 1999. Despite turning out as a “strategic disaster” (57) due to Pakistan’s civil-military discord and geopolitical pressures, the operation was a “brilliant tactical” manoeuvre which gave India a bloody nose (51). Disregarding India’s territorial quest in the region and Pakistan’s right to avail any unguarded opportunity offered by its archrival, the author is out giving India brownie points: “India was simply too complacent. Poor intelligence and its expectation of peace after the nuclear tests had lulled [India] into a false sense of security” (55).

-------------------

In chapter seven, the author dissects the ten-month long India-Pakistan military standoff of 2001-2002, as India thought “it was time for a war to end all wars” (133). Ms. MacDonald believes India came out victorious as it achieved its objective “to defeat cross-border infiltration/terrorism without conflict [and] to contain the national mood of ‘teach[ing] Pakistan a lesson’ through international pressure” (134). However, Operation Parakram (valour) turned out to be a disaster for the Indian Army with high casualty-rate without engaging in war. India’s army chief, General V.K. Singh admitted: “We seemed to be at war with ourselves” (140).

The author, significantly points out that neither India had the political will nor military wherewithal to “destroy and degrade Pakistan’s war fighting capabilities.” She concludes “The Indian Army was not in a position to deal a decisive blow against Pakistan. Vajpayee’s best option was to use angry rhetoric to force the international community to squeeze more concessions from Pakistan” (135-137, 144). However, the author notes, the event led Pakistan to “expand its nuclear arsenal further … reinforce[ing] its belief that it was an insecure state that could be protected only by military force, including nuclear weapons and jihadist proxies” (149).

Comment by Riaz Haq on March 8, 2018 at 10:05pm

Except of Myra McDonald's "Defeat is an Orphan" on the failure of India's Operation Parakram in 2001-2002 against Pakistan:

"Since partition, the India Army--with 1.1 million men compared to 550,000 in the Pakistan Army--had the advantage in terms of numbers. But it was a lumbering beast. India's vast size meant the army was spread more thinly across the country than in Pakistan, acting as a brake on mobilization. Its three armoured strike corps, designed to strike deep into Pakistan territory, were based in central India and took nearly three weeks to maneuver into position because of their sheer size.  THe slowness of the mobilization gave Pakistan enough time to prepare its defenses....Much of the equipment pressed into frontline service, from Vijayanta tanks of 1970s vintage to even older artillery pieces, was barely suited to fighting a modern war. It was only when the Indian Army began to mobilize that its slowness and shortages ---of road vehicles for deployment, missiles, ammunition, and war stores---became apparent. "The very first few days of Operation Parakram exposed the hollowness of our operational preparedness," said General V.K.Singh, who was then with XI Corps in Punjab. Having lost the advantage of surprise because of its slow mobilization, the Indian Army did not have enough superiority in numbers and equipment to guarantee a decisive victory. Nor could it rely on air power to make up for its weakness on the ground. At independence, India had abolished the role of  commander-in-chief of all armed forces, replacing it with three weaker, co-equal, service chiefs who each had a tendency to go their own way. Thus though India's air power was superior to that of Pakistan in 2001-2002, the different branches of its armed forces were not integrated enough to consider a ground assault backed by air strikes and close air support. Had India pressed ahead with an attack on Pakistan that January--and in such situation is with the defender--it risked becoming quickly bogged down. "The slender edge that India had could have led to nothing but a stalemate and...a stalemate between a large and much smaller country amounts to victory for the smaller country, " said Brigadier Kanwal in an analysis of India's military preparedness. Nor did India have the capacity to dig in for a long war where its greater size relative to Pakistan could have eventually triumphed. Thanks to cutbacks, it had run down stocks of ammunition to save money. Even without Pakistan's possession of nuclear weapons to deter an Indian invasion, the balance of power in conventional forces was enough to give pause for thought." 

https://books.google.com/books?id=dvIwDgAAQBAJ&printsec=frontco...

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