Israel and Pakistan Acquire Submarine Fleet for Second Strike Capability

Israel does not trust Iran just as Pakistan does not trust India. While Israel is preparing for eventual nuclear-armed Iran in the future, Pakistan is threatened by India's growing nuclear triad and atomic arsenal today. So what are Israel and Pakistan doing to deter potential nuclear attacks by their regional rivals? They are both building sea-based nuclear second strike capability with diesel-electric submarines equipped with air-independent propulsion (AIP).


Israel's Submarine Fleet:

Israel has just taken delivery of the 5th of 6 Dolphin II class AIP-equipped submarines built by Germany. More than 225 feet long, the diesel-electric Dolphin II class is part attack submarine, part nuclear strike ship and part commando taxi.  Each sub has 10 tubes. Four of these tubes are larger 26-inch tubes—the size is rare for a Western-built submarine—capable of launching small commando teams or firing larger nuclear-capable cruise missiles. The remaining six tubes measure at 21 inches, according to Real Clear Defense.

Israel's German-built Dolphin Class AIP Sub


Several German defense ministry officials interviewed by German news magazine Der Spiegel believe that Israel intends for these submarines to carry nuclear weapons. The missiles can also be launched “using a previously secret hydraulic ejection system,” the magazine reported.

Diesel-Electric AIP Vs Nuclear-Powered Subs:

A key requirement for submarines is to be stealthy—and the Dolphin II is indeed very quiet. The trick is in the submarine’s air-independent propulsion fuel cells, which provide power under the surface as the diesel engines—used for running on the surface—rest and recharge.

This system is quieter than the nuclear-powered engines on American and Russian submarines, which must constantly circulate engine coolant. Nuclear submarines are virtually unlimited in terms of range, and are better used for deep-water operations. But Israel has no need for nuclear-powered subs when quiet diesel subs can do the same job, according to Real Clear Defense.


Pakistan's AIP Submarine Fleet:

The details of Pakistan's planned submarine fleet are not clear yet. However, Pakistan too is acquiring a fleet of AIP-equipped diesel-electric submarines.

Pakistan Navy operates a fleet of five diesel-electric submarines and three MG110 miniature submarines (SSI). The nucleus of the fleet includes two Agosta-70 and three modern Agosta-90B submarines. Pakistan's third Agosta-90B, the S 139 Hamza, was constructed indigenously and features the DCNS MESMA (Module d'EnergieSous-Marin Autonome) air-independent propulsion (AIP) system. Pakistan retrofitted the two earlier Agosta-90B vessels with the MESMA AIP propulsion system when they underwent overhaul in 2011, according to Nuclear Threat Initiative.

Model of Chinese-made S20 Sub Ordered by Pakistan

Pakistan is expanding and modernizing its underwater fleet with 8 additional AIP-equipped submarines ordered from China. Whether the Chinese submarines are the S-20 export derivative of the Type-039A/Type-041 Yuan-class submarine, or a bespoke design, is unclear. But the Yuan has also been mentioned, and according to government officials. If the deal transpires, it will be the largest ever Sino-Pakistani deal. Mansoor Ahmed of Quaid-e-Azam University's Department of Defense and Strategic Studies, believes the submarines will each cost $ 250 million to $325 million.

Mansoor Ahmed told Defense News that AIP-equipped conventional submarines "provide reliable second strike platforms, [and] an assured capability resides with [nuclear-powered attack and nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines], which are technically very complex and challenging to construct and operate compared to SSKs, and also very capital intensive."

Balance of Terror as Deterrence:

Let's hope that nuclear deterrence works and the world never again sees the use of the growing stockpile of nukes in South Asia, the Middle East or anywhere else. Here's the full video of a recent interview with Pakistan's General Khalid Kidawi on Pakistan 2nd strike capability:

https://youtu.be/CNZCw0BXKyE





I think senior American analyst and South Asia watcher Stephen Cohen summed up the current situation in South Asia when he said: "The alphabet agencies—ISI, RAW, and so forth—are often the chosen instrument of state policy when there is a conventional (and now a nuclear) balance of power, and the diplomatic route seems barren."

I see little likelihood of full-scale war between India and Pakistan. The best way for the two nuclear armed neighbors to proceed is sustained diplomatic engagement to resolve all outstanding issues including Kashmir. If the diplomatic route remains barren, there will be continuation of covert and proxy wars in the region.

Related Links:

Haq's Musings

Pakistan's Second Strike Capability

Pakistan's Shaheen 3 Can Hit Deep Inside India and Israel

Pakistan Building Nuclear Submarine?

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Comment by Riaz Haq on January 13, 2017 at 5:23pm

Pakistan Closer To Nuclear Second-Strike Capability After Sub Missile Test

http://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/6959/pakistan-closer-to-nuclea...


Second strike capability means that even if a full-on surprise nuclear barrage were to knock out a country’s nuclear weapons capability, that country still has the ability to make their attacker pay dearly via a retaliatory nuclear attack. It is considered the pinnacle of nuclear deterrent strategies. 

Pakistan’s Babur-3 submarine-launched cruise missile (SLCM) that was tested just weeks ago in the Indian Ocean is an evolution of the land-based Babur-2. The Babur series of cruise missiles were developed partially via reverse engineering US Navy BGM-109 Tomahawk cruise missiles that crashed in Pakistan in 1998. The first and second land-based versions offered just another layer of attack capability for the Pakistani military, but the submarine-launched Babur-3’s strategic significance is far greater. 

Pakistani military officials claim that the sea-skimming Babur-3 has a 280 miles range and is highly accurate. The missile will likely end up on Pakistan’s three French-designed Agosta 90B class—locally known as the Khalid class—diesel-electric submarines. 

These 2,000 ton displacement submarines are quite advanced and are built for open-ocean missions. They can stay submerged for multiple days at a time via their MESMA air independent propulsion (AIP) system. Normal weaponry for the type includes SM39 Exocet anti-ship missiles and 533mm torpedoes. 

With the Babur 3’s supposed range of just under 300 miles, and with just three submarines assigned to the task of deploying them (eventually), Pakistan’s fledgling ability to deliver a second strike on an enemy state is quite limited, but it may still be credible. It remains unclear if Pakistan will keep one boat at sea at all times or if they will train to surge-deploy at a moment's notice. Other operational questions remain as well, including what type of command and control interface will be used to authorize a submarine originated nuclear strike.

A second strike deterrent is largely achieved by deploying nuclear submarines loaded with nuclear-warhead laden submarine-launched ballistic missiles, but the use of nuclear-tipped cruise missiles aboard small diesel-electric submarines as a “poor man’s” second strike capability is not new. Israel has put the concept to use, leveraging their increasingly capable Dolphin class diesel-electric submarines loaded with nuclear-tipped Popeye Turbo cruise missiles. Other countries may be looking at deploying similar concepts in the future. 

Although still a far cry from India’s 6,000 ton displacement Arihant class nuclear ballistic missile submarines (one is service and three others planned) and the short-range K-15 or medium-range K-4 ballistic missiles they carry, Pakistan’s nuclear armed Agosta class boats at least get the country in the second strike game, but in a very minimal way.

The Indian Navy’s anti-submarine capability is credible, and their submarine fleet includes multiple diesel-electric submarines of different origin, as wells a Russian Akula II class nuclear fast attack boat. So keeping an eye on Pakistan’s tiny Agosta 90B fleet will be possible, although it is not clear what level of confidence the Indian Navy has that they can always keep the boats in their own submarines’ crosshairs. Not just that, but even attempting to do so will tie up valuable assets that could better be assigned to deterring other regional nuclear powers, like China.

Comment by Riaz Haq on January 24, 2017 at 8:51am

#Pakistan successfully tests #Ababeel, 2200 Km range #nuclear-capable #missile that can deliver multiple war heads

http://www.dawn.com/news/1310452

Pakistan on Tuesday conducted a successful test flight of the Ababeel surface-to-surface ballistic missile (SSM), the Inter Services Public Relations (ISPR) said in a statement.

Ababeel has a maximum range of 2,200 kilometres and is capable of delivering multiple warheads using Multiple Independent Re-entry Vehicle (MIRV) technology, an ISPR press release added.

"The test flight was aimed at validating various design and technical parameters of the weapon system," it said.

Ababeel is capable of carrying nuclear warheads and has the capability to engage multiple targets with high precision, defeating hostile radars, the ISPR elaborated.

"The development of the Ababeel weapon system was aimed at ensuring survivability of Pakistan's ballistic missiles in the growing regional Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) environment," read the press release.

The Ababeel test came on the heels of a successful test of submarine-launched cruise missile Babur-III earlier this month.

"The successful attainment of a second strike capability by Pakistan represents a major scientific milestone; it is manifestation of the strategy of measured response to nuclear strategies and postures being adopted in Pakistan’s neighborhood," the military had said after the Babur-III test.

The missile, launched from an undisclosed location in the Indian Ocean from an underwater, mobile platform, had hit its target with precise accuracy, the Army had said.

Babur-III is a sea-based variant of ground-launched cruise missile Babur-II, which was successfully tested in December last year.

Comment by Riaz Haq on January 31, 2017 at 7:39am

#Pakistan steps up #missile tests to counter #India #defence push https://www.ft.com/content/a66fdc8c-e6b1-11e6-893c-082c54a7f539 … via @FT

Pakistan is ramping up nuclear missile tests in response to India’s drive to modernise its armed forces, increasing already heightened tensions between the two countries, military and political analysts warn.

Islamabad last week conducted its first flight test of the surface-to-surface Ababeel missile, which has a range of 2,200km and which officials and analysts say marks a significant step forward in the country’s ability to target locations in India. The move followed Pakistan’s first ballistic missile launch from a submarine earlier this month.

“Taken together, these tests prove Pakistan’s ability to go for an outright war if war is imposed on us,” a senior Pakistani foreign ministry official told the Financial Times.

Relations between the two nuclear-armed neighbours have been tense ever since the partition that followed independence from Britain in 1947. They have fought three major wars, largely for control of the disputed state of Kashmir.


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“If Pakistan has a ‘second-strike’ capability, it could make it more assertive and potentially more willing to launch a first attack against India,” said Rahul Roy-Chaudhury, senior fellow for South Asia at the International institute for Strategic Studies.

Pakistani officials last week warned they were ready to use nuclear weapons against India in the event of an invasion by its neighbour. This followed an admission by Bipin Rawat, head of the Indian army, that the country had a plan to send troops across the border if it suffered a terror attack believed to originate in Pakistan.

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Tariq Rauf, head of the disarmament programme at the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, said Pakistan’s response was a reaction to the build-up of India’s conventional military forces.

“If you look at deployment of India’s forces which can seize and hold territory, 75 per cent of the forces are within reach of the border [with Pakistan],” he said.

Ikram Sehgal, a prominent Pakistani commentator on defence and security affairs, said: “Pakistan cannot match India’s planned spending on conventional arms. The route that Pakistan is taking is to build up its strategic forces for a credible response if the Indians ever cross over [into Pakistan].”

After its submarine-based missile test, Islamabad said: “The successful attainment of a second-strike capability by Pakistan represents a major scientific milestone. It is manifestation of the strategy of measured response to nuclear strategies and postures being adopted in Pakistan’s neighbourhood.”

An official described the Ababeel missile — the first in Pakistan’s arsenal able to launch multiple warheads at different targets — “the successful completion of our deterrence”.

While most experts believe the threat of nuclear war between the two neighbours remains low, some warn about the risks of an accident caused by trigger-happy military leaders. 

“Unlike the old days when the Soviet Union and the United States did not share a common border, India and Pakistan share a land border,” said one senior western diplomat with responsibility for monitoring the two militaries. “The risk of one side accidentally going to war is higher.”

Comment by Riaz Haq on February 22, 2017 at 10:31pm

SharpEye #radar for #Pakistan #submarines - News - Shephard https://www.shephardmedia.com/news/digital-battlespace/pakistans-ag...

Kelvin Hughes will supply the I-band SharpEye Doppler submarine radar system as part of a mid-life upgrade programme for the Pakistan Navy's Agosta 90B class submarines. The company announced the contract on 21 February.

Kelvin Hughes will work with lead contractor STM on the programme, with the first system set for delivery in 2018.

Traditionally, submarines only tend to use radar for navigation when entering or leaving port, because high-power RF transmissions can compromise their ability to remain undetected when used in more open waters. However, with its low power, pulse Doppler transmission technology, SharpEye can provide a reduced probability of intercept which significantly lowers the risk of the submarine being detected but without compromising the target detection performance of the radar.

The SharpEye transceiver can be located within the pressure hull, making use of the existing bulkhead infrastructure, antenna rotational drive and waveguide connections.

The radar uses Doppler processing to detect targets at long range, including small, low radar cross section targets in adverse weather conditions. A series of electronic filters enables the radar to distinguish between targets of interest and unwanted sea and rain clutter.

Barry Jones, regional sales manager for Kelvin Hughes, said: 'We are delighted that the Pakistan Navy, a respected and long-standing customer of Kelvin Hughes, has chosen to take advantage of the performance and reliability benefits that our innovative SharpEye radar technology can now bring to submarine platforms. We're looking forward to working with our project partner STM to jointly deliver SharpEye capability to the Navy and [Agosta 90B] class submarines.'

Comment by Riaz Haq on March 22, 2017 at 10:20am

MIT's Vipin Narang: #India prepared to use #nuclear weapons against #Pakistan first. #NFU #nukes

http://www.business-standard.com/article/current-affairs/speculatio...

A day after Business Standard reported a new approach in New Delhi strategic circles to India’s use of nuclear weapons (Click here to read the article), the influential Washington D.C. think tank, Carnegie Endowment, discussed the same issue --- the possibility of an Indian “first strike” to defang Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal.

At the Carnegie International Nuclear Policy Conference on Monday, a prestigious annual event at which important strategic policy chances are often signalled, a discussion took place on whether India was moving away from massive counter-value retaliation (i.e. nuking towns and cities) to counter-force targeting (i.e. nuking enemy nuclear forces and command structures).




Massachusetts Institute of Technology professor, Vipin Narang, outlined a scenario in which a Pakistan-backed terrorist strike on India killed scores of civilians. New Delhi mobilised its three strike corps and attacked Pakistan. With the armour-heavy 21 Corps bludgeoning along, Pakistan ordered a “demonstration” strike with tactical nuclear weapons (TNWs) --- its short-range Nasr missile batteries --- as a nuclear warning to India. New Delhi’s response, according to traditional Indian nuclear doctrine would then be “massive counter-value retaliation against Pakistani cities, leaving aside how credible or incredible that might be.”

But then Narang sprung the surprise. “There is increasing evidence that India will not allow Pakistan to go first. And that India’s opening salvo may not be conventional strikes trying to pick off just Nasr batteries in the theatre, but a full ‘comprehensive counterforce strike’ that attempts to completely disarm Pakistan of its nuclear weapons so that India does not have to engage in… tit-for-tat exchanges and expose its own cities to nuclear destruction.”

Narang pointed out that this dramatic change did not surface from “fringe voices”, but from former national security advisor Shivshankar Menon in his new book; and former chief of India’s strategic forces command, Lieutenant General B S Nagal, both of whom have questioned India’s traditional “massive counter-value retaliation”.

Narang pointed to a possible “decoupling” of Indian nuclear strategy vis-a-vis China and Pakistan. While retaining NFU and massive counter-value retaliation against China, New Delhi was considering a disarming counter-force strike against Pakistan.

Also in question was India’s longstanding “no first use” (NFU) policy, with Narang pointing out that it had been questioned at least four times already. First, India’s official nuclear doctrine, published in 2003, officially eroded the sanctity of NFU by invoking nuclear use against chemical or biological weapons. Second, in November, former defence minister Manohar Parrikar stated (later clarified to be in his personal capacity): “India should not declare whether it has a NFU policy”. Third, General Nagal, in his writings questioned the morality of NFU, asking whether it was possible for India’s leadership to accept huge casualties by restraining its hand well knowing that Pakistan was about to use nuclear weapons.

Fourth, Menon undermines NFU’s sanctity with this paragraph in his book: “There is a potential grey area as to when India would use nuclear weapons first against another NWS (nuclear weapons state). Circumstances are conceivable in which India might find it useful to strike first, for instance, against an NWS that had declared it would certainly use its weapons, and if India were certain that adversary’s launch was imminent.”

Said Narang at Carnegie: “Indian leaders can disavow all of this as personal opinions, but when a sitting defence minister, former Strategic Forces commander, and highly respected NSA all question the sanctity of NFU, it all starts to add up.”

Comment by Riaz Haq on March 31, 2017 at 8:21am


#India, Long at Odds With #Pakistan, May Use #Nuclear First Strikes Against Neighbor

https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/31/world/asia/india-long-at-odds-wi...


India may be reinterpreting its nuclear weapons doctrine, circumstantial evidence suggests, with potentially significant ramifications for the already tenuous nuclear balance in South Asia.

New assessments suggest that India is considering allowing for pre-emptive nuclear strikes against Pakistan’s arsenal in the event of a war. This would not formally change India’s nuclear doctrine, which bars it from launching a first strike, but would loosen its interpretation to deem pre-emptive strikes as defensive.

It would also change India’s likely targets, in the event of a war, to make a nuclear exchange more winnable and, therefore, more thinkable.

Analysts’ assessments, based on recent statements by senior Indian officials, are necessarily speculative. States with nuclear weapons often leave ambiguity in their doctrines to prevent adversaries from exploiting gaps in their proscriptions and to preserve flexibility. But signs of a strategic adjustment in India are mounting.

This comes against a backdrop of long-simmering tensions between India and Pakistan — including over state-sponsored terrorism and the disputed territory of Jammu and Kashmir — which have already led to several wars, the most recent in 1999.

The new interpretation would be a significant shift in India’s posture that could have far-reaching implications in the region, even if war never comes. Pakistan could feel compelled to expand its arsenal to better survive a pre-emptive strike, in turn setting off an Indian buildup.

This would be more than an arms race, said Vipin Narang, a Massachusetts Institute of Technology professor who studies nuclear powers.

“It’s very scary because all the ‘first-strike instability’ stuff is real,” Mr. Narang said, referring to a dynamic in which two nuclear adversaries both perceive a strong incentive to use their warheads first in a war. This is thought to make nuclear conflict more likely.

Hidden in Plain Sight

Hints of a high-level Indian debate over the nuclear doctrine mounted with a recent memoir by Shivshankar Menon, India’s national security adviser from 2011 to 2014.

“There is a potential gray area as to when India would use nuclear weapons first” against a nuclear-armed adversary, Mr. Menon wrote.

India, he added, “might find it useful to strike first” against an adversary that appeared poised to launch or that “had declared it would certainly use its weapons” — most likely a veiled reference to Pakistan.

Mr. Narang presented the quotations, along with his interpretation, in Washington last week, during a major nuclear policy conference hosted by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

“There is increasing evidence that India will not allow Pakistan to go first,” he told a gathering of international government officials and policy experts.

Mr. Menon’s book, he said, “clearly carves out an exception for pre-emptive Indian first use in the very scenario that is most likely to occur in South Asia.”

The passage alone does not prove a policy shift. But in context alongside other developments, it suggests either that India has quietly widened its strategic options or that officials are hoping to stir up just enough ambiguity to deter its adversaries.

After Mr. Narang’s presentation generated attention in the South Asian news media, Mr. Menon told an Indian columnist, “India’s nuclear doctrine has far greater flexibility than it gets credit for.”

Mr. Menon declined an interview request for this article. When told what the article would say, he did not challenge its assertions. India’s Foreign Ministry did not respond to a request for comment.

Whether these signals indicate a real shift or a strategic feint, analysts believe they are intended to right a strategic imbalance that has been growing for almost a decade.

Comment by Riaz Haq on March 31, 2017 at 8:35am

#India, Long at Odds With #Pakistan, May Use #Nuclear First Strikes Against Neighbor

https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/31/world/asia/india-long-at-odds-wi...

Use It or Lose It

Shashank Joshi, a fellow at the Royal United Services Institute, said he suspected that Mr. Menon was signaling something subtler: a warning that India’s strategy could adapt in wartime, potentially to include first strikes.

That distinction may be important to Indian officials, but it could be lost on Pakistani war planners who have to consider all scenarios.

Mr. Joshi, in a policy brief for the Lowy Institute, an Australian think tank, tried to project what would happen if India embraced such a policy, or if Pakistan concluded that it had.

First would come the arms race.

The fear of a first strike, Mr. Joshi wrote, “incentivizes Pakistan to undertake a massive nuclear buildup, in order to dispel any possibility of India disarming it entirely.”

India, whatever its strategy, would feel compelled to keep pace.

Second comes the tightening of nuclear tripwires, Mr. Joshi warned, as “this reciprocal fear of first use could pull each side in the direction of placing nuclear forces on hair-trigger alert.”

Finally, in any major armed crisis, the logic of a first strike would pull both sides toward nuclear escalation.

“If Pakistan thinks India will move quickly, Pakistan has an incentive to go even quicker, and to escalate straight to the use of the longer-range weapons,” Mr. Joshi wrote.

This thinking would apply to India as well, creating a situation in which the nuclear arsenal becomes, as analysts dryly put it, “use it or lose it.”

‘That Can Blow Back Real Quick’

The most optimistic scenario would lock South Asia in a state of mutually assured destruction, like that of the Cold War, in which armed conflict would so reliably escalate to nuclear devastation that both sides would deem war unthinkable.

This would be of global concern. A 2008 study found that, although India and Pakistan have relatively small arsenals, a full nuclear exchange would push a layer of hot, black smoke into the atmosphere.

This would produce what some researchers call without hyperbole “a decade without summer.” As crops failed worldwide, the resulting global famine would kill a billion people, the study estimated.

But nuclear analysts worry that South Asia’s dynamics would make any state of mutually assured destruction less stable than that of the Cold War.


For one thing, Pakistani leaders view even conventional war with India as an existential threat, making them more willing to accept nuclear risks. For another, a large-scale terrorist attack in India could be perceived, rightly or wrongly, as Pakistan-sponsored, potentially inciting war. The disputed territory of Jammu and Kashmir, where conflict sometimes boils over, adds a troubling layer of volatility.

“Maybe it is this Reaganesque strategy,” Mr. Narang said, comparing India’s potential strategic shift to President Ronald Reagan’s arms race with the Soviet Union. “But Pakistan has a much bigger security problem than the Soviet Union did. And that can blow back real quick.”

Comment by Riaz Haq on October 13, 2017 at 7:46am

The Risks of Pakistan's Sea-Based Nuclear Weapons
The Babur-3 opens a dangerous era for Pakistan’s nuclear forces.


By Ankit Panda
October 13, 2017

https://thediplomat.com/2017/10/the-risks-of-pakistans-sea-based-nu...

Nine days into 2017, Pakistan carried out the first-ever flight test of the Babur-3, it’s new nuclear-capable submarine-launched cruise missile (SLCM). A variant of the Babur-3 ground-launched cruise missile (GLCM), this SLCM will see Pakistan’s nuclear deterrent head to sea—probably initially aboard its Agosta 90B and Agosta 70 submarines, but eventually, perhaps even on board new Type 041 Yuan-class submarines Pakistan is expected to procure from China.

In a new article in the Fall 2017 issue of the Washington Quarterly, Christopher Clary and I examine some of the novel security challenges Pakistan may experience with its sea-based deterrent. It is already well known that Pakistan has outpaced it’s primary rival, India, in terms of its nuclear stockpile growth.

On land, low-yield systems, like the Nasr, have also raised concerns of a lower nuclear-use threshold in South Asia. The move to sea can have some positive effects on overall strategic stability; indeed, the perceived survivability of a sea-based deterrent can abate so-called “use-it-or-lose-it” pressures for Pakistan’s land-based forces. But the story doesn’t stop there.

Sea-based weapons can aggravate crisis stability concerns in the India-Pakistan dyad and present unique command-and-control challenges for Pakistan, which may be required to place these weapons at a higher level of readiness during peacetime. Finally, Pakistan’s internal security environment will remain a concern with a submarine-based deterrent. The threat of theft and sabotage may be greater in the case of Pakistan’s sea-based weapons than it is for its land-based forces. In aggregate, we argue that the sea-based deterrent may, on balance, prove detrimental to Pakistan’s security.

Pakistan, like other nuclear states, employs a range of physical and procedural safeguards to ensure that its nuclear weapons are only used in a crisis and a with a valid order from the country’s National Command Authority (NCA). The introduction of a nuclear-capable SLCM aboard its Agosta submarines would necessitate the erosion of some of these safeguards.

For instance, some physical safeguards that Pakistan is known to use for its land-based weapons — including partially dissembled storage, separation of triggers and pits, and de-mated storage — would be impractical at sea. Meanwhile, the experience of other nuclear states, like the United Kingdom, with sea-based deterrents suggests that sea-based nuclear weapons generally see fewer use impediments. Pakistan has long asserted that its nuclear command-and-control is highly centralized, but it remains doubtful that this would remain true for its small nuclear-capable submarine force in wartime or a crisis. The temptation to pre-delegate use authorization may be too great.

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Similarly, Indian forces, unable to discriminate whether a detected Pakistani submarine in a crisis was fielding nuclear or conventional capabilities, would have to presume nuclear capability should the Babur-3 see deployment. All of this in turn not only would make Pakistan’s submarine force a prime early-crisis target for Indian forces, but also aggravate use-or-lose pressures for land-based forces.

Ultimately, even if India resisted attacking Pakistani submarines to avoid unintended escalatory pressures, it would at least see value in targeting the Very Low Frequency (VLF) radar facility established at Karachi in November 2016 that would allow Pakistan’s NCA to communicate with its at-sea deterrent in a crisis. This would require some confidence in New Delhi that Pakistan had not pre-delegated use authorization and that Islamabad’s sea-based weapons would still require the transmission of a use-authorization code from the NCA.

Comment by Riaz Haq on November 26, 2017 at 7:41pm

Kelvin Hughes to supply SharpEye #Submarine #radar systems to #Pakistan #Navy

http://www.naval-technology.com/news/kelvin-hughes-supply-sharpeye-...

The Pakistan Navy has placed a follow-on order to Kelvin Hughes for the delivery of a second SharpEye Doppler submarine radar system.

Kelvin Hughes is set to supply its second set of radar systems for the navy’s newest Agosta 90B-class, or Khalid-class, diesel electric attack submarine under the latest deal.

The new radars will be installed on-board the Pakistan Navy submarines as part of its mid-life upgrade programme, which is currently being carried out at the Karachi Pakistan Naval Shipyard.

The original contract was awarded to Kelvin Hughes in February this year and saw the company deliver the I-Band SharpEye Doppler submarine radar system for the navy’s first Agosta 90B-class vessel.

Kelvin Hughes is expected to work in collaboration with the modernisation programme’s main contractor, Turkish defence company STM, in support of the initiative.

Kelvin Hughes regional sales manager Barry Jones said: “We have a long standing relationship with the Pakistan Navy and STM and I am very pleased to be working with STM to supply the state-of-the-art SharpEye radar system to the Khalid-class submarines.”

The SharpEye radar solution for the first ship is slated to be supplied to the navy next year, while the newly ordered system for the second vessel is scheduled for delivery in 2019.

SharpEye I-Band (X-Band) radar transceivers feature a downmast transceiver system installed in an enclosure located within the pressure hull.

This configuration provides submarines with a high-performance solid state radar with similar capabilities to SharpEye radars deployed on naval surface ships, both in-service as a retrofit and for installation on-board new classes.

The downmast submarine radar solution makes use of the existing bulkhead infrastructure in the pressure hull, thereby eliminating the need to replace the antenna mast system by utilising the existing external antenna, rotational drive and waveguide connections.

Comment by Riaz Haq on January 9, 2018 at 8:27am

India's Lone Arihant-class SSBN Has Been out of Service for Months
The Indian Navy has a serious submarine operations problem.

https://thediplomat.com/2018/01/indias-lone-arihant-class-ssbn-has-...

We need to talk about the Indian Navy’s handling of its submarines. A report published this week in The Hindu reveals an astonishing fact: India’s sole operational indigenous nuclear-propulsion ballistic missile submarine (SSBN), INS Arihant, has suffered major damage and has been out of commission for more than nine months, during which time it has not left port. (Arihant is the lead ship of the Arihant-class of Indian SSBNs; the Indian Navy recently began outfitting the second ship of the class, INS Arighat.)

The cause of the damage, according to one source who spoke to The Hindu, was that “water rushed in because a hatch on the rear side was left open by mistake.” Human error, it seems, has done massive damage to the third leg of India’s burgeoning nuclear triad, leaving the Arihant, the result of a top secret $2.9 billion project, dead in the water for now.

For those readers who follow Indian defense affairs, the Arihant‘s fate might not seem all that surprising. The Indian Navy has not demonstrated a particularly good record in recent years in managing its conventional and nuclear-powered submarine forces.


On one hand, there are the human tragedies, like the August 2013 sinking of INS Sindhurakshak after the Kilo-class submarine suffered a major explosion while berthed in Mumbai. Eighteen sailors died in the incident, which was caused by human error, a navy investigation later found.

Less dramatic, but nearly as serious, incidents have occurred since then. In February 2014, INS Sindhuratna, an Indian Kilo-class submarine, saw a fire break out on board, leading to the death of two sailors by suffocation. While that incident was not found to have been caused by human error, it was likely due to poor maintenance and upkeep of the vessel. (India’s then-chief of naval staff, Admiral D.K. Joshi, resigned following the Sindhurakshak and Sindhuratna incidents, taking responsibility for both accidents.)

Meanwhile, more recently, India’s leased nuclear attack submarine (SSN) INS Chakra, a Russian Akula II-class, saw its sonar domes damaged late last year. Taken together with the incidents involving the two Kilo-class vessels and the Arihant now, it’s hard not to come to the conclusion that the Indian Navy’s submarine operations and maintenance could be greatly improved. Even aside from submarines, since 2010, the Indian Navy has seen a series of accidents and malfunctions across its surface warfare fleet as well.

As an aside, The Hindu‘s reporting on the Arihant‘s circumstances includes an astonishing tidbit that’s darkly illustrative of a troubling divide between the country’s political leadership and the armed forces insofar as nuclear assets are concerned. Consider this:

The absence of Arihant from operations came to the political leadership’s attention during the India-China military stand-off at Doklam. Whenever such a stand-off takes place, countries carry out precautionary advance deployment of submarine assets.

Setting aside the fascinating detail that the Doklam standoff with China in 2017 rose to the level that it merited higher SSBN readiness, it’s disturbing that India’s political leaders would learn about one leg of the country’s nuclear triad being out of commission only after they requested a precautionary advance deployment.

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