World military expenditure passes $2 trillion for first time

https://sipri.org/media/press-release/2022/world-military-expenditu...


Total global military expenditure increased by 0.7 per cent in real terms in 2021, to reach $2113 billion. The five largest spenders in 2021 were the United States, China, India, the United Kingdom and Russia, together accounting for 62 per cent of expenditure, according to new data on global military spending published today by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI).

Military expenditure reaches record level in the second year of the pandemic
World military spending continued to grow in 2021, reaching an all-time high of $2.1 trillion. This was the seventh consecutive year that spending increased.

‘Even amid the economic fallout of the Covid-19 pandemic, world military spending hit record levels,’ said Dr Diego Lopes da Silva, Senior Researcher with SIPRI’s Military Expenditure and Arms Production Programme. ‘There was a slowdown in the rate of real-terms growth due to inflation. In nominal terms, however, military spending grew by 6.1 per cent.’

As a result of a sharp economic recovery in 2021, the global military burden—world military expenditure as a share of world gross domestic product (GDP)—fell by 0.1 percentage points, from 2.3 per cent in 2020 to 2.2 per cent in 2021.

United States focuses on military research and development
US military spending amounted to $801 billion in 2021, a drop of 1.4 per cent from 2020. The US military burden decreased slightly from 3.7 per cent of GDP in 2020 to 3.5 per cent in 2021.

US funding for military research and development (R&D) rose by 24 per cent between 2012 and 2021, while arms procurement funding fell by 6.4 per cent over the same period. In 2021 spending on both decreased. However, the drop in R&D spending (–1.2 per cent) was smaller than that in arms procurement spending (–5.4 per cent).

‘The increase in R&D spending over the decade 2012–21 suggests that the United States is focusing more on next-generation technologies,’ said Alexandra Marksteiner, Researcher with SIPRI’s Military Expenditure and Arms Production Programme. ‘The US Government has repeatedly stressed the need to preserve the US military’s technological edge over strategic competitors.’

Russia increases military budget in run-up to war
Russia increased its military expenditure by 2.9 per cent in 2021, to $65.9 billion, at a time when it was building up its forces along the Ukrainian border. This was the third consecutive year of growth and Russia’s military spending reached 4.1 per cent of GDP in 2021.

‘High oil and gas revenues helped Russia to boost its military spending in 2021. Russian military expenditure had been in decline between 2016 and 2019 as a result of low energy prices combined with sanctions in response to Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014,’ said Lucie Béraud-Sudreau, Director of SIPRI’s Military Expenditure and Arms Production Programme.

The ‘national defence’ budget line, which accounts for around three-quarters of Russia’s total military spending and includes funding for operational costs as well as arms procurement, was revised upwards over the course of the year. The final figure was $48.4 billion, 14 per cent higher than had been budgeted at the end of 2020.

As it has strengthened its defences against Russia, Ukraine’s military spending has risen by 72 per cent since the annexation of Crimea in 2014. Spending fell in 2021, to $5.9 billion, but still accounted for 3.2 per cent of the country’s GDP.

Continued increases by major spenders in Asia and Oceania
China, the world’s second largest spender, allocated an estimated $293 billion to its military in 2021, an increase of 4.7 per cent compared with 2020. China’s military spending has grown for 27 consecutive years. The 2021 Chinese budget was the first under the 14th Five-Year Plan, which runs until 2025.

#Russia Can’t Depend on #India Either. #NewDelhi may be frustratingly tolerant of #Putin, but it isn’t likely to help him substantively in #UkraineWar. #Modi @dhume https://www.wsj.com/articles/putin-cant-depend-on-india-either-russ... via @WSJOpinion

Russian oil makes up a small fraction of Indian oil imports—only around 2% in 2021. Despite its recent purchases, India isn’t among the top 10 importers of Russian energy. As Foreign Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar pointed out last month, this is unlikely to change. Most of Indian energy comes from Gulf nations that are friendly to America. As of 2020, its top three oil suppliers were Iraq, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, while its top gas suppliers were Qatar and the U.S. With access to reliable energy supplies from the Gulf, Indian refiners don’t need to turn to faraway Russia.

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India’s reliance on Russian arms has been declining—down from 69% of Indian arms purchases in 2012-16 to 46% in 2017-21. Western sanctions on Russia could accelerate this decline by undermining Russia’s ability to maintain a sophisticated defense-industrial base. Russia’s battlefield losses may also force its arms producers to focus on replenishing its own stocks over expanding exports. And though Moscow has been a reliable strategic partner to New Delhi in the past, its growing closeness to Beijing makes it less dependable. Mr. Tellis predicts a continued “gentle decline” in Indian arms imports from Russia, at least compared with India’s imports from other nations such as the U.S., Israel and France.

India Arming Its Russian Choppers With Israeli Anti-Tank Missiles

https://www.thedefensepost.com/2022/04/26/india-choppers-anti-tank-...


India is arming its fleet of Russian-origin Mi-17V5 helicopters with Israeli Spike anti-tank guided missiles, Asia News International hasreported.

A limited number of Rafael Spike NLOS (Non-Line-of-Sight) missiles have been ordered, while a larger quantity of the munition will be locally manufactured, the news outlet added, citing sources.

The deployment of tanks and infantry combat vehicles by the People’s Liberation Army along the mountainous Line of Actual Control during a faceoff with the Indian Army two years ago prompted the Indian Air Force to purchase the weapon.

The missile can target armored vehicles, mobile air defenses, and command and control posts.

“Drones do the talking in Pakistan’s anti-#terror offensive”. #Pakistan has launched a #drone campaign in #Afghanistan against the #TTP– the Pakistani #Taliban, after the #Afghan Taliban’s failure to crack down on the TTP on Afghan soil https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/drones-do-talking-pak..., via @LowyInstitute


On 16 April, two days after eight Pakistani soldiers were killed in a terrorist attack on a military convoy near the Pakistan-Afghanistan border in North Waziristan District, Pakistan military drones targeted TTP hideouts in the Khost and Kunar provinces of Afghanistan. Pakistani officials claimed that the TTP suffered huge losses after its bases near the Afghan border were hit by the strikes.

Pakistan’s attack was in retaliation for the spike in cross-border terrorist attacks that followed an announcement by the TTP on 30 March of a spring offensive during the Muslim holy month of Ramadan. The TTP still has between 3,000 and 5,000 fighters in Afghanistan according to a recent report by UN monitors.

Contrary to Islamabad’s optimism, Pakistan has witnessed an exponential rise in attacks on the country’s security forces since the Taliban took control of Afghanistan in August. It appears that Taliban rule has actually emboldened and strengthened the TTP. The withdrawal of US troops from Afghanistan last year, which significantly reduced US air strikes in the region, also allowed the TTP to operate with increased impunity.

The Taliban has done little to counter the TTP, besides facilitating talks last October between Pakistan and the banned group, and suggesting that Islamabad declare amnesty for the TTP. The October talks failed after the TTP declared an end to a month-long ceasefire with Pakistan in December.

Although Pakistan has repeatedly pressed the Taliban to crack down on the TTP, it’s likely that the Taliban’s reticence is driven by a fear of pushing the group towards Islamic State Khorasan (IS-K). The IS-K is already involved in terrorist activity in the strife-torn country and its actions threaten to destabilise the Taliban government.

Islamabad has conveyed to Kabul that the Afghan government could use a crackdown on the TTP as a test case to address not only Pakistan’s concerns but also establish Afghanistan’s credentials internationally with regards to dealing with terrorist outfits. Use of Afghan territory by the TTP to launch attacks on Pakistan contradicts the Taliban’s commitment made under the 2020 Doha accord with the United States and the international community that Afghanistan would not become a launchpad for attacks by al-Qaeda or other outfits against a third country.

Disappointed by the Taliban, Islamabad ultimately resorted to the much criticised drone attacks, previously used by US forces against Islamic extremists in the so-called Af-Pak region. Pakistan developed its own military drone and used it successfully for the first time in September 2015 in a counterterrorism operation against Pakistan Taliban in its northwestern tribal area along the Afghanistan border.

Pakistan’s most recent drone attack escalated the Pakistan-Taliban tensions that had been on the rise since last August when the Taliban militarily conquered Kabul. In December, Taliban fighters, in a provocative move, uprooted the metal fence erected by the Pakistan military to check infiltration of TTP militants along the border. The Taliban strongly oppose what they call the “illegal” fence, but are unwilling to take the action necessary to keep the group from using Afghan soil for attacks on Pakistan.

8 years back, Modi promised to transform India’s military. Today, the plan is in disarray
A large number of standalone military reforms have been conceptualised but for inexplicable reasons have not been executed.

https://theprint.in/opinion/8-years-back-modi-promised-to-transform...

Even the worst critics of the Bharatiya Janata Party’s ideology acknowledge that it was committed to national security and a strong military befitting an emerging power. It was expected that the BJP would give utmost priority to national security and transform the armed forces for conflicts of the 21st century. Prime Minister Narendra Modi had absolute clarity on this issue when he addressed the Combined Commanders Conference on 15 December 2015 — “Modernisation and expansion of forces at the same time is a difficult and unnecessary goal. We need forces that are agile, mobile and driven by technology, not just human valour. We need capabilities to win swift wars, for we will not have the luxury of long drawn battles.”

Eight years down the line, the transformation process Modi directed to be implemented, is in disarray. There has been much rhetoric from the political and military hierarchy and the media, based on “reliable sources”, dutifully gave out details of numerous standalone reforms in the offing. However, despite the appointment of the Chief of Defence Staff on 31 December 2019, none of the major reforms except a policy with respect to atmanirbharta or self-reliance in defence equipment, which is yet to bear fruit, have fructified.

The political leadership has neither “owned” the transformation by giving clear strategic directions and laying down the process with timelines, nor shown the drive to supervise the execution. Consequently, a “bottom up approach” from a statusquoist military known for inter-Service squabbles was adopted. Non-appointment of a CDS — who could have at least continued to coordinate this flawed approach — for five months, only proves the point.

Own the transformation and correct the process
Historically, transformation of the military is politically driven. The government must carry out a long-term strategic review to evolve ‘National Security Perspective 2050’. From this must emerge a progressive National Security Strategy reviewed periodically and matched with the forecast of the GDP. This is the responsibility of the government and not the military and has been pending with the National Security Advisor since 2018.

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Make a fresh start
Let there be no doubt that, so far, no tangible major reforms have taken place towards transformation of the armed forces. Indeed, a large number of standalone reforms have been conceptualised but for inexplicable reasons have not been executed. The government failed to own the transformation by not formalising a National Security Strategy, issuing formal directions to the armed forces and supervising/coordinating the execution by setting up an empowered committee under the defence minister.

The armed forces too failed to rise to the occasion. They should have seized the opportunity opened by cryptic directions of the Prime Minister given during the Combined Commanders Conferences and systematically reformed from within. More so, when the draft for the Prime Minister’s speech is forwarded to the Prime Minister’s Office by the Chiefs of Staff Committee.

The government and the military must get back to the drawing board and make a fresh start.

Lt Gen H S Panag PVSM, AVSM (R) served in the Indian Army for 40 years. He was GOC in C Northern Command and Central Command. Post retirement, he was Member of Armed Forces Tribunal. Views are personal.

Pakistan's ‘Harba’ Missile - How Is Indian Navy Preparing To Defend Itself From Moskva-Like Incident

https://eurasiantimes.com/pakistans-harba-missile-how-is-indian-nav...

Pakistan’s ‘Harba’ Missile – How Is Indian Navy Preparing To Defend Itself From Moskva-Like Incidents?
By
Haider Abbas
May 1, 2022
Alarm bells rang out through India’s defense establishment on April 14, 2022, as the Russian warship Moskva was sunk by Ukrainian Neptune missiles.

In the name of national security, India needed to immediately probe and uncover how one of the world’s mightiest naval forces could lose such a prestigious warship? More so, at the hands of a so-called “underdog” like Ukraine. Furthermore, could India face a similar strategic threat from its own “underdog” neighbor Pakistan?

Soaring High! India’s LCA Tejas To Undergo Critical Testing While Delhi Eyes ‘Debut Deal’ With Malaysia
This was a debacle for Russia, one that India needs to urgently focus on to dissect and learn from. Large portions of India’s arms and weaponry bear the “made-in-Russia” seal.

Russia has been India’s largest supplier of arms and experts in New Delhi would be keenly watching the performance of Russian military hardware in the Ukrainian conflict.

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Pak's Harba missile: How India is preparing to prevent Moskva like incident
Published on May 06, 2022 07:26 PM IST
Since sinking of Russian flagship cruiser- Moskva, after being hit by a Ukrainian missile. India has been keeping a close watch on Pakistan navy’s anti-ship missile - Harba. In March 2022, Pakistan showcased its anti-ship cruise missile Harba for the first time in Qatar. It was developed for Pakistan navy to create an indigenous solution for its vessels. Watch this video for more. #Habra #India #Pakistan #Russia #Moskva #Navy #Ukraine

https://www.hindustantimes.com/videos/world-news/paks-harba-missile...

The US intelligence community is carrying out a sweeping internal review of how it assesses the fighting power of foreign militaries amid mounting pressure from key lawmakers on Capitol Hill who say officials have failed twice in one year on the two major foreign policy crises faced by the Biden administration in Ukraine and Afghanistan.

The Senate Intelligence Committee on Tuesday sent a classified letter to the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, the Defense Department and the CIA pointing out that the agencies broadly underestimated how long the Ukrainian military would be able to fend off Russian forces and overestimated how long Afghan fighters would hold out against the Taliban last summer after the US withdrawal from the country, multiple sources familiar with the matter tell CNN. They questioned the methodology behind the intelligence community's assessments, and the underlying assumptions behind them, the sources said.
CNN has learned that one smaller intelligence agency within the State Department did more accurately assess the Ukrainian military's capability to resist Russia. But while that assessment was shared within the US government, it did not override the wider intelligence community's predictions.


https://www.cnn.com/2022/05/13/politics/us-intelligence-review-ukra...

Current and former intelligence officials acknowledge that only looking at military "capabilities" leaves out the quintessentially human factors that could prove decisive. Assessing a population's will to fight is an art, not a science, that defies purely data-driven analysis, the senior State Department official said. But, the official said, it is a key element to determining how successful a military will be in a fight.
"The basic challenge is, you can see what you can count: so you know something about the armaments they have and you can maybe see something about the training they have," said Treverton.
"But the things that matter are all intangible," he said. "You just don't know how good they're going to be and how willing they're going to be to fight. I've never seen us have much by way of a good method for doing that."

Ukraine crisis: Could India cut its defence ties with Russia?


https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-india-61274042

"There's strong reason to believe that... Russia will be unable to fulfil its contractual commitments to India with delivery of all of the S-400 system," says Mr Lalwani.

He also believes that the losses Russia has incurred in Ukraine could mean it may not be able to meet India's needs "because it will be desperate to use all the spares to replenish its own forces".

Why is Russia losing so many tanks in Ukraine?
And he says Indian policymakers may be taking note of some of the issues that have faced Russian battlefield equipment and munitions in Ukraine.

Could India manage without Russian arms?
That looks unlikely at the moment.

A US Congressional report in October last year said that the "Indian military cannot operate effectively without Russian-supplied equipment and will continue to rely on Russian weapons systems in the near and middle term".

The report noted that Russia offers its weapons at relatively attractive prices.

Sangeeta Saxena, editor of Delhi-based Aviation and Defence Universe, says the Indian army in particular will continue to keep buying from Russia.

Pakistan to launch 3rd Babur class guided missile heavy corvette this month

https://en.dailypakistan.com.pk/13-May-2022/pakistan-to-launch-3rd-...


According to the Pakistan Strategic Forum, "The class of four Babur corvettes are being built under the joint venture MILGEM project between Pakistan and Turkey, with 2 ships being built in Istanbul, Turkey and 2 in Karachi, Pakistan at a cost of around $1.5 Billion to the Pakistan Navy. The Babur Class Corvettes are 3,000 tonne multi-mission platforms, equipped for anti-ship warfare (AShW), anti-submarine warfare (ASW) as well as anti-air warfare (AAW).

"In the Anti-Surface category, the corvettes will be armed with ATMACA anti-ship missiles, with two four-cell launchers. ASuW helicopters can also be deployed from the ship, carrying anti-ship and anti-submarine weapons.

"In anti-air warfare, the corvettes have a 12 cell GWS-26 vertical launch system (VLS) that carries the MBDA Albatros NG/Common Anti-Air Modular Missile-Extended Range (CAMM-ER) surface-to-air missile (SAM) with a range of between 50-65 kilometres. The Babur-class will also use an Aselsan Gökdeniz dual 35 mm close-in-weapon-system (CIWS) with Aselsan ATOM airburst ammunition for terminal and point air defense.

"In Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW), the corvettes have two 3-cell 324 mm lightweight torpedoes launchers as well as the Yakamos hull-mounted sonar and a HIZIR towed array sonar system as well as decoy. ASW helicopters can also be deployed from the ship with submarine hunter-killer capabilities.

"Other weapons systems include a 76 mm OTO Melara Super Rapid main naval gun and two Aselsan STOP 25 mm machine guns. The ships will also have a 10-ton capacity helicopter hangar and deck. The warships have a range of 9,300 kilometres and are powered by General Electric LM2500 CODAD engines.

"The electronics suit for the four ships will be supplied by Aselsan at a cost of 215 million dollars which includes a main 3D AESA S-band naval radar, ASELSAN ALPER LPI Surface Radar, AKREP (AKR-D Block B-1/2) Fire Control Radar, SATCOM, a new network-oriented battle-management system, ARES-2NC ESM modules, ELINT and SIGINT modules, Electronic Warfare (EW) modules, SeaEye-AHTAPOT EO Reconnaisance and Survellience System, ASELSAN Piri (Infrared Search and Track) IRST system, as well as the Yakamos hull-mounted sonar system and HIZIR torpedo countermeasure system. The HIZIR is a complete suite consisting of a towed array, decoy array and expendable decoys."

Is Indian Navy's aircraft carrier a big threat to Pakistan Navy?

https://cscr.pk/explore/themes/defense-security/is-indian-aircraft-...

Pakistan’s Counter Options against Aircraft Carriers

Pakistan is beefing up its muscles against the increasing number of Indian warships and capabilities. Part of its efforts is focused on developing anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) capabilities. It is developing various anti-ship capabilities to effectively neutralize the Indian advantage of large numbers of warships and aircraft carriers. There are three layers of defence against Indian aircraft if deployed against Pakistan.

Firstly, Pakistan deploys anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCM) on its submarines. Pakistan currently operates two Agosta-70 submarines that can fire Harpoon anti-ship missiles, three Agosta 90B submarines that can carry Exocet anti-ship missiles. Eight submarines are on order from China which will also have anti-ship capabilities. Secondly, it has also developed or acquired several ASCMs such as Harba ASCM launched from the ship and the air-launched CM-400AKG anti-ship missile with supersonic speed. The coastal/land-based Zarb ASCM provides the third line of defence in the coastal waters of Pakistan against the intruding carrier. The Navy is also reportedly developing a supersonic cruise missile and an anti-ship ballistic missile. The development of anti-ship ballistic missiles will create a long buffer zone against the Indian carrier depending on the missile’s range.

Indian Navy will seriously consider the growing effectiveness of Pakistan’s anti-ship capabilities for the deployment of its carriers. These capabilities will force Indian carriers to operate from a safer distance making it less useful against the country. Even if trying to carry out a blockade of Pakistan or achieve air dominance against Pakistan in the Arabian sea, it risks its survival against Pakistan’s potent anti-ship capabilities.

Is Indian Navy's aircraft carrier a big threat to Pakistan Navy?

https://cscr.pk/explore/themes/defense-security/is-indian-aircraft-...


The possession of an aircraft carrier is of significant value for any navy. The idea behind the development of an aircraft carrier is to project power at a long distance in peacetime and achieve air dominance at sea during a war. It restricts the adversary warships outside of a designated area, acts as a coercive tool, protects interests at sea, and exercises influence over an area. All major powers having interests outside of their territories have developed them, especially after World War II when the potential of carriers to strike targets accurately at a long-distance using aircraft was effectively demonstrated. India operates one aircraft carrier; another is under sea trials, and the third one is planned. The possession of these carriers lifts India as a major power in the Indian Ocean Region. However, the possession of carriers may have more utility during peacetime than a full-fledged war due to the growing effectiveness and success of anti-ship capabilities.

Indian Maritime Doctrine and Aircraft Carriers

Indian Maritime Doctrine outlines a large area as an area of interest for the Indian Navy to strengthen its position as a blue water force capable of operating and projecting power beyond its home waters. The doctrine enlists primary, secondary, and “other areas” as areas of interest based on the location of the Indian Diaspora and overseas investments vital for the Indian Navy. It also enlists various enabling concepts to protect interests in these areas like “sea control” and “sea denial.”

The backbone of a blue water navy is the aircraft carrier and the Indian Navy plans to possess three aircraft carriers in total, giving it the flexibility to have two operational carriers all the times. INS Vikramaditya aircraft carrier with a displacement of 45,000 tons is the current operational carrier of India. The under-trial carrier is domestically built INS Vikrant and is slated to be commissioned early next year. The construction of follow-on to Vikrant is being debated in India due to the questions on the utility of aircraft carriers in comparison to submarines. It has not been approved by the Indian Government yet. Indian Navy operates two squadrons of MiG 29K carrier-borne multi-role aircraft inducted in 2010. Various operational problems have been observed in the aircraft like engine, airframe, and fly-by-wire system.

Limitations of Indian Aircraft Carriers

While the anti-ship capabilities are becoming common, more advanced, and precise, Indian carriers are not among the most advanced in the world. There are also certain limitations of the Indian carriers to operate and effectively project power against Pakistan. Firstly, Indian carriers have limited displacement and can carry up to 36 mixes of aircraft. The limited displacement also means reduced fuel load and an operational range of aircraft, forcing it to operate near the adversary. Displacement capacity also impacts the weapons load on the aircraft. Secondly, the aircraft on the carriers are allocated defensive and offensive roles. Increasing numbers for one role can have catastrophic implications for the other. Thirdly, take-off and landing on the carrier are totally different from ground-based landing and take-off. Indian carriers use Short Take-off But Assisted Recovery (STOBAR) take-off and landing system, which has a slower take-off rate than the more advanced Catapult Assisted Take-off But Arrested Recovery (CATOBAR) system.

Is Indian Navy's aircraft carrier a big threat to Pakistan Navy?

https://cscr.pk/explore/themes/defense-security/is-indian-aircraft-...

Pakistan’s Counter Options against Aircraft Carriers

Pakistan is beefing up its muscles against the increasing number of Indian warships and capabilities. Part of its efforts is focused on developing anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) capabilities. It is developing various anti-ship capabilities to effectively neutralize the Indian advantage of large numbers of warships and aircraft carriers. There are three layers of defence against Indian aircraft if deployed against Pakistan.

Firstly, Pakistan deploys anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCM) on its submarines. Pakistan currently operates two Agosta-70 submarines that can fire Harpoon anti-ship missiles, three Agosta 90B submarines that can carry Exocet anti-ship missiles. Eight submarines are on order from China which will also have anti-ship capabilities. Secondly, it has also developed or acquired several ASCMs such as Harba ASCM launched from the ship and the air-launched CM-400AKG anti-ship missile with supersonic speed. The coastal/land-based Zarb ASCM provides the third line of defence in the coastal waters of Pakistan against the intruding carrier. The Navy is also reportedly developing a supersonic cruise missile and an anti-ship ballistic missile. The development of anti-ship ballistic missiles will create a long buffer zone against the Indian carrier depending on the missile’s range.

Indian Navy will seriously consider the growing effectiveness of Pakistan’s anti-ship capabilities for the deployment of its carriers. These capabilities will force Indian carriers to operate from a safer distance making it less useful against the country. Even if trying to carry out a blockade of Pakistan or achieve air dominance against Pakistan in the Arabian sea, it risks its survival against Pakistan’s potent anti-ship capabilities.

Early in Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, it wasn’t just Moscow that believed its offensive could succeed quickly. In February, even U.S. officials warned Kyiv could fall in days.

https://www.wsj.com/articles/how-a-simple-ratio-came-to-influence-m...

Russians had numbers on their side, or more precisely a number: the 3:1 rule, the ratio by which attackers must outnumber defenders in order to prevail. It is one of several “force ratios” popular in military strategy. Russia, it seemed, could amass that advantage.

The war in Ukraine has brought renewed interest in force ratios. Other ratios in military doctrine include the numbers needed to defeat unprepared defenders, resist counterinsurgencies or counterattack flanks. Though they sound like rules of thumb for a board game like Risk, the ratios have been taught to generations of both American and Soviet and then Russian tacticians, and provide intuitive support for the idea Ukraine was extremely vulnerable.

“I would imagine that most of them are thinking in those terms, that you need something on the order of a 3:1 advantage to break through,” said John Mearsheimer, a University of Chicago professor whose work focuses on security competition between great powers. “It’s clear in this case that the Russians badly miscalculated.”

Modern versions of the 3:1 rule apply to local sectors of combat. A Rand Corp. study determined a theater-wide 1.5-to-1 advantage would allow attackers to achieve 3:1 ratios in certain sectors.

Overall, Russia’s military has quadruple the personnel and infantry vehicles, triple the artillery and tanks, and nearly 10 times the armored personnel carriers, according to the International Institute for Strategic Studies, the London-based think tank.

With 190,000 Russian troops concentrated to invade in February, and Ukraine’s military spread across the country, (only 30,000 troops, for example, were estimated to be in Ukraine’s east near the Donbas region) it appeared Russia had the numbers to overwhelm Ukraine.

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Ratios don’t account for Western intelligence and materiel support, for Ukrainian resolve, for low Russian morale, for Russia’s logistical struggles, or for severe Russian tactical errors, like leaving tanks exposed in columns on major roadways, Mr. Biddle said.

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These ratios originate from 19th-century European land wars.

In his seminal 1832 text on military strategy, “On War,” the Prussian General Carl von Clausewitz proclaimed: “The defensive form of warfare is intrinsically stronger than the offensive.” By the Franco-Prussian War in 1870, Prussians distilled this to requiring triple the attackers. Prussia decisively triumphed; maybe they were on to something.

World War I, with years of stalemate in the trenches as combatants struggled to break through defenses, lent further credibility to the idea.

English Brigadier-General James Edmonds, writing shortly after World War I, recorded an early version of the rule: “It used to be reckoned in Germany that to turn out of a position an ebenbürtigen foe—that is, a foe equal in all respects, courage, training, morale and equipment—required threefold numbers.”

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Still, he said of Ukraine: “It’s obvious in this case, the force ratio, the number of static units, are a very poor predictor of what’s going to happen on the battlefield.”

To Mr. Epstein, force ratios exemplify a quip from the writer H.L. Mencken—and a lesson Russia is learning the hard way:

“There is always a well-known solution to every human problem—neat, plausible and wrong.”

India may buy Rafales to give its aircraft carriers more strike options
Navy plans to buy 26 MRCBFs, so that INS Vikrant has more strike options

https://www.business-standard.com/article/current-affairs/india-may...

The Indian Naval Ship (INS) Vikrant, the Navy’s first indigenous aircraft carrier (IAC-1), is undergoing lengthy sea trials, after which it will enter operational service late this year.

With the 45 Russian MiG-29K/KUB fighters notorious for their unreliability, the Navy plans to urgently procure 26 multi-role carrier-borne fighters (MRCBF) from an international vendor, so that INS Vikrant has more strike options besides the unreliable MiG-29s. With INS Vikrant likely to be followed by a second indigenous aircraft carrier (IAC-2) named INS Vishal, another 31 MRCBFs will be ...

Boeing, Dassault ‘Fire Salvo At Each Other’ As Both Eye Multi-Billion Fighter Jet Deal For Indian Navy

https://eurasiantimes.com/boeing-dassault-pr-teams-fire-salvo-at-ea...

As the Indian Navy plans to procure an aircraft carrier-borne fighter, US defense giant Boeing is confident of its F/A-18E Super Hornets, sidelining the French Rafale jets challenge.


Later this month, Boeing will display the aircraft’s potential at the Indian Navy’s Shore Based Test Facility (SBTF) at INS Hansa in Goa. The F/A-18E Super Hornet will be put to the test for a few weeks until June. The facility has been chosen as it has a ski jump modeled after the deck of an aircraft carrier.

Alain Garcia, vice-president of India business development, Boeing Defense, Space and Security, and Global Services, said – the aircraft will conduct jobs requested by the Indian Navy and in different configurations. He claimed that Boeing’s fighter jet would exceed the Indian Navy’s expectations.

Earlier in January, France displayed the capabilities of its Rafale maritime fighter jets at the SBTF.

Both Rafale-M and F/A-18 twin-engine fighters compete for India’s need to operate from the 40,000-tonne indigenous aircraft carrier (IAC). The aircraft carrier will be commissioned in August after completing sea trials, which are currently underway.


India’s multi-role carrier-borne fighters (MRCBF) procurement program seeks to acquire 57 naval jets to outfit with India’s first IAC. However, the exact figure is still being sorted out.


Garcia, who had piloted Super Hornet in the US Navy, had said that the Boeing type was ideal for India, stressing that the Block III configuration – which is about to enter US service – plays an essential role in generating a uniform tactical picture.

In an interview with FlightGlobal, he also revealed details about the aircraft’s capabilities that would be evaluated.

“He [Garcia] feels the type will integrate well with other US equipment in service with the Indian navy, such as the Lockheed Martin/Sikorsky MH-60R anti-submarine warfare helicopter and Boeing P-8I Neptune, the Indian variant of the 737-derived P-8A.

Moreover, a Super Hornet acquisition would also allow the Indian Navy to work more closely with the US Navy and Royal Australian Air Force, both of which operate Super Hornets.”

Garcia mentioned the Super Hornet’s advanced electronically scanned array (AESA) radar, wide cockpit displays, and ‘open systems’ architecture, allowing quicker electronics updates.

Is Rafale Marine A Better Option?
Dassault Aviation and Boeing have been aggressively promoting their fighter jet’s capabilities, citing substantial advantages over their rival.

One advantage the Super Hornet has over the Rafale, according to Garcia, is the ability to fold its wings, making it simpler to get into an elevator. Boeing has also designed a mechanism for Indian deck crews to load and unload the Super Hornet onto and off Indian ship elevators.

Super Hornet-Block III
File Image: Boeing-Super Hornets
Furthermore, Garcia has also previously emphasized that the Super Hornet had a twin-seat variant that operated from aircraft carriers, whereas Rafale’s naval version was only available in a single-seat configuration. Twin-seat jets are thought to be better suitable for long-distance missions and activities like electronic warfare and ground attack.

On the other hand, French news outlet La Tribune reported last month that the French government has been considering selling four used Rafale Marine jets to the Indian Navy.

The report revealed, “the sale of four used Rafale Marine to the F3-R standard is likely to give a competitive advantage to France against the Americans in the context of the Indian call for tenders to equip the INS Vikrant.

These four recently modernized devices could indeed be quickly put into service on the Indian aircraft carrier.”

By June 2022, India intends to deploy the S-400 missile defence system that it has received from Russia to defend itself against threat from Pakistan and China, a Pentagon spy master has told US lawmakers. India started receiving the delivery of S-400 missile defence system from Russia in December last year, Lt Gen Scott Berrier, Director, Defense Intelligence Agency told members of the Senate Armed Services Committee during a recent Congressional hearing. As of October 2021, India's military was seeking to procure advanced surveillance systems to strengthen its land and sea borders and boost its offensive and defensive cyber capabilities.

https://www.deccanchronicle.com/nation/current-affairs/180522/india...

“In December, India received its initial delivery of the Russian S-400 air defence system, and it intends to operate the system to defend against Pakistani and Chinese threats by June 2022,” Berrier said.

“India continued to develop its own hypersonic, ballistic, cruise, and air defence missile capabilities, conducting multiple tests in 2021. India has a growing number of satellites in orbit, and it is expanding its use of space assets, likely pursuing offensive space capabilities,” he said.

Berrier told lawmakers that New Delhi is pursuing an extensive military modernisation effort encompassing air, ground, naval, and strategic nuclear forces with an emphasis on domestic defence production.

India is taking steps to establish Integrated Theatre Commands that will improve its joint capability among its three military services.

Since 2019, Prime Minister Narendra Modi has given priority to strengthen India's economy by expanding its domestic defence industry, and establishing a negative import list to curtail defence purchases from foreign suppliers.

“India's longstanding defence relationship with Russia remains strong, holding their first ‘2+2' format talks in December — a joint foreign and defence ministerial that India previously only held with the United States, Japan, and Australia.

“India has maintained a neutral stance on Russia's invasion of Ukraine and continues to call for peace,” Berrier told the lawmakers.

---------

Berrier said that Chinese-Indian relations remain strained following the fatal clashes in summer 2020 between their respective forces along the Western sector of the Line of Actual Control (LAC).

During 2021, both sides held multiple rounds of high-level diplomatic and military talks that resulted in a mutual pullback of forces from several standoff points. However, both sides maintain close to 50,000 troops along with artillery, tanks, and multiple rocket launchers, and both are building infrastructure along the LAC, he said.

The US is preparing a military aid package for India to deepen security ties and reduce the country’s dependence on Russian weapons, people familiar with the matter said.

https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-05-17/us-seeks-to-wean...

The package under consideration would include foreign military financing of as much as $500 million, according to one person, which would make India one of the largest recipients of such aid behind Israel and Egypt. It’s unclear when the deal would be announced, or what weapons would be included.

The effort is part of a much larger initiative by President Joe Biden’s administration to court India as a long-term security partner, despite its reluctance to criticize Russia for its invasion of Ukraine, according to a senior US official who asked not to be named.

Washington wants to be seen as a reliable partner for India across the board, the official added, and the administration is working with other nations including France to make sure Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s government has the equipment it needs. While India is already diversifying its military platforms away from Russia, the US wants to help make that happen faster, the official said.



The major challenge remains how to provide India major platforms like fighter jets, naval ships and battle tanks, the official said, adding that the administration is looking for a breakthrough in one of these areas. The financing package being discussed would do little to make those types of systems -- which can cost billions or tens of billions of dollars -- more affordable, but it would be a significant symbolic sign of support.



India’s Foreign Ministry didn’t immediately respond to a request for comment. Officials at the State Department and US embassy in New Delhi didn’t immediately respond to a request for comment.



India is the world’s largest buyer of Russian weapons, although it has scaled back that relationship of late. Over the past decade, India has bought more than $4 billion worth of military equipment from the US and more than $25 billion from Russia, according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, which collects data on arms transfers.

India’s dependence on Russia for weapons against neighbors China and Pakistan is a big reason Modi’s government has avoided criticizing Russian President Vladimir Putin over the war in Ukraine. As the US, Europe, Australia and Japan piled economic sanctions on Russia, India has held off and instead continued imports of discounted Russian oil.



While the US and its allies were initially frustrated with India, they have sought to woo Modi’s government as a key security partner -- including against China in the Indo-Pacific region. Modi is set to join a summit with Biden next week in South Korea. The meeting will include leaders from the Quad, a partnership between the U.S., India, Japan and Australia that has drawn criticism from China. Modi also received an invitation to join the Group of Seven leaders in Germany next month.



Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin made the point about China when he spoke at a news conference in April with Secretary of State Antony Blinken, Indian Defense Minster Rajnath Singh and Foreign Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar.

“We’re doing all this because the United States supports India as a defense industry leader in the Indo-Pacific and a net provider of security in the region,” Austin said. “And we all understand the challenges that we face there. The People’s Republic of China is seeking to refashion the region and the international system more broadly in ways that serve its interests.”

Why the Aukus, Quad and Five Eyes Pacts Anger China: QuickTake

Links between the US and India have steadily deepened over the past two decades, with the two sides reaching agreements that allow for more interoperability between their military platforms.

Retired colonel speaks out on Russian TV

https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-61484222

Russia's mainstream media outlets offer a view of the Ukraine war that is unlike anything seen from outside of the country. For a start, they don't even call it a war. But our Russia editor reflects on a rare exchange broadcast on state TV.

It was an extraordinary piece of television.

The programme was 60 Minutes, the flagship twice-daily talk show on Russian state TV: studio discussion that promotes the Kremlin line on absolutely everything, including on President Putin's so-called "special military operation" in Ukraine.

The Kremlin still maintains that the Russian offensive is going according to plan.

But on Monday night, studio guest Mikhail Khodarenok, a military analyst and retired colonel, painted a very different picture.

He warned that "the situation [for Russia] will clearly get worse" as Ukraine receives additional military assistance from the West and that "the Ukrainian army can arm a million people".

Referring to Ukrainian soldiers, he noted: "The desire to defend their motherland very much exists. Ultimate victory on the battlefield is determined by the high morale of troops who are spilling blood for the ideas they are ready to fight for.

"The biggest problem with [Russia's] military and political situation," he continued, "is that we are in total political isolation and the whole world is against us, even if we don't want to admit it. We need to resolve this situation.

"The situation cannot be considered normal when against us, there is a coalition of 42 countries and when our resources, military-political and military-technical, are limited."

The other guests in the studio were silent. Even the host, Olga Skabeyeva, normally fierce and vocal in her defence of the Kremlin, appeared oddly subdued.

In many ways, it's a case of "I told you so" from Mr Khodarenok. Writing in Russia's Independent Military Review back in February, before Moscow attacked Ukraine, the defence analyst had criticised "enthusiastic hawks and hasty cuckoos" for claiming that Russia would easily win a war against Ukraine.

His conclusion back then: "An armed conflict with Ukraine is not in Russia's national interests."

Criticism in print is one thing. But on TV - to an audience of millions - that is another level completely. The Kremlin has gone out of its way to control the informational landscape here: shutting down independent Russian news sources and ensuring that television - the principal tool in Russia for shaping public opinion - is on message.

It is rare to hear such realistic analysis of events on Russian TV.

Rare. But not unique. In recent weeks, critical views have appeared on television here. In March, on another popular TV talk show, a Russian filmmaker told the presenter: "The war in Ukraine paints a frightening picture, it has a very oppressive influence on our society."

So what happened on 60 Minutes? Was this a spontaneous, unprompted and unexpected wake-up call on Ukraine that slipped through the net?

Or was it a pre-planned burst of reality in order to prepare the Russian public for negative news on the progress of the "special military operation"?

It's difficult to say. But as they say on the telly, stay tuned to Russian TV for further signals.

Pakistan's 3rd MILGEM corvette 'PNS BADR' launched in Karachi - Naval News

https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2022/05/pakistans-3rd-milgem-c...


Turkish state-owned company ASFAT ceremonially launched the third PN MILGEM corvette for Pakistan Navy (PN), PNS BADR (281), at Pakistan's Karachi Shipyard & Engineering Works (KS&EW) on 20 May 2022.


PN MILGEM Program consists of 4 ships, 2 ships will be built in Istanbul Shipyard Command and 2 ships will be built in KSEW. The program started on 11 March 2019. 4 ships are planned to be delivered in August 2023, February 2024, August 2024, and February 2025, respectively.

The exact configuration of the Pakistan Milgem-class ships has not been made public yet. During the Aman Naval Exercise held in February 2019, Admiral Abbasi said that Pakistan ships will be fitted with a 16-Cell VLS behind the main gun. It is expected that the Babur-class corvettes will be armed with MBDA’s Albatros NG air defence system and Harbah Anti-ship and land attack missiles.

The propulsion system for all the MILGEM ships consist of one LM2500 gas turbine in a combined diesel and gas turbine configuration with two diesel engines; total propulsion power is 31,600 kilowatts.

Turkey’s Ada-class are multipurpose corvettes able to conduct a wide a range of missions, including reconnaissance, surveillance, anti-submarine warfare, surface-to-surface and surface-to-air warfare.

Key data:

Displacement: 2,926 tonnes
Length: 108.2 m
Beam: 14.8 m
Draft: 4.05 m
Propulsion: CODAG
Max speed: 31 knots
Range: 3500 nautical miles
Endurance: 15 days at sea
Crew: 93+40

#India joins as 35th member of #maritime counterterrorism #partnership that includes #Pakistan, #US, #Australia, #Bahrain, #Egypt, #France & #Germany. #PakistanNavy has held the most commanderships of the CTF 150 and CTF 151, at 12 & 9 times, respectively. https://theprint.in/defence/whats-combined-military-forces-bahrain-...

What’s Combined Military Forces-Bahrain? US-backed coalition India joined on Quad sidelines
India is 35th member of the maritime counterterrorism partnership that also includes Pakistan, Australia, Bahrain, Denmark, Egypt, France, Germany and Greece, among others.


Established in 2001 with only 12 members, the coalition — then called the Combined Maritime Forces (CMF) — was formed as a coalition of regional and international like-minded partners to counter the threat of international terrorism and uphold the international rules-based order.

The United States Naval Forces Central Command (NAVCENT) was tasked with leading the then CMF in 2001.

Today, the CMF-B is primarily tasked with ensuring stability and security across 3.2 million square miles of international waters by acting against illegal non-state actors operating in vital sea lines of communication. Its scope has expanded from just counterterrorism to counternarcotics, countersmuggling operations, and suppressing piracy.

The coalition is headquartered in Bahrain, along with the NAVCENT and the 5th fleet of the US.

Other Asian members include Pakistan, the Philippines, Seychelles, Singapore and Malaysia.

Participation in the CMF-B is voluntary — it’s mandated neither by a political agreement nor a military one.

So far, India has been conducting similar anti-piracy missions on its own.

“With India now joining this grouping, it will operate in coordination with the CMF-B members,” a defence source told ThePrint. “Currently, India has two ships deployed round the clock between the Gulf of Aden and the Persian Gulf for anti-piracy and anti-smuggling operations.”

The details of India’s membership have yet to be worked out, the sources said.

“These will be finalised in due course of time,” a source added. “The modalities will map out how many ships India will deploy and whether they will start by deploying personnel.”

CMF-B task forces
The work of the CMF-B is divided into four combined task forces — the CTF 150, CTF 151, CTF 152, and CTF 153.

The CTF 150 focuses on ensuring maritime security in the Gulf of Oman and the Indian Ocean.

Participating nations have included Australia, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, New Zealand, Pakistan, Spain, Saudi Arabia, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Command of CTF 150 generally rotates between nations on a four-monthly basis. It’s currently being commanded by the Pakistan Navy.

CTF 151 focuses on counterpiracy. The CTF 152 aims to ensure maritime security in the Arabian Gulf (also known as Persian Gulf) and is currently being commanded by the Kuwait Navy.

The CTF 153 — which was established in April 2022 — focuses on ensuring maritime security in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden, and is currently being commanded by the US Navy.

Pakistan has held the most commanderships of the CTF 150 and CTF 151, at 12 and 9 times, respectively.

As an associate member, India will reportedly not get command of the task forces’ and will also have a limited say in planning operations.

Structurally, the CMF-B is commanded by a US Navy vice-admiral. The vice-admiral also serves as the commander of NAVCENT and the US Navy’s 5th Fleet.

The deputy commander of the CMF-B is a commodore of the United Kingdom’s Royal Navy.

Spotlight on Two Nuclear Powers: India and Pakistan
Factors increasing both countries’ confrontational risks include the war in Ukraine, rivalries with China and Russia, climate change and pandemics

https://impakter.com/spotlight-two-nuclear-powers-india-pakistan/

Why look at India and Pakistan when much of the world is focused on Ukraine? Because of the possibility of the war in Ukraine escalating to the point where the Russians choose to use a nuclear weapon: This would most likely be for tactical gain and psychological effect to force the Ukrainian Government to sue for “peace”.

Yet, if such were to happen, it would be the first time since World War II that nuclear weapons have been used in a conflict since they were successfully banned 75 years ago. It would change the boundaries of confrontation, conceivably forever, as other countries might be encouraged to consider using their nuclear power, and, among the (still) restricted group that has it, India and Pakistan are among those most inclined to do so.

Nuclear weapons analysts estimate that there are currently nine nuclear states — China, France, India, Israel, North Korea, Pakistan, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States, and these numbers are likely to grow.

Possible newcomers include Iran, and Saudi Arabia, the former seen as purposefully seeking nuclear weapon capability, the latter pursuing nuclear development ostensibly for civilian purposes, but notably with the assistance of Pakistani experts, the same country that supported the North Korean weapons program.

The Saudis have not sworn off nuclear weapons and are the largest funders of Pakistan, which became a nuclear state primarily because the Netherlands allowed a nuclear physicist working at the Urenco labs in the Netherlands, Dr. Abdul Quadeer Khan, to take the blueprints of the Dutch nuclear enrichment and centrifuge technology and develop the Pakistani program.

Three countries “voluntarily” gave up their nuclear capability, namely South Africa, Libya, and Ukraine.

With respect to these latter two, their histories probably would be very different today if they had not done so. They serve as warnings for other countries that might think about giving up such capacity.

Overall, few regions of the world– maybe South America– are currently “nuclear arms-free” if you will

A Russian breach of the ban will have implications for all other nuclear-capable or “wannabe” countries, especially those facing confrontation with neighbors—which are nearly all countries.

Examples of neighbor disputes are numerous and include the Arctic, China and Japan, Colombia and Venezuela, and the Western Sahara pitting Morocco and Mauritania, to name just a few.

South Asia is very much such a region with India and Pakistan both nuclear-armed, and with the three largest nuclear powers, China, Russia, and the United States having clients, and chosen sides. Then there is the neighboring failed island state of Sri Lanka, in default and with a history of civil war that had drawn its neighbors into its disputes in the past.

Add to the geopolitical tensions, this comes at a time the region is experiencing unbelievable heat waves, affecting their economies and daily lives.

Everywhere, but surely here, the costs and availability of food, fertilizer, fuel, and access to concessional financing, along with an ongoing Covid pandemic, have created very difficult challenges for any government.

Into this mix are the political and religious differences between India and Pakistan (and China), and religious divide and territorial disputes over Kashmir, which have brought them in the past to armed conflict and lingering mistrust.

India and Pakistan never-ending disputes, plus China and Russia in the mix
India and Pakistan have been at odds since independence in 1947 from Great Britain and have fought four wars over the Kashmir region.

Spotlight on Two Nuclear Powers: India and Pakistan
Factors increasing both countries’ confrontational risks include the war in Ukraine, rivalries with China and Russia, climate change and pandemics

https://impakter.com/spotlight-two-nuclear-powers-india-pakistan/

India and Pakistan never-ending disputes, plus China and Russia in the mix
India and Pakistan have been at odds since independence in 1947 from Great Britain and have fought four wars over the Kashmir region.

With regard to nuclear policy, India initially declared a No First Use policy, vowing to never use nuclear weapons first in a conflict. However, in 2019 India signaled it was reconsidering this policy.

Unlike India, Pakistan has never declared a No First Use policy and has proceeded to emphasize smaller battlefield or “tactical” nuclear weapons as a counter to India’s larger and superior conventional forces.

Even a small nuclear exchange between India and Pakistan could kill 20 million people in a week.

If a nuclear winter is triggered, nearly 2 billion people in the developing world would be at risk of death by starvation.

India and Pakistan are at odds on many fronts but certainly exacerbated by religious differences, in each case supported by large political majorities, and ultra-national sub-groups, which morph into exclusionary national identity.

Prime Minister Narendra Modi and his Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) have been actively persuading India’s 80% Hindu population that they are under threat—and will only prosper if they support the ideology of Hindutva or Hindu nationalism.

Recent public comments on air by a high-level BJP official disparaging the Prophet Muhammad have exploded across the Moslem world. Despite efforts to distance itself, the actions taken may not be enough to quell what is a diplomatic crisis for India’s relations with countries in the Middle East and elsewhere.

For its external big power support, recently India has moved its alliances more to the United States, and away from Russia, its past primary military hardware supplier.

Pakistan, on the other hand, is officially the “Islamic Republic of Pakistan,” the second-largest primarily Sunni Muslim population in the world. A new Prime Minister, Shehbaz Sharif was elected in April 2022 and in his first address said, “he will expedite the multibillion-dollar China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) project and rebuild broken ties with partners and allies.”

Pakistan’s ties to China go back to the time China chose sides in the 2019 India-Pakistan dispute when India revoked Kashmir’s autonomy in August 2019 and sought to incorporate parts of “Xinjiang and Tibet into its Ladakh union territory,” which China considered violating its own dominion of Tibet.

Mass disenfranchisement of Kashmiri Muslims, deteriorating security, economic backsliding, and a contentious political agenda are causing ongoing tensions between India and Pakistan, building on historical friction in the region.

On its parallel track, Pakistan strengthened its relations with Russia, which has continued despite international condemnation of its invasion of Ukraine. An alliance with Russia had been agreed to by former governments, and now goes forward with the Pakistan Stream Gas Project, also known as the North-South gas pipeline, a multi-billion effort to be built with Russian financing and in collaboration with their companies.

In short, territorial, and ethnic tensions remain high, the two countries have chosen different global “sugar daddies,” with both having significant nuclear arsenals.

Not a promising picture for peace.

Two other factors adding to nuclear risks: climate change and pandemics
India and Pakistan are located in a part of the world that is particularly exposed to the threats of climate change and given huge populations and poor health systems are vulnerable to the spread of infectious diseases.

Spotlight on Two Nuclear Powers: India and Pakistan
Factors increasing both countries’ confrontational risks include the war in Ukraine, rivalries with China and Russia, climate change and pandemics

https://impakter.com/spotlight-two-nuclear-powers-india-pakistan/

Two other factors adding to nuclear risks: climate change and pandemics
India and Pakistan are located in a part of the world that is particularly exposed to the threats of climate change and given huge populations and poor health systems are vulnerable to the spread of infectious diseases.

Here is what you can expect in terms of impacts on both countries.

South Asia Feels the Heat: On most climate maps, this is the hottest region on the planet. Scorching temperatures were already reached in March 2022 at degrees not usually happening until June.

This current heat wave in India and Pakistan is not a lone event; on the contrary, with the acceleration of global warming, it is estimated to be 30 times more likely than compared to preindustrial times. And it has led to a deep reduction in agricultural output, as wheat crops withered, and mango crops were lost, exacerbating food insecurity, and threatening Indians and Pakistanis with limited income.

Those at or near the poverty levels have limited alternatives to cooling themselves, with millions of villages without any access to basic electricity, and for those living in urban slums, many are too poor to afford it even if it were available.

Roop Singh, a climate risk adviser with the International Red Cross Red Crescent Climate Center, makes the point that with more middle-income households having air conditioning, this means widespread power outages in part because the need for more cooling strains the electrical grids, and in part because of a coal shortage in India. “This is particularly impactful for people who might have access to a fan or to a cooler but might not be able to run it because they can’t afford a generator,” she said.

Medical and climate scientists have determined there is a “hard limit” when human tolerance is breached, the ‘wet-bulb’ temperature beyond which the human body is no longer viable. The wet-bulb temperature reflects not only heat but also how much water (humidity) is in the air.

“If the wet-bulb temperature reading is higher than our body temperature, that means that we cannot cool ourselves to a temperature tolerable for humans by evaporating sweat and that basically means you can’t survive,” said Tapio Schneider, a California Institute of Technology climate scientist and professor.

A recent Science Advances study found that some places have already experienced conditions too hot and humid for human survival, including Pakistan where there has been a wet-bulb temperature of 95 degrees Fahrenheit. “That kind of temperature would make it impossible to sweat enough to avoid overheating, organ failure and eventual death.”




According to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, should global emissions continue as they are, places in India and Pakistan will approach these limits in this century.

Even before reaching “hard limits” at “adaptation levels”, the impact of unbelievably high heat levels is increasingly threatening living conditions throughout South Asia.

Recalling the lessons in Gunnar Myrdal’s historical work “Asian Drama”, when large numbers of people and communities are incapable of dealing with daily life and it becomes intolerable and without hope, the inevitable consequence is that social peace disintegrates.

Spotlight on Two Nuclear Powers: India and Pakistan
Factors increasing both countries’ confrontational risks include the war in Ukraine, rivalries with China and Russia, climate change and pandemics

https://impakter.com/spotlight-two-nuclear-powers-india-pakistan/


Recalling the lessons in Gunnar Myrdal’s historical work “Asian Drama”, when large numbers of people and communities are incapable of dealing with daily life and it becomes intolerable and without hope, the inevitable consequence is that social peace disintegrates.

This translates into civil disorder and widespread popular anger directed at their leaders. And often when leaders are not able or unwilling to provide meaningful assistance, they evoke external threats (real or imagined) and blame outsiders as a way to both distract and unite their subjects.

When disastrous living conditions occur in both urban and rural areas, political leaders in weak governments look to external escapism politics, a scenario with a high realism index in today’s South-Asian sub-continent. And with an obvious fallout on Pakistan’s and India’s nuclear policies.

The COVID Factor: The current pandemic has affected virtually every aspect of human activity, including international efforts in nuclear arms control and disarmament, and the work of the 1968 Treaty on the Non- Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (Non-Proliferation Treaty, NPT).

In South Asia, there was no official ongoing India–Pakistan, China–India, or China–Pakistan nuclear dialogue prior to Covid. The pandemic effectively stopped all in-person, non-official contacts which might have led to such engagement.

The pandemic and its accompanying worldwide panic shed light on why it is a mistake for governments to expend huge sums on building nuclear arsenals and war-fighting capabilities at the expense of basic economic and social needs.

The prospect of new variants of Covid-19, such as Omicron, and/or another potential readily transmissible virus underscores the fact that these can be very costly and destabilizing events, epidemics, and pandemics that undermine stability and even nations’ survival.

Covid infections in India– at least during the first two years– went massively unreported both in terms of morbidity and mortality. In Pakistan, both numbers were and have been considerably lower than its neighbor, but massive underreporting is likely there as well.

According to recent data, these figures in both countries have declined. As of April 2022 reported cases in Pakistan were down while in India, by the end of May 2022, an average of 2,574 cases per day were reported, with deaths having decreased by 11 percent.

The reported drop in COVID-19 infection rates at present has meant less attention in the public space in both countries—at least for the moment.

Again, there is no assurance that new variants and a wave of infections will not happen, which could cumulatively add to inter-country political tensions, especially if there are accusations that new infections came from across the border.

It all adds up to a worrying picture
Overwhelming heat currently affecting South Asia means that tens of millions are living with very harmful dehydration, exhaustion, food insecurity, and the possibility of added infectious disease from the ongoing Covid pandemic.

Such conditions potentially pose a level of political unrest which very well may influence the political class of these two nuclear countries.

With fanatic groups on both sides of their borders looking for ways to undermine stability, it will not take much for either India or Pakistan leaders to feel pressed to react, then counter-react, each step bringing them to the brink of choosing nuclear.

Let us hope such a tipping point is never reached, that both cooler weather and heads prevail.

WHAT THE INDIAN MILITARY WON’T LEARN FROM THE WAR IN UKRAINE
ANIT MUKHERJEE JUNE 21, 2022
COMMENTARY


https://warontherocks.com/2022/06/what-the-indian-military-wont-lea...

Much has been written about India’s diplomatic response to the Russian invasion of Ukraine. And military analysts worldwide are working to draw lessons from the first multi-domain conventional war between “modern” forces in decades. Yet amidst all this, the Indian military establishment itself does not seem appropriately concerned with drawing its own lessons from the war.

To date, India has focused on managing the fallout from Western sanctions and securing the serviceability of its Russian-origin platforms. The war has boosted India’s efforts to indigenize its defense industry and created opportunities for Western countries to enhance their strategic engagement with New Delhi. However, it has yet to influence Indian military thinking more broadly. It appears that pressing challenges and the limits of existing institutions will prevent India from reforming its forces in response.


Challenging Times

The Indian military is going through a period of considerable churn, making it harder to assimilate lessons from the Russo-Ukrainian war. Its foremost challenge is the rise of Chinese military power. Until recently, this was somewhat of an abstract concern. However, the Chinese military’s 2020 incursions in the Ladakh region have made this much more pressing. For diplomatic and domestic political purposes, these incursions were initially downplayed by the Indian government, but with the death of 20 Indian soldiers the issue gained national attention nonetheless. Amidst a tense stand-off along the disputed border, India has banned Chinese technological companies and the Indian president characterized Chinese actions in unusually blunt terms as an “expansionist move.” There have been 15 rounds of military-to-military border talks and, despite some disengagements, significant military assets are still deployed along the border. These deployments have further constrained India’s diplomatic position vis-à-vis Ukraine, as a significant proportion of its weapons platforms come from Russia.

At the same time, there is considerable excitement and, to a certain extent, confusion as the Indian military is undertaking its most consequential post-independence transformation yet. This effort was triggered by Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s somewhat surprising decision in August 2019 to establish the position of chief of defense, empowered with an explicit mandate to create joint theater commands. This set off an ongoing debate surrounding the position’s powers vis-à-vis the service chiefs, as well as the organizational structure of the proposed theater command and its relations with existing service formations. Some of these reform initiatives will take time, while in the meantime the Indian military had to deal with three strategic shocks. First, the Chinese incursions in Ladakh halted plans for theaterization of the army’s Northern Command, out of fears that organizational restructuring could lead to force imbalances. Second, the fall of Kabul has created new uncertainties, particularly in regard to the insurgency in Kashmir. Finally, the tragic death of the country’s first chief of defense, Gen. Bipin Rawat, in a December 2021 helicopter accident has also slowed the pace of reforms. Inexplicably, the government has yet to appoint a replacement, giving rise to questions about its commitment to reforms. Thus, despite much initial promise and acclaim, the outcome of the defense reforms process is far from certain. Needless to say, this makes it harder for the military to focus on a war taking place a continent away.

WHAT THE INDIAN MILITARY WON’T LEARN FROM THE WAR IN UKRAINE
ANIT MUKHERJEE JUNE 21, 2022
COMMENTARY


https://warontherocks.com/2022/06/what-the-indian-military-wont-lea...

Dependence on Russian Equipment

The war has also generated more pressing difficulties. The Indian military is currently focused on maintaining its Russian-made equipment in the face of supply shortages and Western sanctions. Within weeks of the war, the government postponed its showpiece Defense Expo, ostensibly due to “logistics problems being experienced by participants.” The Indian Air Force pulled out of previously planned multilateral air exercises in the United Kingdom and, more significantly, postponed its showpiece large-scale triennial air exercise involving around 150 aircraft, “due to the developing situation.” This occurred amidst reports that the air force was curtailing exercises and sorties to preserve the life of its airframes. And these precautions extend beyond Russian-origin platforms. In the first few months after the outbreak of the war, the military reportedly also curtailed flights of its American-made Chinook helicopters. That such orders were passed reflects not only the military’s uneasiness about potential Western sanctions but also their fears about Washington’s reliability.

India’s dependence on Russian weapons is also reflected in its careful diplomatic response to the war. One independent analysis suggests that Russian-origin platforms constitute almost “85 percent of major Indian weapons systems,” although Indian officials argue it is more likely to be between 60 to 70 percent. Differences in methodology and interpretation of indigenous production may explain the varying numbers, but they nonetheless reveal a high level of dependency. With the imposition of Western sanctions and mounting Russian hardware losses, there are growing fears of a slowdown of certain weapon programs. For instance, there are reports of anticipated delays in the production of T-90 tanks and AK-203 assault rifles, the provision of aircraft upgrades, and the supply of spares for submarines and helicopters. In April, the Indian government also cancelled the planned acquisition of 48 Mi-17 helicopters, although it rejected the accusation that this reflected Western pressure by claiming the decision was “taken much before the conflict between Russia and Ukraine.” Similarly, in May India halted negotiations with Russia to acquire 10 Kamov Ka-31 airborne early-warning helicopters “due to concerns over Moscow’s ability to execute orders as well as issues related to payment transfers.” All of these developments indicate not only India’s growing concern with the availability and reliability of Russian equipment, but also, in light of sanctions on electronic goods like computer chips, its continued quality.

What’s more, even before the current conflict India’s weapons acquisitions were already held hostage to the complex dynamics of the bitter marriage, now surely a divorce, between the Ukrainian and Russian defense industries. The defense industry in Ukraine was built during the time of the Soviet Union and, upon its dissolution, continued to share a somewhat symbiotic relationship with that in Russia. As a result, India depended upon both countries to obtain spare parts for its legacy platforms, and even when making new acquisitions. After Russia’s annexation of the Crimean Peninsula in 2014, India felt the adverse impact of this co-dependency and sought out creative solutions, while continuing its engagements with both countries. As recently as last year, the biggest exhibitor at the Aero India show was Ukraine, which had big plans to increase defense cooperation with New Delhi. As a result, the war has delayed, for the foreseeable future, the planned upgrade of India’s An-32 military transport aircraft and acquisition of Talwar-class frigates, which are built in Russia but powered by Ukrainian gas turbine engines.

WHAT THE INDIAN MILITARY WON’T LEARN FROM THE WAR IN UKRAINE
ANIT MUKHERJEE JUNE 21, 2022
COMMENTARY


https://warontherocks.com/2022/06/what-the-indian-military-wont-lea...


Silver Linings

Over the last few months, the Indian defense establishment has taken stock, anticipating delays, sorting through complex financial arrangements (mainly by exploring the rupee-ruble trade), and securing spares and maintenance support. The Russo-Ukrainian war and the Indian military’s struggle to ensure that its Russian platforms remain operational has added an urgency to indigenization efforts. The speed and extent of Western sanctions, especially financial and technological, have spurred greater interest in attaining “technological autonomy.”

As a result, one of the biggest effects of the war is to reinforce support for the government’s Aatmanirbhar Bharat (self-reliant India) initiative. Under this campaign, unveiled in 2020, the Modi government seeks to encourage domestic manufacturing and reduce dependency on foreign goods. In the defense realm, the government has taken several steps to facilitate this process. First, it is encouraging the private sector to play a larger role, under the assumption that such competition will lead to capability accretion, innovation, and technological absorption. Second, it is taking steps to better organize the moribund state-owned defense industry. Most prominently, it has reorganized ordnance factories and is pushing for more public-private partnerships. Third, the government has placed 310 defense items, ranging from lightweight tanks and torpedoes to artillery guns and other complex systems, on the “positive indigenization list,” meaning that they will no longer be imported. Fourth, the government has eased and encouraged exports of different kinds of weapon systems, leading India’s defense exports to grow almost six-fold over the last five years.

India’s desire to reduce its reliance on Russian platforms is also an opportunity for western powers to overcome some of the longstanding challenges to closer cooperation with New Delhi. Previously, Western powers, especially the United States, have been reluctant to share technology. As Aditi Malhotra observed in an excellent brief on the effects of the war in Ukraine, “the West is unlikely to provide India with the advanced defense technologies that Russia readily offers.” Indeed, despite all the brouhaha over the U.S.-Indian relationship, “the two countries do not have a single project that they can claim symbolizes the depth of their defense relationship.” The fault is partly structural, as the U.S. defense industry has very few (if any) preexisting models for co-producing weapon platforms.

To effectively partner with India in creating its next generation of weapons platforms, Western partners will have to convince New Delhi that these partnerships will be reliable and lasting. Fortunately, the Russo-Ukrainian war is leading to an acknowledgement by some in the West that deepening defense and technology ties with India is critical to their vision of a future world order. Yet whether policymakers in India and the West can realize a common vision remains to be seen. While some Western powers, like France, have gone further than others, engaging with India will still require a leap of faith.

WHAT THE INDIAN MILITARY WON’T LEARN FROM THE WAR IN UKRAINE
ANIT MUKHERJEE JUNE 21, 2022
COMMENTARY


https://warontherocks.com/2022/06/what-the-indian-military-wont-lea...

To effectively partner with India in creating its next generation of weapons platforms, Western partners will have to convince New Delhi that these partnerships will be reliable and lasting. Fortunately, the Russo-Ukrainian war is leading to an acknowledgement by some in the West that deepening defense and technology ties with India is critical to their vision of a future world order. Yet whether policymakers in India and the West can realize a common vision remains to be seen. While some Western powers, like France, have gone further than others, engaging with India will still require a leap of faith.

Lessons Not Learned

Like most militaries, India’s has no dedicated institution either at the joint headquarters or in the services with a mandate to study operational lessons from “other people’s wars.” For that reason, there is no office dedicated to and appropriately staffed for analyzing such wars. Despite this, the government gave explicit orders to the Indian military “to study the Russian offensive into Ukraine and draw tactical lessons.” But it is unclear who has been tasked to do so and whether they will have access to adequate data to draw appropriate lessons. This is exacerbated by the ongoing and unexplained lack of a chief of defense. As a result, the joint staff does not carry as much institutional weight as it should, making it difficult to undertake objective analysis of the war free from service-specific prisms. To be sure, the service headquarters and lower formations must be carrying out individual studies at various levels, but they have limited situational awareness, institutional independence, and ability to influence policy. Indeed, it would not be surprising if stories later emerge about how each of the services drew their own institutionally preferred “lessons” from this war.

Nonetheless, Indian military analysts have been busy. They have largely discussed what is widely known about this war — the relevance of force in international relations, the return of conventional wars, the importance of logistics and theater commands for conducting operations, the dangers of relying on a conscript army, and the salience of drones. In addition, others have written on the importance of Starlink systems and of dominating the electromagnetic spectrum. Missing, however, is a detailed discussion of what this means for the Indian military’s current institutional structures or operating environment. To find that one would have to read the idiosyncratic Lt. Gen. H. S. Panag — never one to pull punches — who in a must-read article argues that the Indian military is “tailored for the wars of a bygone era,” and does not “have the technological military capability to defeat Pakistan or avoid a military embarrassment by China.” He then goes on to caution against the potential short-term drawbacks of relying on indigenization in a country with low domestic manufacturing capabilities.

In spite of these warnings, there is no evidence that the Indian military has undertaken any substantive changes to incorporate emerging technologies in warfare. This should be the primary focus for senior military officers as they think through the broader lessons of the war in Ukraine. Based on publicly available sources, there is also little indication that the war will lead to any significant changes in India’s military structures, doctrines, or training. On the contrary, to reduce its inflated manpower costs the Indian military has introduced a controversial, widely criticized “tour of duty” recruitment scheme — amounting to a quasi-conscript military. This has led to widespread public protests and is an all-consuming issue for senior defense officials. For them, as a result, the war in Ukraine must seem like a distant afterthought.

WHAT THE INDIAN MILITARY WON’T LEARN FROM THE WAR IN UKRAINE
ANIT MUKHERJEE JUNE 21, 2022
COMMENTARY


https://warontherocks.com/2022/06/what-the-indian-military-wont-lea...


Militaries all over the world are closely observing the war in Ukraine, but some have proven prone to hubris — concluding that they have little to learn because they are different. It is tempting for foreign observers to attribute the failures of the Russian military to its lack of professionalism rather than the increased difficulty of waging modern war. In the short term, the Indian military is focused on managing the immediate disruption caused by the current conflict. In the medium to long term, it is focusing on indigenization, including exploring opportunities to partner with Western countries. Professionally, however, there are few indications that the military is embarking on defense reforms that draw on the lessons of the war. Unfortunately, that might require a bigger crisis somewhere closer to home.

ASELSAN produces several EWSs and platforms, but one of them, KORAL, occupies a unique position and has played a critical role in Ankara’s recent involvements in several regional theatres. Although Turkey’s unmanned aerial combat vehicles (UACVs) have been making headlines in the last few years, the KORAL has been the invisible power behind their success.

https://rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/turke...


Not much credit is given to this system due to its silent role and lack of publicity; however, there is no doubt that this system has enabled Turkey’s strategic and military planners to boost the efficiency and lethality of its UACVs. This is not to underestimate the unique capabilities of Ankara’s drones, but rather to underscore the value and role of the KORAL.


The KORAL is a land-based transportable EWS with an effective range of 150–200 km. The system offers advanced options and supports Suppression of Enemy Air Defences (SEAD) operations. It consists of two subsystems: the first provides electronic support operations for conducting ISR, while the other is dedicated to attack operations to degrade, neutralise or destroy enemy combat capabilities. This kind of operation usually involves the use of electromagnetic energy against communication systems and radar systems.

The KORAL was part of a Land-Based Stand-off Jammer System project adopted by the Defence Industry Executive Committee around two decades ago. It came as a response to increasing threats and to meet the growing needs of the Turkish air force command. The system was contracted in 2009, and within seven years, the KORAL EWS entered the Turkey Armed Forces’ (TSK) inventory. In this sense, the EWS filled a gap and offered new opportunities for the TSK.

Since 2016, the KORAL has been battle-tested in different environments, including critical theatres in Syria, Libya and Azerbaijan, demonstrating impressive capabilities and executing complex roles in the first-ever wars won by unmanned systems. Ankara incorporated the KORAL in a new unconventional drone doctrine that prescribes the use of drones as an air force in a conventional battle. The doctrine requires a high level of cooperation, coordination and integration between the deployed EWS (KORAL in this case), the UAVs (Aerospace Anka-S and Bayraktar TB2) and the smart micro-munitions (MAM-L and MAM-C).

This innovative military doctrine has generated a lot of discussion. Many defence ministers, military experts and security analysts worldwide have called on their countries and armies to observe what Turkey has done in this field and to draw appropriate lessons, in order to be prepared for the new age of automated wars. During the Royal Air Force’s online Air and Space Power Conference 2020, UK Defence Secretary Ben Wallace urged the force to go in this direction, hinting that ‘Even if half the claims [about Turkey’s drones and EWSs] are true, the implications are game-changing’.

During Operation Spring Shield against the Syrian regime and pro-Iranian militias, the KORAL set the stage for Ankara’s drones by securing aerial dominance for the TSK. As a result, Turkey’s drones were able to wipe out a large portion of Bashar al-Assad’s army in Idlib using pinpoint technology. During the battle, the Assad regime lost 151 tanks, eight helicopters, three drones, three fighter jets (including two Russian-made Sukhoi Su-24s), around 100 armoured military vehicles, eight aerial defence systems, 86 cannons and howitzers, multiple ammunition trucks and one headquarters, among other military equipment and facilities. Additionally, the KORAL humiliated Russia’s technology, including the air defence systems (ADSs) designed specifically to counter such drone threats.

Turkey’s Electronic Warfare (Koral) Capabilities: The Invisible Power Behind its UACVs

https://rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/turke...


Video captures by Turkey’s Ministry of Defence proved that Ankara was able to identify, locate, monitor, follow and target several Russian-made ADSs, including the Pantsir, without fear of being hit. One video which went viral on social media showed that the Turkish drones targeted and destroyed the Pantsir, even though its radar was active and combat-ready. Considering the close-up nature of the video and the large size of the TB2, it is highly likely that the KORAL managed to blind the Russian radar. During the operations, the TSK successfully destroyed eight Pantsir ADS units.

In Libya, Ankara’s intervention in favour of the UN-recognised government and against Khalifa Haftar’s Libyan National Army (LNA) – which has been supported by a host of countries including the UAE, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, France and Russia – turned the tide of the war. Turkey’s deployment of the KORAL alongside its TB2s dramatically changed the equation on the ground.

The KORAL disrupted the LNA’s Chinese-made Wing Loong drones supplied by the UAE, and established local aerial superiority for Turkey’s UACVs by rendering the LNA’s ADSs useless (including S-125, SA-6 and Pantsir S-1 systems). Furthermore, it enabled the lethal and precise targeting of Haftar’s military bases, supply lines, military equipment, fortified positions and ground targets. Clash Report claimed that Turkey destroyed at least 15 Pantsir systems in Libya. Once again, in at least one case, a video recording showed a Pantsir’s radar active and hopelessly looking for a threat to engage with, before being hit and destroyed by Ankara’s state-of-the-art drone, the TB2.

During the 44-day war between Azerbaijan and Armenia last year, the KORAL demonstrated its critical capacity on a broader scale. The Turkish-made EWS prepared the ground for a swift and decisive Azeri victory. The KORAL reportedly reduced the formidable Russian-made Armenian formations of ground-based ADSs to junk, enabling the Azeri forces to wipe them out, and thus leaving the Armenian Army at the mercy of Azeri TB2s acquired from Turkey.

Turkey’s Electronic Warfare (Koral) Capabilities: The Invisible Power Behind its UACVs

https://rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/turke...


Armenia lost around 256 tanks, 50 BMP vehicles, 40 OSA SAM systems, over 400 trucks, hundreds of artillery pieces, and other military equipment during the war. In an act of psychological and information warfare, Azerbaijan’s Ministry of Defence released video recordings showing Armenian ADSs of all types (SA 8 Osa, SA 13 Strela 10, SA 15 Buk and even Russian-made S-300) being hit and destroyed by its forces. According to Azerbaijan’s President Ilham Aliyev, the Azeri military destroyed at least six S-300 missile systems using mainly Turkish and some Harop loitering munitions or Kamikaze drones.

To gain leverage over Azerbaijan, Yerevan acquired Russia’s Iskander ballistic missile and Repellent EWS in 2016 and 2017. Yet, Armenia’s Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan discovered that these systems – worth tens of millions of dollars each – did not actually work, despite Moscow promoting them as advanced, complex and superior systems. Azerbaijan managed to disable and/or destroy many of these systems along with Armenia’s ADSs. In one documented case, an Armenian ADS is seen executing a series of unsuccessful attempts to launch missiles against an aerial target due to the powerful suppression targeting of the KORAL.

In November 2020, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan praised the KORAL. Confirming the EWS’s critical role in Ankara’s latest battles, he revealed that his country is working on a new, more advanced version of the KORAL. Under the leadership of the Presidency of Defence Industries, ASELSAN has been working on a new generation of KORAL with advanced capabilities, the Kara SOJ-2. More recently, the TSK added the new highly capable SANCAK EWS to its inventory.

These new developments mean that Ankara is now open to exporting the KORAL. Several news platforms claimed that Ankara signed a $50.7 million contract to sell the KORAL EWS to Morocco’s Royal Armed Forces. Last August, a report indicated that the Royal Army of Oman was mulling the possibility of buying the Turkish-made EWS. At the end of that month, Iraq’s Defence Minister Jouma Saadoun reportedly expressed his country’s willingness to purchase Turkish-made military equipment, including TB2 UACVs, 12 T-129 ATAK helicopters and six KORAL EWSs.

Considering Ankara’s rising ambition to become a leader in robotic warfare systems and its relentless effort to add more unmanned offensive and defensive systems to the TSK’s inventory in the coming years, it will definitely focus on boosting its electronic warfare capabilities in the future.

3 cheers for INS Vikrant & 3 questions for India’s leadership on naval doctrine

by Shekhar Gupta

https://youtu.be/3GbgmJM4Ygw

Key points:

1. Indian aircraft carrier is powered by American General Electric turbines

2. Russian MIG 29s require a lot of maintenance. These will be replaced with French Rafales or US F-18s in future.

3. Chinese aircraft carriers are totally indigenous (including engines, weapons, and aircraft) are much bigger

4. China has developed "aircraft carrier buster missiles" to deal with hostile nations' Navies.

5. Indian Navy hid its aircraft carriers from Pakistani submarines during 1965 and 1971 wars.

6. Indian-American analyst Ashley Tellis questions the utility of Indian aircraft carriers in the absence of India's geopolitical aims and its Naval Doctrine.

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Ashley Tellis on submarines vs aircraft carriers

https://youtu.be/6BficVBrqls

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The Unusual Carrier Killer Capability Of The Chinese Navy’s Strategic Bomber - Naval News

https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2021/10/the-unusual-carrier-ki...

China’s recent test of a hypersonic ‘Orbital Bombardment System’ has been characterized as a ‘Sputnik moment’. The world is only just waking up to Chinese advances in strategic weapons technologies. Among a raft of new weapons, which increasingly do not have direct equivalents in the West, are anti-ship ballistic missiles (ASBMs). One of these, an air-launched version, appears to include a hypersonic maneuvering missile.

Venkatesh Kandlikar, defence analyst at GlobalData, told Naval Technology that the INS Vikrant features a significant amount of Indian industrial contribution in the design and manufacturing stage, even using locally sourced steel.

However, the programme was not without its difficulties, with component and equipment delivery and supply chain issues delaying the commissioning by around five years. The programme also suffered from cost overruns, coming in at $3bn more than the initial allocated budget.


INS Vikrant (specifications)
Displacement 43,000t
Speed 28kt
Endurance 7,500nm
Embarked aircraft 30 fixed- and rotary-wing

https://www.naval-technology.com/analysis/ins-vikrant-a-profile-of-...

According to Kandlikar, the Indian Navy is expected to field three aircraft carriers in its fleet by the next decade. With Vikramiditya in service and Vikrant now commissioned, India is beginning to plan the build of the future INS Vishal, which is expected to be larger still than existing carriers and feature updated technologies, such as an electromagnetic air-lift systems, also known as EMALS, as being installed on the US Navy’s Ford-class super carriers.

“With the experience gained in the construction of IAC-1, supported by the indigenous ecosystem it is expected that the Indian Navy will soon get a green light from the Indian Ministry of Defence to start designing the third aircraft carrier,” Kandlikar said.

Air wing composition
In terms of embarked aircraft, Kandlikar said the Indian Navy was looking to deploy a new carrier air wing comprising of either F/A-18 Super Hornets or Rafale-M fighters. The Indian Air Force currently operates the conventional Rafale 4.5 generation fighter, which is manufactured by France’s Dassault Aviation, offering a commonality option for the Indian Navy.

Capability-wise, the two aircraft are similar, although the Rafale is the newer aircraft and is being heavily pushed for export. The Super Hornet, meanwhile, is entering the twilight of its naval career. Although it still broadly matches the Rafale in terms of engine thrust it, is slightly slower at Mach 1.6 compared to Mach 1.8, but with a higher payload capacity at 66,000lb (29,937kg) to the Rafale’s 54,000lb.

However, in the near-to-mid-term, India will utilise its fleet of 45 MiG-29K/KUB fighters, acquired from Russia following the signing of separate deals in 2004 and 2010. India is also developing a navalised variant of its LCA/HAL Tejas fighter, although it is not known when the platform will be integrated into the country’s carrier fleet.

The rotary component, vital for search-and-rescue and airborne early warning and surveillance roles, will be fulfilled by the Russian-supplied Kamov 31 helicopter.

INS Vikrant boosts Indian Navy's firepower but Chinese navy still ahead in numbers

https://www.cnbctv18.com/india/ins-vikrant-india-first-indigenously...

NS Vikrant is the largest indigenous warship built by India and expected to "bolster India's position in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) and its quest for a blue water navy". How will it boost India's naval power, especially against rival China?

For starters, the induction of India's first indigenous aircraft carrier means the navy now has two aircraft carriers, including INS Vikramaditya in service boosting the country's maritime defence. Compared to the Indian Navy, China's People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) has three aircraft carriers. India now has two aircraft carriers—INS Vikrant and INS Vikramaditya. China has three—Fujian, Shandong and Liaoning.

India has now joined the "select group of nations" which have the capability to indigenously design and build an aircraft carrier, say experts.
"There are only 14 countries in the world which have at least one aircraft carrier and only six countries in the world have the capacity and the capability to build an aircraft carrier. India is one of these six," Lt Col JS Sodhi. a Defence and Strategic Affairs analyst told CNBC-TV18.com.
INS Vikrant's importance for India
INS Vikrant "would bolster India's position in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) and its quest for a blue water Navy", the government had said in July this year in a press release.
A blue water Navy "operates deep into the oceans", Sodhi added.

This comes at a time when the ties between the two nations are under stress owing to the Chinese People’s Liberation Army's (PLA) movements around India's borders as well as Chinese PLAN's movement in and around the Indian Ocean.
With INS Vikrant's entry, India can deploy an aircraft carrier each on the eastern and western seaboard and expand its maritime presence.

"We will have two aircraft carriers. Because of that, India, having an eastern and western coast and vast oceans on both sides, will be able to utilise one carrier on each seaboard... we'll be able to cover the primary areas of maritime interest," Captain Kamlesh Agnihotri (Retd.), a senior fellow at the National Maritime Foundation (NMF) told CNBC-TV18.com.
The need for an aircraft carrier
An aircraft carrier has great operational range, carrying fighter aircraft which are important in any battle to project power and control the sea.
NMF's Agnihotri said, "projecting powers and sea control is the primary purpose of aircraft carriers," while adding, "the aircraft carrier are floating airfields."

"The aircraft carrier adds to the maritime power of the country. It is the most potent weapon of a navy because it has the capacity to operate at a very large distance. It also acts as an air base at the time of conflict," Sodhi said.

India Vs China maritime power
While INS Vikrant adds to the Indian Navy's firepower, Chinese navy or PLAN is ahead in the number of warships and overall seapower. According to the World Directory of Modern Military Warships (2022), China ranks second on the Global Naval Powers Ranking 2022 after the United States — the true global blue water navy, while India ranks seventh.

"Comparing India's carrier INS Vikrant to Fujian is not correct," said Agnihotri. This is because, while INS Vikrant has a ski-jump kind of take-off mechanism, the Chinese Fujian has a catapult type of take-off mechanism.
"With catapult, you are able to launch heavier aircraft carrying more payloads, and more fuels for longer range," he said. It is better to compare Vikrant with Shandong, the second aircraft carrier China owns.
Besides, aircraft carriers, India has INS Arihant, an indigenously built
nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine (SSBN).

INS Vikrant boosts Indian Navy's firepower but Chinese navy still ahead in numbers

https://www.cnbctv18.com/india/ins-vikrant-india-first-indigenously...

"Comparing India's carrier INS Vikrant to Fujian is not correct," said Agnihotri. This is because, while INS Vikrant has a ski-jump kind of take-off mechanism, the Chinese Fujian has a catapult type of take-off mechanism.
"With catapult, you are able to launch heavier aircraft carrying more payloads, and more fuels for longer range," he said. It is better to compare Vikrant with Shandong, the second aircraft carrier China owns.
Besides, aircraft carriers, India has INS Arihant, an indigenously built
nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine (SSBN).
Can India counter Chinese navy incursions?
NMF's Agnihotri said, "our strong carrier-based force will be able to counter the challenges." Sodhi, however, said that "India is fast emerging as great naval power but China has an edge."
"We have picked up speed in the defence manufacturing indigenously. We are also slowly matching up," Sodhi added.
Earlier, news agency ANI quoted Southern Naval Command (SNC) Chief Vice admiral MA Hampiholi as saying that the Indian Navy needs three aircraft carriers to deter Chinese presence in Indian Ocean Region.

India is Building a Carrier Fleet, but Pakistan has a Plan to Sink It
To directly threaten Pakistan, the small-deck carriers will have to maneuver closer to “anti-access / area denial” weapons which could sink them.

by Robert Beckhusen

https://nationalinterest.org/blog/reboot/india-building-carrier-fle...


Most likely, India would attempt to enforce a blockade of Pakistan and use its carriers to strike land-based targets. But Pakistan has several means to attack Indian carriers — with near-undetectable submarines and anti-ship missiles — which must also operate relatively far from India itself in the western and northern Arabian Sea. China does not have a similar disadvantage, as the PLAN would likely keep its carriers close and within the “first island chain” including Taiwan, closer to shore where supporting aircraft and ground-based missile launchers can help out.

Thus, Indian carriers would be relatively vulnerable and only one of them will have aircraft capable of launching with standard ordnance and fuel. And that is after Vishal sets sail in the next decade.

To directly threaten Pakistan, the small-deck carriers will have to maneuver nearer to shore — and thereby closer to “anti-access / area denial” weapons which could sink them. And even with a third carrier, the threat of land-based Pakistani aircraft will force the Indian Navy to dedicate a large proportion of its own air wings to defense — perhaps half of its available fighters, according to 2017 paper by Ben Wan Beng Ho for the Naval War College Review.

“Therefore, it is doubtful that any attack force launched from an Indian carrier would pack a significant punch,” Ho writes. “With aircraft available for strike duties barely numbering into the double digits, the Indian carrier simply cannot deliver a substantial ‘pulse’ of combat power against its adversary.”

Essentially, this makes Indian carriers’ self-defeating, with the flattops existing primarily to defend themselves from attack rather than taking the fight to their enemy. Carriers are also expensive symbols of national prestige, and it is unlikely the Indian Navy will want to risk losing one, two or all three. Under the circumstances, India’s investment in carriers makes more sense symbolically, and primarily as a way of keeping shipyards busy and shipyard workers employed.

However, this is not to entirely rule out a carrier-centric naval strategy. Ho notes that Indian carriers could be useful when operating far out at sea and in the western Arabian Sea, effectively as escort ships for commercial shipping and to harass Pakistani trade. Nevertheless, this strategy comes with a similar set of problems.

“In any attempt to impose sea control in the northern Arabian Sea and to interdict Pakistani seaborne commerce by enforcing a blockade of major Pakistani maritime nodes, Indian carrier forces would have to devote a portion of their already meager airpower to attacking Pakistani vessels, thereby exacerbating the conundrum alluded to earlier,” Ho added. “What is more, Pakistani ships are likely to operate relatively close to their nation’s coast, to be protected by Islamabad’s considerable access-denial barrier.”

Another possibility is India massing its carriers in the later stages of a war after the Army and Air Force pummel and degrade the Pakistani military.

But this raises the question as to whether India strictly needs carriers at all if it cannot use them during the decisive periods of a conflict — as opposed to, say, less-expensive warships, and more of them, equipped with long-range missiles.