Banning Russia from SWIFT is a big deal. But the real pain comes from sanctions.
Keeping Russian banks from using SWIFT is not the financial nuclear weapon some have suggested.

https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2022/03/07/swift-sanctions-...

While the United States might fear the growth of new messaging services in the future, this case isn’t likely to bring significant blowback. Russia is unlikely to use alternative financial channels, because the existing ones all have problems. For example, executing transactions over telephone or fax, or by using credit or debit cards that fuse communications technologies with transactions. That’s outdated and will not scale to the degree Russia would need.

Alternative financial communication networks are either in their infancy or depend on the SWIFT network. The Bank of Russia created a financial messaging system (FMS) after the 2014 Ukraine crisis — but it includes only 400 users and therefore isn’t that useful. China’s Cross-Border Interbank Payment System (CIPS) has about three times FMS’s users — but SWIFT includes nearly 10 times as many users as CIPS. What’s more, CIPS isn’t an alternative to SWIFT; it depends on SWIFT for international messaging.

Russian banks not facing sanctions may turn to CIPS. But China may be reluctant to welcome sanctioned banks, lest it jeopardize its use of SWIFT.

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Two days after Russia launched an attack on Ukraine, the United States, Canada and European allies agreed to disconnect a handful of Russian banks from SWIFT, the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication. These “de-SWIFTed” Russian banks would no longer be able to use the financial interface to transfer money.

The long-standing, and controversial, threat to disconnect Russia from the SWIFT network has been touted as a centerpiece of the West’s retaliation. How big is it, really? And how will it affect the United States and its use of financial power in the future?

The limits of de-SWIFTing

SWIFT connects more than 10,000 financial institutions in a communications network where orders are sent and received. This messaging service enables participating banks to settle commercial, financial and foreign-exchange payments. Cutting banks off from SWIFT means they can no longer use the network to exchange information.


But keeping banks from accessing SWIFT is not, on its own, the financial nuclear weapon some suggest. Denying access to SWIFT, for example, does not stop banks from communicating or transacting with the 11,000 financial institutions outside the SWIFT network. Disconnected banks that do not face sanctions are free to use alternative messaging networks to settle payments.

In fact, without sanctions on actual money transfers, denying countries access to SWIFT could undermine the messaging service by encouraging users to rely on other financial communication networks.

Today, SWIFT continues to be dominated by major U.S. financial institutions, with 40 percent of recorded transactions occurring in U.S. dollars. Making the U.S.-centered financial order less attractive is precisely the type of collateral damage the United States seeks to avoid.

To evade western sanctions, #India and #Russia are exploring the possibility of using #China’s yuan as a reference currency to value the #rupee-#ruble #trade, It'll cover #oil purchase from Russia, availability of ships, insurance cover for imports, etc. https://www.livemint.com/industry/energy/india-and-russia-explore-p...


This assumes importance given the Western sanctions on Russia and PJSC Rosneft Oil Co. stating that Indian companies can acquire stakes in Russian projects and purchase Russian crude oil.


Rosneft’s production cost per unit is considered to be among the lowest globally.

“Rupee-ruble trade is very much on the cards. We are working on a currency arrangement to facilitate trade, especially as we also plan to increase oil purchase from Russia," said one of the two Indian government officials cited above, requesting anonymity.

The rupee-ruble trade mechanism will allow Indian exporters to be paid in rupees for their exports to Russia instead of dollars or euros.

Under this arrangement, a Russian bank is required to open an account in an Indian bank while an Indian bank opens an account in Russia.

Incidentally, the rupee-ruble payment mechanism with Russia has been attempted earlier on a small scale for a few items such as tea.

“We can look at a floating exchange rate system. A third currency can be taken as a point of reference, maybe yuan," said the official. He added that the arrangement would not require the exchange rate to be pegged to any currency, especially as the ruble has been depreciating. The ruble has fallen by as much as 39% this year against the dollar.

The local currency trade mechanism is key to resuming trading with Moscow as India buys a lot of defence and nuclear products from Russia, while India exports pharmaceuticals, engineering and agriculture items.

Payments worth close to $500 million to Indian exporters for goods already shipped to Moscow remain stuck.

Meanwhile, the Reserve Bank of India is consulting banks, including UCO Bank, to appoint a third party for facilitating payments. UCO Bank acted as a facilitator when sanctions were imposed on Iran.

Queries sent to India’s ministries of finance, petroleum and natural gas on Sunday remained unanswered till press time. Also, emailed queries to spokespeople for the Reserve Bank of India on Sunday evening wasn’t immediately answered.

Under the currency arrangement, the Russian currency will be converted into rupees at a specified exchange rate, and the money will be deposited into an Indian bank account.

“We are yet to finalize the Russian and Indian banks," said another government official.

Russian oil-related exports to India is close to $1 billion, but the exports are still very small given that the South Asian country imports 85% of its oil and 55% of natural gas requirements.

“Increasing oil purchases from Russia is definitely being considered at a discounted price. But we need to resolve a few issues to make that happen. One is we need to figure out the availability of shipping vessels. The other pertains to the high insurance premiums for imports from Russia," said the second government official. “High premiums will erode all the benefits of the discounted price. Also, the refining capability and cost will need to be assessed as we buy a different blend," the official added.

He added that India need not worry about buying oil from Russia as long as Europe continues to buy from there.

While the European countries have exempted Russian banks involved in energy trade from sanctions due to their heavy dependence on Russian oil, the US has announced a complete ban on the import of all Russian oil products from 8 March.

Oil prices have been elevated since Russia invaded Ukraine last month. On 7 March, Brent touched $139.13 per barrel, the highest since 2008. On Friday, the May contract of Brent on the Intercontinental Exchange closed at $112.67 per barrel.

Saudi Arabia is in active talks with Beijing to price its some of its oil sales to China in yuan, people familiar with the matter said, a move that would dent the U.S. dollar’s dominance of the global petroleum market and mark another shift by the world’s top crude exporter toward Asia.

https://www.wsj.com/articles/saudi-arabia-considers-accepting-yuan-...


China introduced yuan-priced oil contracts in 2018 as part of its efforts to make its currency tradable across the world, but they haven’t made a dent in the dollar’s dominance of the oil market. For China, using dollars has become a hazard highlighted by U.S. sanctions on Iran over its nuclear program and on Russia in response to the Ukraine invasion.

China has stepped up its courtship of the Saudi kingdom. In recent years, China has helped Saudi Arabia build its own ballistic missiles, consulted on a nuclear program and begun investing in Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman’s pet projects, such as Neom, a futuristic new city.

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The talks with China over yuan-priced oil contracts have been off and on for six years but have accelerated this year as the Saudis have grown increasingly unhappy with decades-old U.S. security commitments to defend the kingdom, the people said.

The Saudis are angry over the U.S.’s lack of support for their intervention in the Yemen civil war, and over the Biden administration’s attempt to strike a deal with Iran over its nuclear program. Saudi officials have said they were shocked by the precipitous U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan last year.

China buys more than 25% of the oil that Saudi Arabia exports. If priced in yuan, those sales would boost the standing of China’s currency.

It would be a profound shift for Saudi Arabia to price even some of its roughly 6.2 million barrels of day of crude exports in anything other than dollars. The majority of global oil sales—around 80%—are done in dollars, and the Saudis have traded oil exclusively in dollars since 1974, in a deal with the Nixon administration that included security guarantees for the kingdom.

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Meanwhile the Saudi relationship with the U.S. has deteriorated under President Biden, who said in the 2020 campaign that the kingdom should be a “pariah” for the killing of Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi in 2018. Prince Mohammed, who U.S. intelligence authorities say ordered Mr. Khashoggi’s killing, refused to sit in on a call between Mr. Biden and the Saudi ruler, King Salman, last month.

It also comes as the U.S. economic relationship with the Saudis is diminishing. The U.S. is now among the top oil producers in the world. It once imported 2 million barrels of Saudi crude a day in the early 1990s but those numbers have fallen to less than 500,000 barrels a day in December 2021, according to the U.S. Energy Information Administration.

By contrast, China’s oil imports have swelled over the last three decades, in line with its expanding economy. Saudi Arabia was China’s top crude supplier in 2021, selling at 1.76 million barrels a day, followed by Russia at 1.6 million barrels a day, according to data from China’s General Administration of Customs.

How the West Can Win a Global Power Struggle
In an economic Cold War pitting China and Russia against the U.S. and its allies, one side holds most of the advantages. It just has to use them.

https://www.wsj.com/articles/how-the-west-can-win-a-global-power-st...

In the years preceding its invasion of Ukraine, Russia set out to sanction-proof its economy by developing local substitutes for key foreign products, such as microprocessors. The only problem: Since it lacks advanced semiconductor fabrication capacity, production of these Russian-designed chips was outsourced, mainly to Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Co. After the invasion of Ukraine, Taiwan joined the U.S. in banning the export of sensitive technology to Russia. TSMC immediately promised to comply.

Russia may be an energy superpower but Taiwan is a semiconductor superpower, and semiconductors are harder to replace than oil. Therein lies a critical insight about the emerging Cold War between Russia and China on one side and the West—the U.S. and its democratic allies—on the other. This Cold War will be much more of an economic contest than the first, and the balance of economic power favors the U.S. and its allies. And it’s not even close.

Chinese President Xi Jinping likes to boast, “The East is rising, the West is declining.” When the rivalry was limited to China and the U.S., this had some resonance: At current rates of growth, China will surpass the U.S. as the world’s largest economy as soon as 2030 despite U.S. gains in the last year.

But with China partnered with Russia and the West more united than ever, this is turning into a contest of alliances, and Xi couldn’t be more wrong. In this framing, “East” and “West” are not geographic, but geopolitical, labels. If “the East” is defined as those countries with which China is closely aligned (it eschews formal alliances), only China is any sense rising. Russia was a stagnating petrostate even before sanctions eviscerated its economy. The others, such as Kazakhstan, Belarus, Pakistan, North Korea, Cambodia and Laos, are poor, slow-growing, or both. The West, defined as the European Union, the anglosphere (the U.S., Australia, Canada, Britain and New Zealand) and East Asia’s three big, rich democracies, Japan, South Korea and Taiwan, may not be growing rapidly, but it is growing and has a gigantic head start. As former U.S. Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson said a Chinese official once told him: “You have all the good allies.”

By itself, China accounted for 18% of global gross domestic product at current exchange rates last year, based on International Monetary Fund data. Adding Russia and their assorted allies brings the total to just 20%. The U.S., meanwhile, accounted for 24%, and adding its allies vaults the total to 59%.

While sanctions on Russia demonstrate the West’s control of the global financial system, long-run economic advantage will come from technology and knowledge. In pure science—such as space travel and atomic energy—Russia and China certainly hold their own. But in commercially useful technology, Western companies lead in almost every field, from commercial aviation and biotechnology to semiconductors and software.

“If you have a coherent strategy across the major democracies, you’re in an enormously robust position in terms of financial, economic and technological leverage,” said former Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd, now president of the Asia Society think tank.

How the West Can Win a Global Power Struggle
In an economic Cold War pitting China and Russia against the U.S. and its allies, one side holds most of the advantages. It just has to use them.

https://www.wsj.com/articles/how-the-west-can-win-a-global-power-st...

Of course the East plays a central role in the global economy. As recent market turmoil illustrates, Russia is a key supplier of not just oil and gas but metals such as palladium, used in catalytic converters, and nickel. China dominates manufacturing of countless goods whose value became abundantly clear during the pandemic, when demand for some, such as protective personal equipment, skyrocketed.

To a great extent these strengths reflect Russia’s comparative advantage in geology and China’s in factory labor. The West’s comparative advantage is in knowledge. That’s why Russia and China court Western investment. For example, to develop a complex liquefied natural gas (LNG) project in the Arctic, Russia relied on Norwegian, French and Italian contractors for essential expertise, research firm Rystad Energy notes.

Catching up with the West is no easy task, as semiconductors illustrate. Western companies dominate all the key steps in this critical and highly complex industry, from chip design (led by U.S.-based Nvidia, Intel, Qualcomm and AMD and Britain’s ARM) to the fabrication of advanced chips (led by Intel, Taiwan’s TSMC and South Korea’s Samsung ) and the sophisticated machines that etch chip designs onto wafers (produced by Applied Materials and Lam Research in the U.S., the Netherlands’ ASML Holding and Japan’s Tokyo Electron ).

Russia and China have made efforts to reduce this dependence. Russia developed locally designed microprocessors called Elbrus and Baikal to run data centers, cybersecurity operations and other applications. Though neither has achieved significant market share, they “represent the pinnacle of local design capability,” said Kostas Tigkos, principal at Jane’s, a defense intelligence provider. Russia hoped that they would eventually displace chips made by Intel and AMD, he said. “This would not only have been the foundation for diversifying their installed base, but a stepping stone for exports of those processors to other friendly nations.” But without manufacturers like TSMC to make the chips, Russia is facing “the complete disintegration of their aspirations to develop their own industry.”

China has a much bigger semiconductor industry than Russia, and its partly state-owned national champion, Semiconductor Manufacturing International Co. (SMIC), could in theory make Russia’s chips, but that would take at least a year, Mr. Tigkos said. Moreover, its efforts to catch up to its Taiwanese competitor have been set back by sanctions. In 2020 the U.S. required companies using American technology to obtain a license to sell to SMIC. This effectively limited its ability to acquire advanced equipment from Netherlands’ ASML, which is critical for “any country that wants to have a competitive semiconductor industry,” Mr. Tigkos said.

Why does all this matter to the outcome of the geopolitical contest? Over time economic weight, strength and vitality are what allow countries to sustain military capability, achieve and maintain technological superiority, and remain attractive partners for other countries.