Tom Shugart
@tshugart3


Last week saw the release of the 2025 China Military Power Report (CMPR). For those not familiar, this is DoD’s Congressionally-mandated unclassified update on the Chinese military. It’s an annual feast of open-source data.

So, here are few thoughts (Part 1) on the report:

https://x.com/tshugart3/status/2005315617906401580?s=61&t=mgTxr...

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While the 2024 report's exec summary says the driver of China's national strategy is to achieve China's "great rejuvenation" by 2049, the 2025 report sees China overall goal as the displacement of the U.S. as the world's most powerful nation.


https://x.com/tshugart3/status/2005315631655338220?s=61&t=mgTxr...

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The new report's exec summary makes a pretty strong statement: the PLA is making progress specifically toward its goal to be able to achieve victory over Taiwan and balance against the U.S. - that China expects to be able to "fight and win a war on Taiwan by the end of 2027".

https://x.com/tshugart3/status/2005315635921010802?s=61&t=mgTxr...

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The new report also states that China has been practicing components of all of its options to force Taiwan unification, including strikes on U.S. forces in the Pacific that could "seriously challenge and disrupt" them out to 1500-2000 nm.


https://x.com/tshugart3/status/2005315642363367634?s=61&t=mgTxr...

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In the section on PLA Navy modernization (which lacks some data like total hull count predictions as in previous reports), we see a statement that's been making some headlines: that the PLAN aims to produce six MORE aircraft carriers over the next decade.


https://x.com/tshugart3/status/2005315675242598408?s=61&t=mgTxr...

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On the topic of PLA modernization, we see confirmation China's been testing 6th-gen aircraft, with an operational timeline of 2035.

We're also told China's KJ-3000 AEW aircraft will probably be the first to use digital radar, though I don't know why the E-2D & E-7 don't count?


https://x.com/tshugart3/status/2005315671698313705?s=61&t=mgTxr...





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This is the first time I can recall seeing a PRC carrier force size prediction from DoD, and tbh I find it somewhat astonishing.

This means that in addition to the 2 ski-jump carriers, and Fujian which is on sea trials now, and the purported CVN (not confirmed here by DoD)...




https://x.com/tshugart3/status/2005315678409261370?s=61&t=mgTxr...

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...DoD expects the PLA to at least launch five MORE carriers in the next 10 years?

For perspective, the USN will be buying its next five carriers over more than twice that timeline so...given that U.S. carriers are deployed globally, they will end up outnumbered in the Pacific.


https://x.com/tshugart3/status/2005315682020528161?s=61&t=mgTxr...

Bilal Khan
@bilal_quwa
Quite interesting that the #PakistanNavy tested a SAM, a USV, and a loitering munition on the same day -- i.e., 3 key weapon systems that have risen in importance since the Russia-Ukraine War. I think they were testing or validating a maneuver centered on these 3 types of systems: https://quwa.org/pakistan-navy-news/pakistan-navy-tests-unidentifie...

https://x.com/bilal_quwa/status/2010577508538724713?s=20

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Pakistan Navy Tests New USV & Loitering Munition From Private Sector

https://quwa.org/pakistan-navy-news/pakistan-navy-tests-unidentifie...

On 10 January, the Pakistan Navy (PN) announced it had successfully tested a new unmanned surface vehicle (USV) and a loitering munition. In addition, a PN Tughril-class (Type 054A/P) frigate also carried out a successful live firing of a LY-80(N) surface-to-air missile (SAM).

The loitering munition was confirmed to be a Mudamir LR, produced by the private company Sysverve Aerospace based in Rawalpindi. The Mudamir LR is from a growing portfolio of Shahed-style munitions being developed and produced in Pakistan.

Regarding the USV, the design does not match any of Pakistan’s known USV platforms, including an unnamed platform developed by the National Engineering and Scientific Commission (NESCOM) and others by Stingray Technologies (also developed by NESCOM), Beyond Koncept, and Woot-Tech.

It is possible that the newly tested USV is a technology demonstrator, possibly developed by NESCOM (but not confirmed), which appears to be managing at least two such platforms (one revealed in 2024 and a newer, stealthier strike platform via Stingray Technologies in 2025).

The newly tested USV was equipped with a mast-mounted, stabilized electro-optical and infrared (EO/IR) camera turret mounted aft of the hull. This was likely a remote driving camera used to provide the operator with a visual feed and, potentially, basic surveillance and/or targeting capabilities.

In addition, there is a white vertical element near the bow, which could be a communications and/or GNSS antenna within a radome structure. This would likely be the line-of-sight (LoS) control link for the operator to remotely control the USV.

Overall, there are no indications that this USV is configurable for munitions or warheads, so it is probably intended as a simpler system for testing and validation. Thus, the intent of the tests likely had less to do with the hull design and was instead focused on validating the integrated subsystems, such as the datalink and the EO/IR turret, which would be configured into the actual service-ready products.

A Hint at the PN’s Future Defensive Posture
In one day, the PN tested a USV, a SAM, and a loitering munition – i.e., arguably the three core pieces of a scale-driven anti-access and area-denial (A2/AD) posture…

Pakistan rattles India with new Chinese-built stealth submarine | South China Morning Post

https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/politics/article/3358523/pakistan-ra...

Pakistan has not maintained a meaningful naval presence east of India since its forces were routed there more than half a century ago.
Since the 1971 war, in which India’s navy blockaded what was then East Pakistan, severed supply lines and accelerated the surrender of Pakistani forces that led to the creation of Bangladesh, Islamabad’s naval ambitions have been effectively confined to the northern Arabian Sea.
For it to now signal an intention to operate in the Bay of Bengal – home to India’s Eastern and Nicobar naval commands – is “strategically significant less for its immediate military effect than for its audacious geopolitical symbolism”, according to independent maritime security analyst Swaran Singh.

The Hangor class comes equipped with air-independent propulsion (AIP) technology, enabling the submarines to remain submerged for extended periods – making them stealthier and harder to track than the ageing Agosta vessels they replace.

Unlike conventional diesel-electric submarines, which must regularly surface or snorkel to recharge batteries, AIP-equipped vessels can operate silently at depth for weeks at a time, dramatically increasing their survivability and strike potential in contested waters.
Pakistan currently operates a core fleet of five diesel-electric attack submarines and three midget submarines primarily used for special operations. India’s fleet stands at around 19 active submarines, consisting of roughly 16 conventional diesel-electric vessels and three nuclear ballistic missile submarines.
A parity play?
Abdul Moiz Khan, a research officer at the Centre for International Strategic Studies in Islamabad, said the Hangor class offered Pakistan “parity” with the growing and much larger Indian fleet through precision rather than numbers.
“Instead of a quantitative arms race with India, it [Pakistan] aims to maintain a qualitative parity to maintain balance of power and mutually assured destruction,” he said.
If India were ever to blockade or strike Pakistani naval assets in the Arabian Sea, Khan said the Hangor class would give Pakistan a credible retaliatory reach extending to India’s eastern seaboard.
But the capability question cannot be separated from its strategic context. Singh points to timing: PNS Hangor’s arrival coincides with the deepening of a China-Pakistan naval partnership that now encompasses joint drills and co-production agreements, as well as China’s expanding Indian Ocean presence.
The two navies have conducted regular exercises in the Arabian Sea in recent years and the Hangor programme itself reflects a broader pattern of Chinese arms transfers to Pakistan that includes JF-17 fighter jets, frigates and missile systems.

China permanently stations up to eight warships in the Indian Ocean, operates a military base in Djibouti and has access to ports at Gwadar in Pakistan and Hambantota in Sri Lanka. Its submarines and intelligence vessels have become a routine fixture in waters India once considered its preserve.
The prospect of Pakistani submarines operating in those same waters, potentially networked with Chinese platforms, raised what Singh described as the spectre of “coordinated strategic pressure on both India’s eastern and western seaboards.”
Sultan Mahmood Hali, a retired Pakistan Air Force group captain, read the Hangor’s arrival in similar terms: less a single tactical development than a strategic signal.