Why has Pakistan launched a new rocket command after India conflict? | India-Pakistan Tensions News | Al Jazeera

https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/8/26/why-has-pakistan-launched-...

What missiles will fall under the ARFC (Army Rocket Force Command):

Pakistan possesses a range of missiles, including surface-to-surface, air-to-surface, and surface-to-air systems.

While some are nuclear-capable, the ARFC will primarily control short- to medium-range conventional missiles, according to security experts.

Salik said the force currently includes the Fatah-1 (range up to 140km or 90 miles) and Fatah-2 rockets (range between 250-400km or 155-250 miles), both of which were deployed during the May conflict, along with systems like Hatf-1 and Abdali, which have ranges less than 500km (310 miles).

Ahmed said the new command would provide Pakistan with “deep-strike options against high-value targets in India without lowering the nuclear threshold”.

“The development of multiple-launch rocket systems and conventional precision-strike capabilities under the ARFC is central to executing Pakistan’s Quid Pro Quo Plus doctrine, which is a response to India’s escalatory deterrence posture,” he said.

The Pakistani doctrine of “quid pro quo plus” refers to the possibility of Pakistan’s response to an Indian attack, which could go beyond a simple reciprocal action, by being more expansive or even disproportionately severe in a way that could risk intensifying the conflict, but remain contained enough to avoid a nuclear escalation.


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In his first speech after the cessation of fighting, Modi said his country “will not tolerate nuclear blackmail” and added that the Indian government will not make a distinction between governments that support “terrorism” and “terrorist groups”.

Ahmed said the ARFC was aimed, in part, at countering “this new normal of ‘escalatory deterrence’ [from India] that seeks to exploit perceived gaps in Pakistan’s conventional retaliatory ladder”.

Pakistan’s nuclear doctrine has long been central to its defence posture and has for years focused on developing its arsenal of tactical nuclear weapons.

Tactical nuclear weapons consist of short-range, low-yield nuclear weapons which are primarily intended to be used against an opposing army on a battlefield, instead of medium-to-longer range weapons which can be used against strategic targets.

They are designed with the intention to deter any large-scale Indian incursion. But the 2025 conflict was the second time in six years that the two nations came to the cusp of a potential nuclear escalation, after tensions erupted in 2019 when Indian jets bombed Pakistani territory, claiming to hit fighter camps.

A former Pakistani government defence analyst said the rocket force was designed to plug gaps exposed during the May war.

“When India employed the BrahMos missile, Pakistan was unable to deploy its Babur cruise missiles in a conventional role, as they are solely managed by the SPD and Strategic Forces Command for nuclear missions,” the analyst said, requesting anonymity.

The Babur, also known as Hatf-7, is a ground-launched cruise missile with a 700km (435-mile) range, and has been operational since 2010 but remains tied to Pakistan’s nuclear doctrine.

“Establishing a new rocket force underlines shortcomings of the existing nuclear posture, which relied on tactical nuclear weapons to deter India from attacking Pakistan,” the analyst said.

“Conflicts in 2019 and 2025 clearly show that India has found ways to circumvent Pakistan’s nuclear deterrent. Now, conventional firepower is needed to cover India’s territory and overcome missile defences,” he added.

India-Pakistan missile race heats up, but China in crosshairs, too | India-Pakistan Tensions News | Al Jazeera

https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/8/28/india-pakistan-missile-rac...

Before announcing the ARFC, Pakistan showcased the Fatah-4, a cruise missile with a 750km range and the capability to carry both conventional and nuclear warheads.

India, meanwhile, is working on Agni-VI, which is expected to have a range exceeding 10,000km and carry multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs), a capability already present in Agni-V.

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“With India working on different variants of Agni with multiple capabilities, this test was a technological demonstrator for India’s emerging submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) capability,” Ahmed said.

“Depending on the configuration of the warheads for India’s SLBMs, India will be able to deploy anywhere between 200-300 warheads on its SSBN force alone over the next decade,” he added. SSBNs (ship, submersible, ballistic, nuclear) are nuclear-powered submarines designed to carry SLBMs armed with nuclear warheads. India currently has two SSBNs in service, with two more under construction.

Pakistan, by contrast, does not possess long-range missiles or nuclear submarines. Its longest-range operational ballistic missile, the Shaheen-III, has a range of 2,750km.

“Pakistan also has South Asia’s first MIRV-enabled ballistic missile called Ababeel, which can strike up to 2,200km range, but it is the shortest-ranged MIRV-enabled system deployed by any nuclear-armed state,” Ahmed said.

Tughral Yamin, a former Pakistani army brigadier and nuclear policy scholar, said the countries’ missile ambitions reflect divergent priorities.

“Pakistan’s programme is entirely Indian-specific and defensive in nature, while India’s ambitions extend beyond the subcontinent. Its long-range systems are designed for global power projection, particularly vis-a-vis China, and to establish itself as a great power with credible deterrence against major states,” said Yamin, author of The Evolution of Nuclear Deterrence in South Asia.

But some experts say Pakistan’s missile development programme isn’t only about India.

Ashley J Tellis, the Tata Chair for Strategic Affairs at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (CEIP), said that while “India wants to be able to range China and Pakistan,” Islamabad is building the capability to keep Israel – and even the US – in its range, in addition to India.

“The conventional missile force in both countries is designed to strike critical targets without putting manned strike aircraft at risk,” Tellis told Al Jazeera.

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Ahmed, the Canberra-based academic, said India’s long-range missile development is openly supported by Western powers as part of the US-led Asia Pacific strategy.

“The US and European powers have viewed and encouraged India to act as a net security provider. The India-US civil nuclear deal and the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) waiver effectively gave India de facto nuclear weapons status without signing the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT),” he said.

The NPT is a Cold War-era treaty aimed at preventing the spread of nuclear weapons, promoting the peaceful use of nuclear energy and advancing the goal of nuclear disarmament. It formally recognises only the United States, Russia, China, France and Britain as nuclear weapons states.

But the 2008 waiver from the NSG – a club of 48 nations that sell nuclear material and technology – allowed India to engage in global nuclear trade despite not being an NPT signatory, a unique status that elevated its global standing.

Clary from the University of Albany, however, pointed out that unlike the Biden administration, the current Trump White House has not expressed any concerns about Pakistan’s missile programme – or about India’s Agni-V test.

Sushant Singh
@SushantSin
The Delhi blast matters not only because it represents a security failure, but because it reveals the deeper failure of Modi’s strategic approach.
I write in
@thecaravanindia
on why Modi did not go on a Pakistan-bashing spree after the Delhi blast.

https://x.com/SushantSin/status/1993966922547831004?s=20

https://caravanmagazine.in/politics/modi-pakistan-delhi-blast

On 28 November 2008, Narendra Modi, then Gujarat’s chief minister, stood outside the Oberoi Trident hotel in Mumbai, ready to deliver a clear message. Terror attacks had unfolded just days ago. Modi blamed Pakistan, well before any evidence was available. He argued that “the country needs a government that takes decisive action, not one that watches while terrorists strike at will.” He spoke of himself as the man who saw conspiraciesothers missed. Throughout his career, this would be a key pillar of Modi’s political identity: the promise to target and punish Pakistan. As prime minister, he did so after Uri in 2016, Pulwama in 2019 and Pahalgam in April 2025.

But this November, when a car explosion near Delhi’s historic Red Fort killed at least fifteen people, something was different about Modi’s script. The prime minister spoke of conspirators. He spoke of justice. He promised that those responsible would not be spared. Yet conspicuously absent from his remarks was any mention of Pakistan.

This omission is not an accident, or a moment of tactical recalibration or restraint. There have been some leads bringing up the possibility of Pakistani involvement. In a video, now viral on social media, Anwarul Haq, the former “Prime Minister” of Pakistan-occupied Kashmir, is heard saying that terror groups linked to Pakistan carried out attacks “from the Red Fort to the forests of Kashmir.” An Indian Express report has also noted that one of the handlers of the Delhi blast fled to Pakistan. Where the Modi government has previously pounced on Pakistan on far less evidence, it has so far held back even in the face of these new developments.

In one sense, this represents an admission that Operation Sindoor—the military operation of May 2025 after the Pahalgam attack, when triumphalist claims of destroying terrorist headquarters inside Pakistan—has failed to eliminate the threat of terrorism in India. By characterising the Delhi blast’s perpetrators as self-radicalised rather than Pakistan-backed, the government has tacitly confessed that eleven years of Modi’s Hindutva regime have produced the ideological and social conditions that can induce people to embrace extremist violence, without requiring any external support. Most critically, Modi’s stance reflects a converging set of geopolitical constraints. It is a reckoning of US President Donald Trump’s transactional pivot toward Pakistan, Asim Munir’s consolidation of unprecedented control over Pakistan, Pakistan’s new defence pact with Saudi Arabia, and India’s own vulnerabilities.