India, Pakistan advance a diverse range of missiles
Both nations tested conventional missiles over the holiday period


https://www.army-technology.com/features/india-pakistan-advance-a-d...


Therefore, in late December 2025, Indian forces tested a number of missile capabilities including the Pralay quasi ballistic missile and Pinaka long range guided rockets. Foremost among them however was a submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) from Arihant Class SSBNs.
Widespread reporting suggests the service tested the K4 SLBM, which is nuclear capable and has a range of 3,500 kilometres.
Commentary from Chatham House alluded to three delays in the run up to the K4 test, which was said to be due to the increased presence of Chinese research vessels (thought to be equipped with sensors) in the northern and central Indian Ocean at the time.


A total of four Arihant Class nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) are planned, two (S2 and S3) are in active service and the remaining two (S4 and S4*) are undergoing sea trials.
S2 and S3 feature four vertical launch system (VLS) tubes and can carry either 12 K-15 (750–1,500 km range) or four K-4 SLBMs. S4 and S4* have double the number of VLS tubes, meaningthey can carry either 24 K-15 or eight K-4 SLBMs.
India also seems to be developing longer range K-5 SLBMs with a range between 5,000 and 8,000 km. Such missiles will equip the upcoming S5-class SSBNs, which are scheduled to be inducted by the mid 2030s.

Of course, such a range far exceeds that of its smaller rival Pakistan. Indeed, Globato 2,500 km, supported by airborne options like Su 30MKI and Rafale. “Sea based missiles instead focus on China” he maintained.
“Due to their shorter range, the K-15 equipped SSBNs have to operate in shallow waters of the Arabian Sea, making them susceptible to detection by Pakistan Navy’s MPAs naval ships. With the K-4 and K-5 SLBMs, Indian Navy’s SSBNs can operate much farther, beyond the range of maritime patrol assets of Pakistan Navy and People’s Liberation Army Navy.
“The Indian Navy will be able to cover the entire Pakistan and most of China by deploying the K-4 equipped SSBNs in the Bay of Bengal. This area is optimal for deployment of SSBN mainly due to deep waters and proximity to Indian Navy’s Eastern Naval Command (Visakhapatnam).”

The most recent announcement came from the Pakistan Air Force (PAF), which said it tested the Taimoor Air-Launched Cruise Missile (ALCM) for the first time on 3 January 2026.
Following their ostensible success in supposedly destroying a Rafale fighter jet using Chinese-designed PL-15E missiles last year, the PAF is now looking to build their own sovereign airspace capabilities. The ALCM was built by the state controlled company, Global Industrial and Defence Solutions (GIDS).
Taimoor is a precision-strike cruise missile capable of engaging enemy land and sea targets at a range of 600 kilometres with a conventional warhead. The ALCM flies at very low altitudes, “enabling it to effectively evade hostile air and missile defence systems” the PAF said.
The weapon utilises two wings and three fins during its flight time after launch, in the same way as the Western Storm Shadow counterpart.

Likewise, Taimoor can also engage targets at sea which is necessary given the considerable Indian naval threat. However Mangure was less optimistic in conversation with this reporter, upon considering the prospective timeline for delivery.
“Even if we consider a highly optimistic four-to-five year timeline for the development and testing of the missile, the operational deployment may not happen before 2028,” he maintained.
“At that point in time, it does not seem to offer any incremental threat to the Indian Navy, which has inducted advanced frigates and destroyers equipped with Barak-8 anti-missile systems, specifically designed to intercept supersonic BrahMos class missiles” such as the CM-302, which is an export variant of Chinese YJ-12 anti-ship/land attack cruise missile.

Why the Next India-Pakistan War Will Escalate | Foreign Affairs


https://www.foreignaffairs.com/india/why-next-india-pakistan-war-wi...


ELIZABETH THRELKELD is a Senior Fellow and Director of the South Asia Program at the Stimson Center.
More by Elizabeth Threlkeld

The May 2025 crisis did not bring India and Pakistan to the brink of nuclear war. It did, however, lay the groundwork for another clash that could. Washington’s success in encouraging a cease-fire should not be mistaken for proof that future crises can be managed with the same tools, timing, or assumptions. The fire next time may burn hotter and spread faster. Whether it remains limited or spirals out of control will depend largely on the firebreaks built now, before the next spark ignites.---------

The most effective way to manage the risks exposed by the May 2025 crisis is to work to prevent the next one while reinforcing crisis-management mechanisms should those efforts fail. Despite deep animosity in the relationship, quiet engagement between India and Pakistan could still reduce the risk of another conflagration in the near future. India’s decision not to respond militarily to a November 2025 car explosion in New Delhi that killed ten people, for example, demonstrated restraint and a willingness to not default to military action. Participants in unofficial dialogues suggest that such actions, along with public gestures such as the December 2025 handshake between India’s foreign minister and Pakistan’s national assembly speaker in Bangladesh, have created modest space for renewed discussion.

The Trump administration should treat the May crisis not as a one-off diplomatic success, but as the impetus for a more serious South Asia crisis-prevention strategy. The United States should encourage engagement between India and Pakistan behind the scenes, supporting informal forums for dialogue without overshadowing or complicating the process. Discussions could focus on restoring and deepening confidence-building measures between the two sides, including the development of new communication channels for use in both peacetime and crisis to minimize the risks of inadvertent escalation. At the same time, Washington and its partners should privately make clear to New Delhi and Islamabad the economic, political, and strategic costs of a large-scale crisis.

Admonitions alone, however, may not be enough to stop a tense moment from exploding into something more destructive. A coordinated crisis-management plan that watches for unpredictable or unprecedented escalation pathways, identifies where the United States and its partners have leverage over or access to each side, and clarifies which officials, channels, and messages would be used at each stage would be a valuable first step. These efforts may not guarantee de-escalation, but they would give outside governments a better chance of acting quickly and coherently before a fast-moving crisis outruns diplomacy.

By Rabia Akhtar

https://x.com/Rabs_AA/status/2051571431935488029?s=20

I have long admired Elizabeth Threlkeld’s @ethrelkeld scholarship and her careful attention to crisis dynamics in South Asia. Yet her article in @ForeignAffairs https://www-foreignaffairs-com.hks.idm.oclc.org/india/why-next-indi... while analytically rich, reflects a set of assumptions that flatten critical asymmetries in the India-Pakistan relationship and, in doing so, risk misdiagnosing the sources of instability in the region.
Analyses of the May 2025 crisis increasingly converge on a familiar conclusion: that both India and Pakistan are becoming more risk-acceptant and that future crises will escalate faster and further. While this framing appears balanced, it obscures a more consequential dynamic.
What is unfolding in South Asia is not symmetrical risk-taking. It is the gradual expansion of the conventional conflict space by India under the nuclear threshold articulated through its “new normal” and Pakistan’s corresponding effort to restore deterrence credibility in response. Each crisis does not simply reveal mutual learning; it shifts the baseline of acceptable military behavior incrementally upward.

By framing escalation as a product of mutual learning and shared risk-taking, it overlooks how India is incrementally expanding the conventional space under the nuclear threshold, while Pakistan’s posture remains anchored in restoring deterrence credibility in response. Treating these dynamics as equivalent obscures the reality that one side is testing thresholds, while the other is attempting to hold the line, an imbalance that is central to understanding why crisis stability in the region continues to erode.
Equally important is the uncritical acceptance of attribution in crisis triggers. The absence of scrutiny over claims of cross-border terrorism risks normalizing escalation pathways built on contested narratives, particularly in an information environment saturated with disinformation.
Pakistan’s evolving posture whether through conventional precision capabilities or institutional reforms should not be misread as newfound appetite for escalation. It reflects a calibrated attempt to plug emerging deterrence gaps and prevent the normalization of limited war doctrines that erode strategic stability.
The real danger, therefore, lies not merely in faster escalation, but in the quiet redefinition of thresholds where what was once exceptional becomes routine, and deterrence is forced to chase a moving target.