@Clary_co

I’ve been in rooms with US officials far more times than I can count—including 3 years working as one. In twenty-plus years, I’ve never heard a US official articulate counterbalancing India as a goal of Pakistan policy. It’s possible US policy has this effect; it’s not a goal.


https://x.com/clary_co/status/2004892275399331872?s=61&t=mgTxrm...

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@nitingokhale

“U.S.A. wants a strong Pakistan as a counterbalance against India to the extent possible and as a source of stability, particularly in the Persian Gulf area.” If you think this is some current Indian official being quoted, you would be right. But in reality this is what RN Kao, founder of the R&AW wrote to Gen (later Field Marshal) Sam Manekshaw in June 1972. In reality, more than half a century later history is repeating itself in India’s neighbourhood, maybe in a more virulent form, thanks to the continuing hostility of the Americans: stratnewsglobal.com/dont-miss/trum… @StratNewsGlobal @Vikram_Sood @BharatShaktiBSI

https://x.com/nitingokhale/status/2004798974801395892?s=61&t=mg...

Happymon Jacob
@HappymonJacob
In this long piece for INDIA'S WORLD magazine, I make a case for ‘De-Americanising’ India’s Grand Strategy.

The Indo-US relationship may have thrived in the 2000s, but it was built on the back of a decade of threats, pressure and bullying.

India's most consequential relationship in the last quarter century was the by-product of a shared anxiety about a third party.

For nearly a quarter of a century, our grand strategy has been shaped by its convergence with Washington. As a result, our grand strategic questions once appeared to answer themselves and rather effortlessly.

Now we must go and find them, and this ensures that our relationship rests on choice rather than dependence.

This is how grand strategies are made. Or remade.

https://x.com/HappymonJacob/status/2069067319767413172?s=20

Hassan Aslam Shad
@HassShad
Happymon Jacob's article argues that India should begin "de-Americanising" its grand strategy because convergence with Washington has weakened India's strategic autonomy and encouraged reliance on American power. It's a provocative thesis, but it rests on several assumptions that simply don't hold up under scrutiny. 🧵

The biggest hole in the article is that it never actually proves its central claim: that India's strategic convergence with the US caused India to neglect indigenous capacity building. India's defence industrial weaknesses, procurement failures, technological gaps, and slow military reforms existed long before the US partnership deepened. These problems existed during non-alignment, during the Soviet era, and during periods when India was far less aligned with Washington than it is today. If the same weaknesses persisted across completely different strategic eras, how can American convergence be the primary explanation? The more obvious answer is that India's capacity deficits are rooted in domestic political and institutional failures, not in the existence of a partnership with the United States.

The article also claims that India increasingly viewed the world through a borrowed American lens, particularly regarding China. But this argument strips India of agency and ignores reality. India does not need Washington to tell it who China is. China occupies territory claimed by India, repeatedly challenges the status quo along the border, shields Pakistan diplomatically, arms Pakistan militarily, and seeks to expand its influence throughout India's neighbourhood. These concerns arise from India's own geography and security interests. To suggest that India's China policy is somehow a by-product of American thinking reverses the causal relationship. India and the US converged because both became concerned about China's behaviour, not because India outsourced its strategic judgment to Washington.

Another weakness is the article's suggestion that if Washington becomes more transactional, India should reconsider the logic of balancing China. But India is not balancing China for America's benefit. India is balancing China because China presents the most significant long-term strategic challenge to Indian interests. Even if the US withdrew from Asia tomorrow, India would still face an unsettled border, a growing Chinese military presence, and an increasingly capable China-Pakistan partnership. The China challenge does not disappear because US policy changes. The article implicitly treats India's China policy as derivative of US strategy when it is fundamentally rooted in India's own national interests.

The most striking contradiction in the article is that it argues India became "Americanised" while simultaneously describing a country that repeatedly ignored American preferences. If India's grand strategy was truly shaped by Washington, why did India maintain ties with Russia despite intense Western pressure? Why did it continue purchasing Russian energy? Why did it engage Iran? The evidence presented throughout the last two decades points toward strategic flexibility, not dependence. In fact, India's ability to cooperate with Washington while preserving ties with countries the US opposes is arguably evidence that strategic autonomy has been working rather than failing.

Ultimately, the article mistakes benefiting from American power for being dependent on American power. Those are not the same thing. Every rising power seeks to exploit favourable external conditions to advance its own interests. The real test is whether a country retains freedom of action when interests diverge. The stronger conclusion is not that India became excessively Americanised, but that India successfully leveraged a partnership with the US while maintaining independent decision-making. That is not a case for "de-Americanisation." It is evidence that India's strategy has been considerably more autonomous than the article acknowledges.

https://x.com/HassShad/status/2069140846872785212?s=20