Geopolitics: Changing Dynamics of Pakistan's Ties to China and the US

Pakistan has long sought to balance its foreign policy between China and the United States through a pragmatic hedging strategy, gaining economic, military, and diplomatic benefits from both superpowers while maintaining strategic autonomy. But the relationship between Pakistan and China is not the same as the one between Pakistan and the United States. Pakistan's ties with China are strategic while those with the United States remain tactical and transactional. What has changed recently is that Pakistan is no longer waging war to help the United States as it did during the "Cold War" and the "War on Terror". Instead, Pakistan has emerged as a peacemaker between the US and Iran. 

Both China and US Are Courting Pakistan


In a piece titled "Pakistan's Great Game", French political scientist Christophe Jaffrelot has explained what he sees as Pakistan's "tactics and strategy" in dealing with the two superpowers. Here's a quote from Jaffrelot's recent article on the subject:  

"While Pakistan’s relationship with China is rooted in strategic logic, its relationship with the United States is more tactical in nature-and has been since the 1950s, when General Ayub Khan boasted of his ability to play "one lion against another" (referring to the United States and the USSR at the start of the Cold War). In its dealings with the United States, Pakistan has played the role of intermediary, or even "client," within a typical clientelist framework: in exchange for the services Islamabad provided to Washington, the United States provided Pakistan with substantial aid and agreed to sell it sophisticated weapons, and even to train its officers-a privilege greatly appreciated.....  The first major service rendered by the Pakistanis to the Americans was none other than the intermediary role played by General Yahya Khan vis-à-vis Chairman Mao in the early 1970s, which led to the United States’ recognition of the People’s Republic of China. Over the following decade, Pakistan served as an intermediary between Washington and the mujahideen tasked with driving the Soviets out of Afghanistan. And in the 2000s, Pakistan was tasked by Washington with hunting down al-Qaeda-with much more mixed success this time, as evidenced by the discovery of bin Laden’s hideout in Abbottabad in 2011". 

Pakistan PM Sharif (L) with Chinese President Xi


Jaffrelot goes on to say that the United States has repeatedly proved to be an unreliable partner of the South Asia nation.  "Whenever the United States no longer needed Pakistan-or even felt betrayed by it-it abandoned the country or even imposed sanctions on it", he writes. 

More recently, Pakistan's usefulness to the US has once again become obvious,  no longer to wage war against the USSR or terrorism, but to make peace with Iran, Jaffrelot says. 

"In 2026, Pakistan appears useful once again, no longer to wage war against the USSR or terrorism, but to make peace. Each time, these glorious episodes were very short-lived and came to an end due to criticism of the Pakistani regime’s authoritarianism - with the military always remaining in power, even when civilians are in the forefront; its ties to Islamists accused of terrorist activities - particularly in India; or accusations of nuclear proliferation. Will the same be true tomorrow, once the war in Iran is over and the United States no longer needs Pakistan?  Everything will, of course, depend on the outcome of the conflict and the role Pakistan plays in resolving it-for it will be harder to send Islamabad back home if the world owes it something resembling peace". 

Oval Office Photo: L to R: VP JD Vance, President Trump, PM Sharif, FM Munir & Sec of State Rubio

Jaffrelot argues that "Pakistan has reached a turning point through the recognition of its military capabilities, as reflected in the mutual defense agreement it signed with Saudi Arabia...... Last June, Kaja Kallas, the EU Vice President in charge of the Union’s international relations, on the occasion of the 8th Strategic Dialogue between Pakistan and the European Union in Islamabad, thanked Pakistan-"a major regional power"-for its efforts in helping to avert an "all-out war" in the Middle East.  Jaffrelot now sees Pakistan's new role as a "net security provider" in West Asia and the Middle East.

He writes: "A more significant factor entering the equation relates to regional balances of power: Pakistan will continue to serve as a "net security provider" for Middle Eastern countries such as Saudi Arabia if those countries continue to fear the rise of Israel - a potential regional hegemon - and if they doubt Washington’s intentions, or even its mere reliability. There is no doubt that Pakistan itself will do everything in its power to prevent Israel from asserting itself on the regional stage and to gain influence over Iran-which is what the Israeli-American plan for regime change in Iran might have entailed. At the very least, faced with the risk of Israeli hegemony based on force and repeated military interventions, Pakistan could emerge as the architect of a resistance front bringing together not only Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Egypt, but also Iran".  



Jaffrelot expects India to continue its decade-long campaign to isolate Pakistan internationally. "India’s ability to isolate Pakistan-the strategy Narendra Modi has pursued for more than a decade-is another important variable, though its significance may be undermined by New Delhi’s drift toward authoritarianism and ethnocracy, as well as by the economic and social crisis threatening the country", according to Jaffrelot. 

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  • Riaz Haq

    Pakistan and the new great game of Risk

    Islamabad has bold ambitions to play a more proactive role in the world
    by Alec Russell
    In the last few decades of the 20th century, the go-to geopolitical board game for many teenagers was Risk. The object was world domination, the secret to success simple. You take over a hinge power on the map that covers the board, try to control a continent and expand from there. 
     
    It is like playing the Great Game, as the 19th-century contest for Central Asia was known, around your kitchen table: you keep your armies hidden, and then you strike. Remarkably, the original Risk map with its 42 territories has stayed all but the same since it was launched in 1957. 
     
    It is time for an update. Why does the game not include nuclear-armed Pakistan? Its surface area on the Risk board is split between a supersized India, Afghanistan and a vast “Middle East”. Yet in the real-life game of Risk that is geopolitics in Donald Trump’s second term, Pakistan is busily projecting itself as a hinge power. 
     
    This month’s defence pact with Saudi Arabia and Turkey is just the latest power play by Islamabad. The most striking was in April when it drew on its ties with America, China and regional powers, and hosted the first direct talks between Washington and Tehran since the Islamic revolution of 1979. There was no breakthrough. Officials fret the impasse made them look silly. Qatar has now in effect assumed their mediating role. 
     
    But the signal was clear. Pakistan has tense relations with neighbouring India, Afghanistan and Iran, yet it senses an opportunity to play a more proactive role in the world. It is on paper the ultimate “à la carte” middle power, able to pick when to align with Washington and when with Beijing, and able to keep lines open to the Sunni Gulf states and Shia Iran. 
  • Riaz Haq

    Mao Keji | मुखर्जी
    @kejimao
    This article offers a particularly astute observation: in the past, irrespective of the state of Sino-Indian relations, many Chinese long regarded India as a peer power, embracing the “narrative of potential” and “future value,” and believing that India would eventually match China’s strength.

    Today, even as bilateral ties have warmed, many Chinese have instead grown far more pragmatic in their view of India, placing faith only in “tangible power” and “present value.”

    Interestingly, when many Indians detect this shift, they often perceive the Chinese as having become condescending, even overbearing.

    From the Chinese perspective, however, this turn toward realism regarding India is in fact a form of assistance—for in Chinese culture, humility and self-reflection are regarded as the key preconditions for progress and self-strengthening.

    More striking still is that this abrupt transformation in attitudes toward India is not confined to China; it is even more pronounced in the United States.

    So far, the Trump administration cares solely about the tangible benefits India can deliver to the US—whether arms orders, energy revenues, or investment commitments—while showing no interest whatsoever in the future status and potential value that Modi seeks to sell.

    https://x.com/kejimao/status/2088864534123720712?s=20

  • Riaz Haq

    China’s view of India has changed. It’s time New Delhi recognized that shift Chinese diplomats to India are saying all the right things for Indian ears, but Beijing’s policy actions are moving in the opposite direction.

    https://themorningcontext.com/chaos/chinas-view-of-india-has-change...


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