Comment by Riaz Haq on June 26, 2025 at 5:36pm

How to Survive the New Nuclear Age: National Security in a World of Proliferating Risks and Eroding Constraints

by Vipin narang and pranay vaddi (Indian-American analysts)

Yet another threat comes from Pakistan. Although Pakistan claims its nuclear program is strictly focused on deterring India, which enjoys conventional military superiority, U.S. intelligence agencies have concluded that the Pakistani military is developing an ICBM that could reach the continental United States. In acquiring such a capability, Pakistan might be seeking to deter the United States from either trying to eliminate its arsenal in a preventive attack or intervening on India’s behalf in a future Indian-Pakistani conflict. Regardless, as U.S. officials have noted, if Pakistan acquires an ICBM, Washington will have no choice but to treat the country as a nuclear adversary—no other country with ICBMs that can target the United States is considered a friend. In short, mounting nuclear dangers now lurk in every region of vital interest to the United States.

https://www.foreignaffairs.com/united-states/how-survive-new-nuclea...

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In 2009, when U.S. President Barack Obama came into office, nuclear weapons looked increasingly superfluous. As the Cold War faded into history, Moscow and Washington, the world’s two nuclear superpowers, had long been working together to reduce their arsenals. At the same time, after years of protracted conventional wars in Afghanistan and Iraq and the broader “war on terror,” the U.S. defense establishment was far more preoccupied with counterterrorism and counterinsurgency than with nuclear strategy and great-power rivalry. The notion that any other country would attempt to reach nuclear parity with Russia and the United States seemed far-fetched, and American leaders were all too happy to delay an expensive refurbishment of the aging U.S. arsenal. So strong was the consensus that nuclear arms were a relic of a previous era that four top former national security officials—Henry Kissinger, George Shultz, Sam Nunn, and William Perry, not one of them a dove—publicly called for “ending” nuclear weapons “as a threat to the world.”

A decade and a half later, things could not be more different. The United States now faces a Category 5 hurricane of nuclear threats. After decades of maintaining only a minimal nuclear capability, China is on pace to nearly quintuple its 2019 stockpile of some 300 nuclear warheads by 2035, in a quest to attain an arsenal equivalent in strength to Russia’s and the United States’. Far from being a partner in arms reductions, Russia is using the threat of nuclear weapons as a shield for its aggression in Ukraine. Meanwhile, North Korea continues to expand its arsenal, which now includes missiles capable of hitting the continental United States. Iran is closer than ever to producing a nuclear weapon. And in May, the world witnessed India and Pakistan, two nuclear-armed powers, strike each other’s heartlands with conventional weapons in the aftermath of a terror attack, a confrontation that—already unprecedented—could have escalated to a nuclear standoff.

Comment by Riaz Haq on June 26, 2025 at 5:36pm

How to Survive the New Nuclear Age: National Security in a World of Proliferating Risks and Eroding Constraints

by Vipin narang and pranay vaddi (Indian-American analysts)


https://www.foreignaffairs.com/united-states/how-survive-new-nuclea...

These multiplying threats have not just brought nuclear strategy back to the center of U.S. defense concerns; they have also introduced new problems. Never before has the United States had to deter and protect its allies from multiple nuclear-armed great-power rivals at the same time. Like Russia, both China and North Korea may integrate nuclear weapons into offensive planning, seeking a nuclear shield to enable conventional aggression against nonnuclear neighbors. Moreover, there is a growing possibility that two or more nuclear powers—for example, China and Russia, or North Korea and Russia—might try to synchronize military aggression against their neighbors, stretching the U.S. nuclear deterrent beyond its means. Finally, the rapid erosion of nuclear guardrails, the diplomatic architecture that has for decades limited proliferation and brought security to dozens of countries under the U.S. nuclear umbrella, has pushed some Asian and European allies to consider acquiring their own nuclear weapons. All this has happened in an era in which the United States’ antiquated nuclear arsenal has fallen into disrepair, with ongoing modernization efforts mired in delays and rampant cost overruns.

This coming nuclear hurricane poses far-reaching challenges. For the first time since the end of the Cold War, Washington will need to develop more, different, and better nuclear capabilities and begin to deploy them in new ways. Given the scale of the problem, nuclear concerns can no longer be treated as a niche issue managed by a small community of experts. Officials at the highest levels of government will need to incorporate them into core defense policy in each of the major theaters of vital interest to the United States: Europe, the Indo-Pacific, and the Middle East. At the same time, Congress will need to back an accelerated effort to overhaul the U.S. arsenal with significant funding and give the project urgent priority, to be able to address not just today’s changing threat environment but tomorrow’s as well. Above all, for the United States to effectively handle a highly volatile and quickly changing nuclear order, nuclear affairs must once again become a central part of American grand strategy.


CHINA’S BIG PLAY
The most momentous shift in the global nuclear weapons landscape is China’s determination to become a nuclear powerhouse. As recently as 2019, the small Chinese arsenal scarcely factored into U.S. nuclear strategy. After first testing nuclear weapons in 1964, Beijing sought nuclear capabilities almost exclusively for defensive purposes and to be able to deter the United States (or the Soviet Union) from nuclear attack and “blackmail.” To achieve these limited goals, Beijing maintained a handful of unfueled intercontinental ballistic missiles and stored the warheads separately—an arrangement that required hours, perhaps days, to prepare the ICBMs for launch. This posture enabled a retaliation-only strategy, accompanied by a “no first use” pledge to the world. As a result, U.S. strategists, both during the Cold War and after, were able to set China’s nuclear forces aside as a “lesser included case” and concentrate on deterring the Soviet Union and its successor, Russia.

Sometime during the last decade, however, Chinese leader Xi Jinping ordered a breathtaking expansion of his country’s nuclear arsenal.

Comment by Riaz Haq on July 26, 2025 at 11:04am

Is Pakistan developing an Intercontinental Ballistic Missile? - Modern Diplomacy

https://moderndiplomacy.eu/2025/07/26/is-pakistan-developing-an-int...

By Fakhar Alam


Any missile that could reach the American mainland from Pakistan must have a range of more than 12000 km. Even that hypothetical missile would be less than half of what is needed to reach the US mainland. It would be irrational and a waste of resources for Pakistan to develop any missile with a range that has no political purpose for the country.

This range limitation of Pakistan is also rooted in its rocket motor technology. Technically, rocket motors act as the heart of a missile system. The larger the diameter of a rocket motor, the greater the distance a missile covers. So far, Pakistan has developed a rocket motor with a diameter of 1.4 meters, and the Shaheen III missile uses this rocket motor. For a missile to cover a distance of more than 12000 km (the distance from Pakistan to the US), this diameter of a rocket motor is far less.

Minimally, Pakistan would need to develop rocket motors with a diameter between 2 and 2.3 meters so its missile can reach the American mainland. Interestingly, there is no publicly available data published by any source that claims that Pakistan has developed rocket motors that have a diameter of more than 1.4 meters. However, in the future, if Pakistan tests a rocket motor having a diameter more than 1.4 meters, it will be either for its space program or for enhancing terminal maneuvering, boosting acceleration, improving the ballistic trajectory, and having additional space for advanced guidance systems of its current missile systems.

Contrary to this, according to international sources, India has not just successfully tested rocket motors that have a diameter of 2.8 meters. But it is also developing a four-stage intercontinental range missile, projected to have a striking range between 12000 and 16000 km, making the American mainland well within its reach.

In international politics, there are no permanent friends or enemies; rather, national interest remains the foremost consideration for every country. What if, in the future, US-India relations diverge due to conflicting national interests? What will America do about the Indian missiles having the American mainland within reach? Why did Vipin Narang, despite his loyalty to American strategic thinking, never openly raise this issue in any of his writings? During the Cold War and the war against terror, America never perceived Pakistan’s capabilities as a direct threat, but with changing geopolitical dynamics, America has started perceiving a direct threat from Pakistan’s alleged capabilities. Simultaneously, what if, in the future, due to some geopolitical shifts, America starts perceiving itself as threatened by India’s capabilities? What will America do then?

For Pakistan, an ICBM carries no strategic utility within the framework of its existing strategic force posture. The development of an ICBM would be incongruent with both the operational logic and doctrinal principles that underpin Pakistan’s nuclear deterrence strategy, which remains fundamentally India-centric and only regionally focused. Integrating an ICBM into its force structure would require a fundamental revision of Pakistan’s national security strategy and a comprehensive reorientation of Pakistan’s nuclear doctrine. Particularly, Pakistan would need to expand its deterrence objectives far beyond the current declared scope. Politically and economically, Pakistan cannot afford this reorientation, at least in the foreseeable future.

Comment by Riaz Haq on Friday

The STRATCOM Bureau
@OSPSF
BREAKING:

Pakistan signs $406.4 million dollar contract with China’s PIESAT, a leading satellite manufacturer, to build a Pakistani satellite manufacturing facility, and manufacture an orbital satellite constellation for launch with SUPARCO.

Under the agreement, PIESAT will assist Pakistan in constructing an integrated satellite system for global real-time communication and remote sensing. The first phase includes the launch and operation of 20 satellites, the construction of a satellite manufacturing facility, and the development of supporting software. Piesat will also provide technical support to help Pakistan develop independent capabilities in satellite manufacturing, operations, and applications.

https://x.com/OSPSF/status/1966185602002436499

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Pakistan, China sign $4bn MoUs in agriculture

https://www.dawn.com/news/1940384

ISLAMABAD: Pakistan and China have inked more than two dozen memorandums of understanding (MoU) worth $4 billion in the agriculture sector, focusing on mechanisation, seed development, smart farming and precision agriculture for data-driven productivity gains.

The MoUs were signed on Saturday during the Pak-China Business-to-Business Conference in Beijing, witnessed by Minister for National Food Security and Research Rana Tanveer Hussain.

Speaking on the occasion, Mr Hussain emphasised that these areas are crucial for strengthening Pakistan’s food security while also opening new avenues for bilateral cooperation.

The one-day conference, held on the sidelines of Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif’s visit to China, featured an opening and closing ceremony as well as multiple business-to-business sessions. The minister participated in a dozen meetings with leading Chinese and Pakistani agri-industry players.

These included Dayu working in irrigation sector, Jessica EV, PIESAT, and LOVOL in agricultural machinery sector, Sanyang Company Xinj­iang, Jinghua Seed Ind­ustry Company Ltd, Guard Agricultural Research and Services (Pvt) Lim­ited, and China State Engineering Construction Corporation GDSP, among others.

Chinese media reports said shares of PIESAT surged after the Chinese aerospace firm signed a $406.4m agreement with Pakistan — nearly double the company’s total revenue last year — to help build a satellite constellation for better communication and Earth data.

Under the agreement, PIESAT will assist Pakistan in constructing an integrated satellite system for global real-time communication and remote sensing. The first phase includes the launch and operation of 20 satellites, the construction of a satellite manufacturing facility, and the development of supporting software. PIESAT will also provide technical support to help Pakistan develop independent capabilities in satellite manufacturing, operations, and applications.

Highlighting China’s $215bn annual agricultural import market, the minister said that Pakistan can play a significant role in supplying tropical and temperate fruits, vegetables, and cereal crops. He stressed that Pakistan, as China’s closest neighbour and a “brotherly country,” offers geographical proximity and competitive pricing advantages compared to imports from Brazil and other Western countries.

He praised the initiatives of both Pakistani and Chinese agricultural companies under the leadership of PM Shehbaz, reaffirming Islamabad’s commitment to fostering long-term agri-sector part­n­erships with Beijing

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