Comment by Riaz Haq 18 hours ago

India’s Great-Power Delusions
How New Delhi’s Grand Strategy Thwarts Its Grand Ambitions
Ashley J. Tellis

https://www.foreignaffairs.com/india/indias-great-power-delusions

Since the turn of the century, the United States has sought to help India rise as a great power.

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In military terms, it is the most significant conventional power in South Asia, but here, too, its advantages over its local rival are not enormous: in fighting in May, Pakistan used Chinese-supplied defense systems to shoot down Indian aircraft. With China on one side and an adversarial Pakistan on the other, India must always fear the prospect of an unpalatable two-front war. Meanwhile, at home, the country is shedding one of its main sources of strength—its liberal democracy—by embracing Hindu nationalism. This evolution could undermine India’s rise by intensifying communal tensions and exacerbating problems with its neighbors, forcing it to redirect security resources inward to the detriment of outward power projection. The country’s illiberal pivot further undermines the rules-based international order that has served it so well.

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An illiberal India is also likely to be less powerful. The BJP’s policies have polarized India along ideological and religious lines, and the unresolved issues about how India’s changing demography is to be represented in parliament threaten to exacerbate regional and linguistic divisions. This makes India look increasingly like the highly divided United States. Polarization has been bad enough for Americans, hobbling their institutions and fueling democratic decay. But it will be even worse for India, where the state and society are much weaker. Polarization, for example, could intensify the armed rebellions against New Delhi that have long been underway, creating opportunities for outside powers to sow chaos within India’s borders. Those conflicts could also spill over into India’s neighborhood, as the ideological animus against Muslims exacerbates tensions with both Bangladesh and Pakistan. Polarization would also increase India’s internal security burdens, consuming resources that New Delhi needs to project influence abroad. And even if polarization does not create more internal troubles, it will undermine New Delhi’s efforts to mobilize its population in accumulating national power.

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The United States has tolerated these Indian behaviors in the past in part because both countries were largely liberal democracies. As both proceed down the path of illiberalism, however, they will no longer be tied by shared values. Transactional habits may come to dominate the relationship, and Washington could demand more of New Delhi as the price of partnership. Trump’s approach to India in his second term has already signaled such an evolution. Indeed, India’s inability to match China in the future, as well as its commitment to multipolarity, which is fundamentally at odds with American interests, will be deeply inconvenient for the United States. India, it seems, will partner with the United States on some things involving China, but it is unlikely to partner with Washington in every significant arena—even when it comes to Beijing.

If New Delhi cannot effectively balance Beijing in Asia, Washington will invariably wonder how many resources and how much faith it should invest in India. A liberal United States might continue to support a liberal India because helping it would be inherently worthwhile (provided that the costs were not prohibitive and New Delhi’s success still served some American interests). But if either India or the United States remains illiberal, there will be no ideological reason for the latter to help the former.

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