Comment by Riaz Haq on May 8, 2020 at 7:32am

Prof Ashok Swain's tweet: My Piece which no one in India Published: #India must remember that #Balochistan is not #Bangladesh
https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/southasia/2016/09/05/india-must-remember-th...

https://twitter.com/ashoswai/status/772678975265107968?s=20

Following Prime Minister Modi’s comments about Balochistan in his independence day speech, Ashok Swain warns that open support for Baloch separatists will not solve the Kashmir conflict. What is more, he writes that by threatening its neighbour’s territorial integrity India risks alienating key allies, and in the worst case scenario intervention could result in a nuclear conflict which would threaten the lives and livelihoods of millions.

India’s Prime Minister Narendra Modi in his Independence Day Speech on 15 August 2016 raised the issue of Pakistan’s human rights violations in Balochistan. This has brought a new excitement in New Delhi, particularly among the right wing commentators as if India has finally found a solution to the Kashmir issue.

Since the death of a charismatic militant Burhan Wani in the hands of the security agencies on 8 July 2016, Kashmir is witnessing unprecedented violent protest. Modi and his advisors hope that Kashmir unrest will come to an end if India starts spreading the fire in Balochistan. If Modi and his advisors really believe that the Balochistan threat will dissuade Pakistani agencies to stay out of Kashmir and the contested state will be peaceful forever, they are living in a cloud-cuckoo land. History shows that Pakistani military establishment does not succumb to Indian threats. Instead, it uses this threat to accumulate more power for itself. India’s direct support to the East Pakistan liberation movement, which resulted in the creation of Bangladesh, did not succeed in changing the perception of Pakistani agencies. It only exacerbated their paranoia towards India further.

In the last decade, while Western attention has been mostly on the Taliban, the separatist struggle is turning quite violent in this scarcely populated but mineral-rich province in the south west of Pakistan. The Baloch have waged two major violent ‘freedom’ struggles against the state: an uprising from 1973 to 1977, which was crushed by the Pakistani Army using brute force. The second ongoing struggle started in 2005.

It is no secret that India has been supporting the separatists in Balochistan in their fight again Pakistani military without openly admitting it. Baloch activists have repeatedly admitted of receiving India’s ‘moral’ support and a representative of Balochistan Liberation Organization (BLO) has been living in New Delhi since 2009. Pakistan has been regularly accusing India for using its consulates in Jalalabad and Kandahar to fund, train and arm Baloch militants. A decade back, senior officials of Pakistan had even alleged that 600 Baloch tribals were being trained by India’s Research and Analysis Wing (RAW) in Afghanistan to handle explosives, engineer bomb blasts, and use sophisticated weapons.

Pakistan has failed to provide much proof about Indian involvement, however, according to 2010 WikiLeaks cables, US and British intelligence cautiously agrees with the Pakistani accusations. Last year, Pakistan had handed over a dossier to the UN Secretary General containing ‘evidence’ of Indian support to violence in Balochistan. In March this year, Pakistan claimed to arrest an alleged RAW operative from Balochistan. India has been always denied these accusations, but has continued to remain engaged unofficially. However, by openly committing India to Balochistan’s cause in his speech, Modi is likely to expose India’s geo-strategic limitations without gaining any additional advantage, and there is a lot to lose.

Comment by Riaz Haq on May 8, 2020 at 12:33pm

#India must remember that #Balochistan is not #Bangladesh by Prof Ashok Swain: "After the country split (in 1971), Pakistan did not just sulk and accept Indian domination, it decided to acquire a large nuclear arsenal" #Pakistan #nuclear #Modi http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/southasia/2016/09/05/india-must-remember-tha...

It is important to keep in mind that the Balochistan issue is not a straightforward one for India to directly engage in, as was the case with East Pakistan. India does not share a common border with Balochistan and is therefore dependent upon Afghanistan to provide more support to Baloch separatists. This is not as easy as some hawks in India tend to believe, especially as India is struggling to get enough security cover even to protect its own assets in a fast-deteriorating environment in Afghanistan.

India’s expanded engagement in Balochistan might also bring Iran on Pakistan’s side because Baloch nationalists have not only pitched themselves against Pakistan but against Iran as well. Balochs form a majority in Iran’s Sistan and Baluchestan provinces and, like the Kurds, they are Sunni Muslims. It is not hard to imagine an Iran-Pakistan axis developing rapidly to prevent Baloch aspirations for independence. So getting bogged down in Balochistan risks turning Iran to an enemy of India.

When India went to war with Pakistan over Bangladesh in 1971 it had the blanket support of the Soviet Union, one of the two superpowers in the Cold War. If India picks a fight over Balochistan, Pakistan will receive support from China whose $46 billion USD CPEC investment in the region is at stake, and it is unlikely that any global or regional power will come out openly on India’s side. Both its old friend Russia, and new ally the USA have tried their best to stay out of the Balochistan imbroglio to date. There is no reason to expect that they will change their stance now.

Not only is Balochistan not East Pakistan, the Pakistani Military has moved on since the early 1970s. In 1971 their most prized possessions were the Patton tanks, but today it is their tactical nuclear weapons. After the country split, Pakistan did not just sulk and accept Indian domination, it decided to acquire a large nuclear arsenal by hook or crook. Unlike India, Pakistan has always been very clear about its purpose in acquiring nuclear weapons: to defend itself against Indian aggression. And unlike India, Pakistan also refuses to commit to a ‘no first use’ of their weapons.

Based on the amount of fissile material Pakistan has produced, it is estimated to have 110-130 nuclear warheads compared to India’s 100-120. Both now possess ballistic missiles, cruise missiles and sea-based nuclear delivery systems. Most importantly, Pakistan’s recent deployment of tactical nuclear weapons for its artillery arsenal has taken away any advantage India had previously in the case of a conventional war. This seriously limits India’s manoeuvrability to intervene militarily in Pakistani territory, whether to retaliate against any terror group or support any ‘separatist struggle’.

Provoking Pakistan to an armed conflict now is like playing with fire. If India threatens the territorial integrity of Pakistan as it did in 1971 there is a real possibility of that the Pakistani military will retaliate with its prized weapons. It has the capacity to launch a nuclear strike against India within 8 seconds and could strike Delhi in five minutes.

Comment by Riaz Haq on May 11, 2020 at 6:43pm

Lessons from Balakot
Electronic and information warfare can be game changers
Shahid RazaShahid Raza


"PAF has collected vast amounts of experience in EW during the bilateral Shaheen series exercise w/ China. These exercises offer the PAF a rare opportunity to both fly and contest against the Chinese Su-27 & Su-30 aircraft to learn about their capabilities, weaknesses & tactics"


http://forceindia.net/guest-column/lessons-from-balakot/

The PAF was forged in the inferno of the Indo-Pakistani wars of 1965 and 1971. Its organisational growth continued during the Soviet-Afghan war when the PAF was engaged in combat against the Soviet Air Force and its Communist Afghan allies. The PAF also learned valuable lessons on indigenisation during the so-called ‘lost decade’ of the Nineties during which the PAF was unable to equip itself adequately due to the US sanctions.

When the Indo-Pakistani conflict broke out in the remote mountainous regions of Kargil, the PAF found itself poorly equipped to handle the crisis, especially due to the lack of a Beyond Visual Range (BVR) capability on its F-16 fighters. The ‘BVR Gap’ between the PAF and IAF tilted airpower dynamics in favour of the IAF throughout the Kargil crisis, therefore its focus remained primarily on maintaining homeland defences. The seriousness of the situation for PAF during that time cannot be better exemplified than the fact that the IAF lost two aircraft during the Kargil conflict, none of which were shot down by PAF.

This situation for the PAF changed after the 9/11 attacks in 2001, as the Americans suddenly found themselves in the need for Pakistani assistance in Afghanistan, and consequently, the sanctions imposed on the PAF were lifted. This opened a gateway for new development and acquisition programmes initiated by the PAF leadership at that time, to conduct fast-paced modernisation of the entire PAF. This is the time when the PAF launched its JF-17 Thunder fighter development initiative with China, placed an order for the F-16 C/D Block-52+ fighters, sought delivery of its remaining F-16 fighters which were placed under long-term storage in the US and put forth a requirement for the Mid Life Upgrade (MLU-MIII) for its F-16 A/B Block-15 aircraft.

During the past two decades, despite economic challenges, the PAF maintained a steady pace of modernisation – it not only acquired new aircraft but also inducted new capabilities by purchasing high-end assets such as the SAAB 2000 EriEye AEW&C from Sweden, ZDK-03 Karakoram Eagle AWACS from China, SPADA-2000+ surface-to-air missile system from MBDA, AN/TPS-77 Long Range Surveillance Radar system from Lockheed Martin, FALCO UAVs from Italy, IL-78 aerial refuelling tankers from Ukraine, and more recently, JY-27A VHF Radar system from China. During this period, the PAF also attained Nuclear Strike Capabilities to complete the aerial delivery element of the ‘Minimum Credible Deterrence’ strategy.

Since the US-led invasion of Afghanistan, the PAF provided Close Air Support to the Pakistan Army then engaged in low-intensity conflict against various al Qaida linked militant organisations operating out of the unstable bordering regions of Pakistan and Afghanistan, and regular patrolling of the Indo-Pakistani border, mostly to deter potential intruders and UAVs. This all suddenly changed on 26 February 2019 when the IAF carried out a ‘Dead Drop’ strike in Pakistan’s Balakot region — across the International Border. This led to a reciprocal action by the PAF, which carried out a similar ‘Dead Drop’ operation across the Line of Control (LC) in the Jammu region, on the morning of 27 February 2019.

Comment by Riaz Haq on May 13, 2020 at 12:45pm

Ambassador M K Bhadrakumar: 'It is crucial today to realise where we have reached in this 15 year-period..." Indian Military scaling down? Cutting #weapons imports? Feel used by Americans? Stop competing with China? #India #Modi #China #US #IndoPacific. https://www.rediff.com/news/column/gen-rawat-hints-at-major-change-...


His views reflect radically new thinking. Concepts such as 'cold start', fighting two-front wars, interoperability and so on that were inherited from the UPA government (2004-2014) are being discarded.


The coronavirus pandemic focuses attention on the social sectors and the overall state of the country's economy where a reset of development strategies has become necessary demanding judicious resource allocation.
The country simply cannot afford the armament programme as of today, which is heavily dependent on import of prohibitively expensive arms purchases.
The operational requirements of the armed forces should not be exaggerated.
India's defence strategy is strictly limited to defending the country's borders and dominating the Indian Ocean Region.
A realistic and thorough reappraisal of operational priorities is needed to reduce arms imports so as to optimally utilise the available budget.
Equally, there is imperative need to indigenise the weapon systems. But 'unrealistic GSQRs' (general staff qualitative requirements) stand in the way.
Again, GSQRs should be redefined strictly in terms of our own operational requirements rather than by way of imitating the inventories of the US or other advanced countries.
General Rawat has spoken with remarkable candour. It has a stunning effect already. Especially, since a reasonable assumption is that General Rawat has articulated official thinking with a purpose to calibrate India's defence strategy.

Indeed, what we see here is not a mere 'tweaking' of the defence strategy.

His views reflect radically new thinking. Concepts such as 'cold start', fighting two-front wars, interoperability and so on that were inherited from the UPA government (2004-2014) are being discarded.

The new emphasis is on local products and local supply chains -- self-reliance.

General Rawat's interview appeared two days before Prime Minister Narendra Damodardas Modi's address to the nation on Tuesday where he said, inter alia, 'Making India self-reliant is the only way to make the 21st century belong to India... This era of self-reliance will be our new pledge, we have to move on with new resolve.'

Suffice to say, this week becomes a truly defining moment if one were not to miss the wood for the trees.

The doctrine laid down by the PM and applied to the sphere of defence strategy by General Rawat punctuates a 15-year steady upward curve in the thinking and actions by our bureaucratic and military establishment since the signing of the landmark India-US defence agreement in 2005 by then defence minister Pranab Mukherjee and his American counterpart Donald Rumsfeld.

It is crucial today to realise where we have reached in this 15 year-period in order to fully and properly assess the profundity of what General Rawat has said in his weekend interview.

From the Indian perspective, what began as a much-needed modernisation of our armed forces, metastasized incrementally -- almost inexorably -- over this period as an obsessive drive to attain interoperability between the Indian and US militaries.

The American side has done extraordinarily well in dominating the Indian bureaucracy -- civilian and military alike -- to take us to this point today, where we no longer, as General Rawat plaintively framed it, tend to define our GSQRs not 'as per our own operational requirements", but instead in terms of "what the US or other advanced countries have'.

If the US has seven aircraft carriers, shouldn't we at least have three? Our mind no longer applies logically, rationally.

The thinking is done for us largely by the Americans.

Comment by Riaz Haq on May 19, 2020 at 5:12pm

#Pakistan Air Force (#PAF) to buy more #AWACS from #Sweden. The aircraft can perform multiple missions & comes with a range of sensors, including its Erieye airborne radar. Pakistan is understood to currently operate 6 Saab 2000 Erieyes and #SaudiArabia 2. https://www.flightglobal.com/defence/saab-2000-lands-secretive-aewa...

Saab has secured an SKr1.6 billion ($165 million) order for an undisclosed number of its Saab 2000 Erieye airborne early warning and control (AEW&C) system aircraft.

“The industry’s nature is such that due to circumstances concerning the product and customer, further information about the customer will not be announced,” says the company.

Deliveries will run from 2020 to 2023.

Saab notes that the aircraft can perform multiple missions and comes with a range of sensors, including its Erieye airborne radar.

Pakistan is understood to operate six Saab 2000 Erieyes and Saudi Arabia two.

The Pakistan military’s yearbook for 2017-2018 disclosed that Islamabad also obtained three baseline Saab 2000s for a total cost of $9.3 million.

Comment by Riaz Haq on May 21, 2020 at 1:46pm

#UnitedStates to Upgrade F-16 Fighter Jets of #Pakistan with precision advanced target pods (ATP). An indefinite-delivery/indefinite-quantity contract for Pakistani F-16s has been awarded to Lockheed Martin. #PAF #F16 #ATP https://www.researchsnipers.com/united-states-to-upgrade-f-16-fight...

Foreign Military Sales (FMS) for Sniper, Infrared Search and Track (IRST), and Low Altitude Navigation and Targeting Infrared for Night (LANTIRN) navigation pod (fixed wing) hardware production are part of the contract.

On its website, the US DOD confirmed the development stating, “This contract provides the necessary resources required for the management, fabrication, upgrade/retrofit, integration support and testing and shipping of its non-developmental item (NDI) Sniper Advanced Targeting Pods (ATP) System, NDI LANTIRN Fixed Image Navigation Set upgrades, and the NDI IRST system as it relates to the requirements document associated with each specific delivery order placed under this contract.”

In Orlando, Florida the work on the production will begin. It will be completed by May 2025. The FMS is basically for the US allies that include Bahrain, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Egypt, Greece, Indonesia, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Republic of Korea, Kuwait, Morocco, Netherlands, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Poland, Qatar, Romania, Saudi Arabia, Slovakia, Taiwan, Thailand, and Turkey.

Comment by Riaz Haq on May 21, 2020 at 9:40pm

Pakistan F16 upgrades contract to Lockheed Martin

https://www.militaryaerospace.com/sensors/article/14176374/electroo...

The Sniper Advanced Targeting Pod provides precision targeting and situational awareness to combat aircraft crews, and is among the most widely deployed targeting system for fixed-wing aircraft in use by the U.S. Air Force and U.S. allies.

The pod provides precision strike, as well as non-traditional intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (NTISR) for close air support of ground forces. The pod has electro-optical imagery capability, a video datalink, and J-series coordinates.

The pod has image processing algorithms, stabilization, high-resolution, mid-wave forward-looking infrared (FLIR) and daylight TV sensors, dual-mode laser for geo-location, laser spot tracker, infrared marker, meta-data for video, and common software and hardware interfaces.

The pod has been flown on U.S. Air Force and international F-15E, F-16, B-1, A-10C, Harrier GR7/9, and CF-18 combat aircraft, and is suitable for the B-52 strategic bomber.

LANTIRN is a combined navigation and targeting pod system for use on the F-15E Strike Eagle and F-16 Fighting Falcon. It enables these aircraft to fly at low altitudes, at night, and under-the-weather to attack ground targets with a variety of precision-guided weapons.

The LANTIRN's AN/AAQ-13 navigation pod provides high-speed penetration and precision attack on tactical targets at night and in adverse weather, and contains a terrain-following radar and a fixed thermographic camera, which provides a visual cue and input to the aircraft's flight control system, enabling it to maintain a pre-selected altitude above the terrain and avoid obstacles.

The system's AN/AAQ-14 targeting pod contains a high-resolution, forward looking infrared sensor, which displays an infrared image of the target to the pilot; a laser designator and rangefinder for precise delivery of laser-guided munitions; a missile boresight; and software for automatic target tracking. LANTIRN has been in full-rate production since 1986.

IRST is a longwave infrared detection system that targets aircraft in a radar-denied environment. The system uses infrared search and track technology to detect and provide weapon-quality track solutions on potentially hostile aircraft.

Related: Raytheon to provide UAV electro-optical targeting systems in $50.2 million contract

The system has a processor, inertial measurement unit, and environmental control unit that fit inside the sensor pod, which attaches to a weapons station underneath the aircraft.

Infrared sensors like the IRST detect the heat from an aircraft's engine exhaust or even the heat generated by the friction of an aircraft as it passes through the atmosphere. Unlike radar, infrared sensors do not emit electronic signals, and do not give away their presence to adversaries.

On this contract Lockheed Martin will do the work in Orlando, Fla., and at locations to be identified with each order, and should be finished by May 2025. For more information contact Lockheed Martin Missiles and Fire Control online at www.lockheedmartin.com, or the Air Force Life Cycle Management Center-Robins at www.robins.af.mil/Units/AFLCMC.

Comment by Riaz Haq on May 22, 2020 at 4:22pm

USA, Pakistan and the F-16: What lies behind US's $125 mn military sales to Pakistan to monitor F-16s

By Brig Kuldip Singh (India)

As in 1979 and in 2001, once again, a crisis in Afghanistan has allowed Pakistan to reset its relations with the US.

https://www.dailyo.in/politics/usa-pakistan-donald-trump-imran-khan...

Between 2002 and 2018, the US has given Pakistan about $34.2 billion ($11.3 bn as economic aid, $8.3 as security aid, including $4 billion as Foreign Military Financing (FMF), and about $14.6 billion as Coalition Support Fund (reimbursement for deployment of Pakistan military in aid of US objectives).

Since 2002, Pakistan has received 60 Mid-Life Update (MLU) kits for its 1980s vintage fleet of F-16A/B aircraft. The US partly subsidised these kits, paying $477 million from FMF. This MLU, carried out in Turkey, a NATO member, had upgraded the older F-16A/B aircraft to Block-52 standards. It received 18 new F-16 C/D Block-52 aircraft for $1.43 billion, including 500 x AMRAAMs, advanced medium-range air-to-air missiles — of the kind used to bring down Wing Commander Abhinandan Varthaman’s MiG-21 in the February 27 dogfight this year.

Another 14x F-16 A/B aircraft were given free by the US, after being deemed Excess Defense Articles. Additionally, Pakistan received six second-hand F-16s (Block-15 Air Defence Fighter (ADF) version) from Turkey.

Enter the US Technical Support Teams

The Pakistani military operates with a mix of western, Soviet/Russian and Chinese equipment — and there are documented instances of Pakistan providing China access to western military technology — particularly that from the US — which Beijing then reverse-engineered

When the US commenced supplying F-16s to Pakistan in the early 1980s, China had expressed explicit interest in its avionics and associated technology. Later, in 2006, when the US agreed to upgrade the PAF’s existing fleet of F-16 A/B and also supply new F-16 C/D aircraft, it did not want China to get access to the advanced F-16 technologies in view of the changed geopolitical circumstances.

Hence, the US insisted that the MLU be carried out outside of Pakistan, and the upgraded and the new F-16s be segregated from PAF’s other air bases where Chinese technicians operate.

Comment by Riaz Haq on May 23, 2020 at 11:04am

Peace Gate: US F-16 Sales to Pakistan 1984


https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a147543.pdf


The sale of 40 F-16 Multi-role fighter aircraft to the
emerging nation of Pakistan not only encompasses a variety
of geo-political, economic, and military consequences for the
country itself but subsequently creates unique challenges
for USAF foreign military sales program managers. This
thesis examines the managerial challenges and program management performance during the acquisition and logistics
support phases of the Peace Gate program. By first analyzing
Pakistan as an emerging nation and recipient of F-16 aircraft
under the Zia dictatorship, the thesis then discusses program
management impediments and consequent management action taken
by the USAF, Pakistan Air Force, and contractor management
teams. Managerial decisions and strategies applied during
the sale and support phases are assessed in light of accomplishing Peace Gate program objectives. Conclusions regarding the contribution of specific managment techniques toward
program success are made.

-----------------

As of May 1984, 15 aircraft have been
delivered (six from PG I and nine from PG II); the entire
program cost for PG I has been aid by the Government of
Pakistan (GOP); and ten PAF pilots and over 100 maintenance
technicians have been trained in CONUS. CIS work for PG I
has been completed and PG II CIS work has begun (19).

-------------------

Because the economic, political and military elements of
the Peace Gate environment determine, to a large extent, the
potential for program success and the character of program
decision making during the life of Peace Gate, this chapter
attempts to provide some insight into the program's operating
environment.
Geography
Pakistan's world position and perception of international events is largely determined by its strategic loca- r
tion. The Islamic Republic of Pakistan, a South Asian Third
World country approximately the size and shape of California, *.
is surrounded by either historic or current adversarial
nations. Pakistan has four neighboring states: Iran to the
southwest, Afghanistan to the north and west, China to the
northeast, and India to the east; all of which play an
important part in determining its security requirements
(14:680). Pakistan is a country of considerable environmental variety. The northern border of its 1100 mile expanse
is comprised of the Hindu Kush mountains--the greatest
concentration of high peaks in the world.

-------------

Because of Pakistan's tenuous agricultural and industrial development, it is one of the 49 United
Nations (UN) designated "low income countries of the world"
(28:1367). Its low per capita Gross National Product (GNP)
of about $300 (70:128) is aggravated by its 3.2 percent
population growth rate--one of the highest in the world
(66:37). The full extent of Pakistan's economic plight is
perhaps best expressed by the tragic fact that 34 percent of
its population is still classified as "living in a state of
absolute poverty" (28:1367).
--------

Needless to say, the industrial capacity and economic
base of Pakistan are of great concern to American Foreign
Military Sales decision makers (66:41). Pakistan lacks the
industrial capacity to sustain a technical defense program
without substantial support. Additionally, economic conditions have led a number of U.S. government officials to
question Pakistan's ability to afford a major military
modernization program, either in the short run or long term
(67:80).

Comment by Riaz Haq on May 26, 2020 at 6:47pm

Given Islamabad’s intimate relationship with China and the economic problems currently gripping the country, acquiring the JH-7 heavy strike fighter can both provide its navy with much needed aerial strike capability as well as free up PAF’s core assets to engage with the IAF for supremacy over the battlefields of Kashmir and Punjab.

https://thediplomat.com/2020/05/is-the-chinese-jh-7-an-answer-to-th...

The JH-7, while utilizing an old air frame, is a highly effective aircraft for deep strike operations. The jet first flew in 1988 and small numbers were delivered to the Chinese People’s Liberation Army Air Force during the 1990s. An improved version of the JH-7 fighter-bomber, also known by the NATO designation Flounder, began to be inducted in large numbers after 2004, after the Chinese aviation industry was able to indigenously manufacture a derivative of the Rolls Royce Spey engine. The Spey engine was designed specifically by the British for development of a low flying naval strike aircraft to counter the Soviet Navy in the Cold War.

Faced with cuts in defense expenditure and decreasing global influence after World War II, Britain could no longer afford to operate a sizable navy to deter the Soviet threat. Instead, the British opted for developing naval strike aircraft, such as the Blackburn Buccaneer, to extract a heavy toll on large Soviet Navy cruisers in a future conflict. The Spey engines were later utilized on the Royal Air Force’s fleet of F-4 Phantoms, giving the aircraft greater range and a shorter takeoff distance.

In addition to their low maintenance and impressive safety record, the Spey engine’s utility lies in the fact that it is designed specifically for sustained low altitude flight below the radar horizon of enemy naval vessels. Despite significant advances in jet engine development since the Cold War, the majority of engines today are designed for mid-to-high altitude flight. Flying at low altitude to avoid radar detection for longer periods thus decreases much of the engines’ range.

The JH-7 also complements the Pakistan Navy’s combat doctrine, which is based on the anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) blueprint. The PN’s three Khalid-class submarines form the linchpin of their A2/AD strategy, with the wartime objective of preventing an attempted blockade of the vital Karachi port by the Indian Navy. Acquisition of the JH -7 by Pakistan would provide Islamabad with lethal capability to considerably limit the maneuvering capacity of the Indian Navy in the proximity of Karachi port.

Also, the JH-7, with its longer combat range, heavy payload capacity, and ability to fly under enemy radar cover provides Islamabad with an offensive capacity targeted at India’s protracted western coastline. Hence, acquisition of the JH-7 by Pakistan serves both defensive and offensive purposes. The improved JH-7A variant currently in service with the PLA Air Force is capable to carry over seven tonnes of armament, including four KD-88/YJ-83 anti-ship missiles.

The capability to carry long range anti-ship missiles, which can be launched more than 100 miles away from their targets, means that the JH-7 is able to utilize an asymmetric “hit and run” strategy before enemy air defenses can effectively engage with it. This doctrine was perhaps most aptly demonstrated by the Argentine Air Force during the 1982 Falklands War, as French Super Etendard strike aircraft armed with Exocet missiles sank two British warships.

One alternative to the JH-7 for Pakistan is its existing arsenal of cruise missiles, but this option has its own pitfalls. First, cruise missiles follow a predictable trajectory and are vulnerable to interception by India’s air defense network and fighter aircraft such as the Sukhoi 30 MKI. Second, the use of cruise missiles, even in an all-out conflict, presents a significant leap in terms of escalation. As such, a cruise missile attack by either New Delhi or Islamabad can lead to an eventual nuclear exchange.

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