Comment by Riaz Haq on April 1, 2021 at 6:16pm

“What our (#Indian) textbooks don't tell us: Why the #Rajputs failed miserably in battle for centuries. They were defeated by Ghazni, Gloria, Khilji, Babur, Akbar (#Mughals) the #Marathas and the #British”. #Hindutva #Modi #BJP #India http://scroll.in/article/728636/what-our-textbooks-dont-tell-us-why...

Girish Shahane

What’s astonishing is that centuries of being out-thought and out-manoeuvred had no impact on the Rajput approach to war. Rana Pratap used precisely the same full frontal attack at Haldighati in 1576 that had failed so often before. Haldighati was a minor clash by the standards of Tarain and Khanua. Pratap was at the head of perhaps 3,000 men and faced about 5,000 Mughal troops. The encounter was far from the Hindu Rajput versus Muslim confrontation it is often made out to be. Rana Pratap had on his side a force of Bhil archers, as well as the assistance of Hakim Shah of the Sur clan, which had ruled North India before Akbar’s rise to power. Man Singh, a Rajput who had accepted Akbar’s suzerainty and adopted the Turko-Mongol battle plan led the Mughal troops. Though Pratap’s continued rebellion following his defeat at Haldighati was admirable in many ways, he was never anything more than an annoyance to the Mughal army. That he is now placed, in the minds of many Indians, on par with Akbar or on a higher plane says much about the twisted communal politics of the subcontinent.

There’s one other factor that contributed substantially to Rajput defeats: the opium habit. Taking opium was established practice among Rajputs in any case, but they considerably upped the quantity they consumed when going into battle. They ended up stoned out of their minds and in no fit state to process any instruction beyond, “kill or be killed”. Opium contributed considerably to the fearlessness of Rajputs in the arena, but also rendered them incapable of coordinating complex manoeuvres. There’s an apt warning for school kids: don’t do drugs, or you’ll squander an empire.

Comment by Riaz Haq on October 13, 2022 at 11:25am

Book Review | Book of Reckoning
October 12, 2022 forceindia 0 Comment
A tour de force of South Asia’s military, tech and strategic dynamics
Andrew Korybko


https://forceindia.net/book-of-reckoning/

Pravin Sawhney’s The Last War: How AI Will Shape India’s Final Showdown With China is the most detailed and up-to-date work about South Asia’s military, technological, and strategic dynamics. The author compellingly argues that India is far behind China as a result of mistakenly prioritizing Pakistan as its top security threat. By disproportionately focusing on the western vector of its national security interests, including countering related unconventional threats, Delhi is unprepared to adequately address newfound challenges along the northern one that are much more conventional in nature.

The summer 2020 clashes over the Galwan river valley should have served as a belated wake-up call, but they failed to be interpreted properly according to Sawhney, who provides evidence proving that decisionmakers continue to misperceive everything connected to China. He’s particularly concerned that his homeland might not be able to catch up with the cutting-edge challenges posed by China’s unprecedented military modernisation, which comprises the bulk of his book. It’s here where the author showcases his unparalleled expertise on military, technological, and strategic dynamics.

The Last War opens dramatically with the scenario of a Chinese sneak attack on India that includes cyberattacks, robot invasions, and swarms of miniature assassination drones, among other aspects. This captivates the reader’s imagination since they’re immediately intrigued to learn more about how Sawhney arrived at this particular vision of the future. He then proceeds to describe these two Great Powers’ polar opposite security paradigms, military modernisation programmes, and points of friction. Plenty of insight is shared about Pakistan and the US too, which helps complete the picture.

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Upon learning how far India is behind China, it becomes clear to the reader that the former is at risk of sleepwalking into a disaster of epic proportions unless it urgently changes course to correct the trajectory that it’s on. Fundamental to the author’s scenario forecast is his concern that Delhi is too distracted by Pakistan to appreciate the full-spectrum paradigm-changing challenges posed by China. Furthermore, he argues that its armed forces don’t coordinate at the level required to effectively address this, nor does its political leadership have a proper understanding of technological trends.

Sawhney is also suspicious of the US’ influence over India, which he very strongly suggests is aimed at exploiting it as a proxy against China, one that Washington will inevitably hang out to dry once the going gets tough for Delhi in the event of a serious conflict with Beijing. It’s this patriotic motivation that drove him to elaborate on everything as extensively as he did, which includes very sharp critiques of India’s institutions. Readers should always remember this so as not to be put off by some of what he wrote, which for as ‘politically inconvenient’ as it might be for some, is fully cited and thus credible.

Comment by Riaz Haq on November 18, 2022 at 7:05am

Pravin Sawhney
@PravinSawhney
For Pakistani friends:
1. Under CPEC, you have excellent opportunity to enter digital & AI age for prosperity.
2. Given deep military ties with PLA, Pak can adopt to new character of war quickly.
3. Definition of deterrence has changed. Cruise missiles replaced by HGVs!

https://twitter.com/PravinSawhney/status/1593618020026372096?s=20&a...

Comment by Riaz Haq on March 10, 2023 at 8:36am

Kashmir letters cast doubt on claims Nehru blundered by agreeing ceasefire
Exclusive: papers kept classified for decades reveal India’s first PM acted on advice from most senior general


https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/mar/08/kashmir-letters-cast-...

In his message to (Prime Minister) Nehru dated 28 November 1948, (General Sir Francis Robert Roy )Bucher warned of fatigue among Indian troops in Kashmir, adding that an “overall military decision was no longer possible”.

“Army personnel evince two weaknesses, lack of training in the junior leaders, tiredness and ennui in the other ranks … In brief, the army needs respite for leave, training, and vitalising.”

Nehru, in response, raised concerns over reports that Pakistan intended within weeks to bomb Indian positions from the sky. Meanwhile, Pakistan was building roads to maintain and advance its positions.

In another letter to Bucher sent on 23 December 1948, Nehru wrote: “It is clear to me that we cannot rely on Pakistan remaining on the defensive.” He added: “In the event of Pakistan continuing their persistent shelling and offensive operation and our not being able to check this there, there is every likelihood of war taking place with Pakistan.”

In a later letter dated 28 December, Bucher made his position clear: “I am afraid we cannot take military action to stop every road-building operation by Pakistan. May I suggest a political approach to this problem.”

The war ended on 1 January 1949 with a ceasefire arranged by the United Nations, and later that year Nehru provided special status to the state of Jammu and Kashmir, giving the region autonomy.


Over the decades, India and Pakistan have fought three more wars over the Kashmir issue and the ensuing border dispute. However, the measures in article 370 provided by Nehru were seen by Kashmiris as crucial to protecting their rights in the India-controlled parts of the Muslim-majority state, and also reduced tensions with Muslim-majority Pakistan.

But in 2019, under the leadership of Hindu nationalist Modi, Delhi formally revoked the state’s constitutional autonomy, in an attempt to integrate it fully into India. The decision tightened the government’s grip over the region and stoked anger and resentment.

The ruling Bharatiya Janata party justified its decision by suggesting Nehru had made a mistake, blaming him for not seeking to grab more territory from Pakistani forces. The India home affairs minister, Amit Shah, in 2019 said the decision to reach a UN-mediated compromise was Nehru’s “biggest mistake”, criticising it as a “Himalayan blunder”.

“What was the need to announce a ceasefire when we were about to win the war?” Shah said.

However, the Bucher papers, as they are known in India, suggest Nehru was acting on informed advice from his military officers.

Bucher, a British officer, was chosen by post-independence India to become commander-in-chief of the Indian army due to his familiarity with Indian military operations and his ability to bridge the gap between British and Indian military personnel. He served between 1948 and 1949 until his retirement and was the last non-Indian to hold the top military post.

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