Comment by Riaz Haq 6 hours ago

Pakistan’s Eight Hangor Submarines Could Strain India’s Navy, Former Admiral Warns

Former Indian vice admiral Sanjay Mahindru warns that Pakistan’s planned eight-boat Hangor fleet could force India to devote more ships, aircraft and sensors to tracking concealed threats.


https://defencesecurityasia.com/en/pakistan-hangor-submarines-india...


India’s Delayed Submarine Replacement Magnifies the Hangor Window
Pakistan’s first Hangor entered service eleven years after the 2015 order, while India’s Project 75I programme for six air-independent propulsion submarines remained unsigned by mid-2026, illustrating how acquisition tempo can alter regional risk before fleet totals decisively change.

Project 75I has spent roughly two decades in planning and negotiation, with German Type 214-derived proposals widely discussed, but even a near-term contract would likely place the first completed Indian submarine around 2032–2033 under optimistic industrial and testing assumptions.

Meanwhile, several Sindhughosh-class Kilo and Shishumar-class HDW submarines are approaching retirement, creating a late-2020s readiness window in which hull availability, refit schedules, and crew pipelines may matter more than nominal Indian fleet strength displayed on paper

India’s six Kalvari-class Scorpène submarines provide modern conventional capability, but they entered service without air-independent propulsion, while plans to integrate an indigenous AIP plug during future refits remain subject to engineering validation, schedule risk, and availability costs.

This mismatch explains Mahindru’s “lost decade” description because submarine construction cannot be accelerated instantly; specialised steel, pressure-hull fabrication, combat-system integration, sea trials, certification, crew training, and dockyard capacity impose long lead times after political approval.Explore History

Simply ordering more boats would therefore leave an immediate surveillance deficit, whereas investments in seabed sensors, unmanned underwater vehicles, deployable arrays, maritime patrol aviation, and networked processing could improve detection coverage before new Indian submarines become operational.

India must also protect anti-submarine warfare availability by maintaining P-8I mission systems, stocking sonobuoys and lightweight torpedoes, expanding MH-60R support, and ensuring surface combatants possess reliable towed-array sonars, trained operators, and sufficient operational flying hours.

Force posture becomes central because sensors concentrated near major bases may leave patrol gaps elsewhere, while widely dispersed systems require secure communications, common acoustic libraries, automated correlation, and command arrangements capable of converting detections into timely operational decisions.ASW technology training

Pakistan faces parallel constraints, including Chinese CHD620 diesel-engine reliability after German export restrictions blocked planned MTU engines, local construction delays, infrastructure expansion, crew generation, and the challenge of sustaining high readiness across eleven eventual AIP-equipped submarines.

The undersea balance will consequently depend less upon ceremonial commissioning totals than deployable boats, trained crews, maintenance throughput, weapon readiness, sensor integration, and each navy’s ability to regenerate patrols after failures, losses, or prolonged wartime operations.

(CLICK HERE): India’s 200-Warship Surge Targets China as Pakistan’s Hangor Submarines Reshape the Indian Ocean
Underwater Domain Awareness Will Decide Whether Hangor Changes the Balance
Mahindru’s proposed remedy places underwater domain awareness above platform-for-platform competition because a submarine that can be continuously detected becomes containable, whereas an unlocated boat can influence fleet behaviour, harbour activity, and political decision-making without firing a weapon.Submarine fleet analysis

Comment

• ‹ Previous
• 1
• 2
• 3
• 4
• Next ›
• Page