Comment by Riaz Haq on March 27, 2026 at 8:21pm

China is moving to bolster its security presence in the Middle East through comprehensive partnerships, and the Pakistani-Chinese alliance serves as a bridge to elevate this partnership.
Dr.Nadia Helmy
BY
DR.NADIA HELMY


https://moderndiplomacy.eu/2026/03/27/behind-the-gulfs-shift-to-bei...

The Pakistani army plays a pivotal strategic role in bridging the military perspectives of China and the Gulf states, leveraging its close ties with Beijing and its historical defense partnerships with Saudi Arabia and the UAE. Currently, there is no formal, unified joint military structure between Pakistan and the Gulf under Chinese leadership, but current developments suggest the establishment of an integrated security system in which Pakistan acts as a conduit for transferring Chinese expertise and technology to the region. Here, China places great importance on the role of the Pakistani army in facilitating interoperability between Chinese and Gulf military doctrines: The Pakistani army works to coordinate interoperability between Gulf and Chinese forces through multilateral military exercises: Pakistan conducts regular, intensive exercises with China, such as Shaheen and Sea Guardian, and others with Saudi Arabia, such as Al-Kasih. This allows Pakistan to develop military protocols that combine Eastern and Western training methods, facilitating their future integration into regional security structures. With intelligence sharing between China and Pakistan, Islamabad acts as an informal channel for exchanging security assessments regarding threats in the Indian Ocean and the Arabian Sea, which serves both Gulf energy security and Chinese interests.

The importance of the Chinese-Pakistani alliance in this context stems from several reasons, most notably advanced military and technological support. Pakistan relies heavily on China (approximately 70% of its defense imports between the two countries in 2019-2026), making China the primary source of drones, submarines, and advanced air defense systems that a joint force might require. Furthermore, the transfer of expertise and training: given the Pakistani army’s extensive experience in combat operations and training and its status as a strategic partner of Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states, its integration into a joint military structure led by Beijing would be facilitated. In addition, (Pakistan’s strategic and nuclear weight): China contributes to modernizing Pakistan’s defense capabilities, granting any potential alliance defensive depth and influence that balances other powers in the region, especially considering Pakistan’s partnerships with Turkey and China.

The most prominent roles of the Pakistani army in assisting China in forming a joint military structure with the Gulf states led by China in this context include facilitating the transfer and localization of Chinese military technology. Pakistan serves as the largest field-testing ground for Chinese weaponry and acts as a technical and operational intermediary for integrating these weapons into the arsenals of the Gulf states (by integrating Chinese combat systems into their defense ministries and armies). Here, Gulf countries, under the guidance of the Pakistani Air Force, have tested Chinese aircraft, such as the J-10C & JF-17.

Comment by Riaz Haq on March 27, 2026 at 8:22pm

China is moving to bolster its security presence in the Middle East through comprehensive partnerships, and the Pakistani-Chinese alliance serves as a bridge to elevate this partnership.
Dr.Nadia Helmy

https://moderndiplomacy.eu/2026/03/27/behind-the-gulfs-shift-to-bei...


These Chinese aircraft were tested in joint exercises with Gulf countries, such as the Zelzal-2 exercise with Qatar, to assess their effectiveness against Western systems, encouraging the Gulf states to acquire them. Furthermore, the Pakistani military’s role as a strategic alternative for China in the Gulf region, especially with the signing of the Joint Strategic Defense Agreement between Saudi Arabia and Pakistan in 2025, has positioned China as a vital supplier of weapons, training, and joint production, offering an alternative to traditional suppliers.

Here, Chinese intelligence, military, defense, and security circles view this cooperation with Pakistan as an alternative to traditional alliances and as an urgent necessity for China to restore regional balance amidst tensions with Iran. As Gulf partners seek to diversify their defense partnerships away from the West, China’s military leadership in the region is emerging. China is moving to strengthen its security presence in the Middle East through comprehensive partnerships, and the Pakistani alliance represents the bridge to elevate this partnership from the economic level within the Belt and Road Initiative to the level of a defense alliance. This ensures the security of energy supplies and maritime routes through the Arabian Sea, which connect China to the Gulf.

In this context, Pakistan plays a pivotal role as a strategic ally and a key gateway for Chinese penetration into South Asia and the Indian Ocean. The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) is a fundamental pillar of this endeavor. Here, Pakistan provides China with a direct sea outlet via the Pakistani port of Gwadar, reducing Beijing’s reliance on the Strait of Malacca, where it competes with the United States. Meanwhile, China strengthens its presence through extensive military, economic, and technological support to achieve shared geopolitical objectives, particularly balancing power with India. The most prominent aspect of Pakistan’s role in Chinese expansion is the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC).

The CPEC is the flagship project of China’s Belt and Road Initiative, connecting western China to the Indian Ocean via Pakistan. It includes joint investments in infrastructure, energy, and transportation. Furthermore, the strategic role of the Pakistani port of Gwadar is crucial; located in Pakistan’s Balochistan province, Gwadar, financed and operated by the Chinese, is a key linchpin in China’s string of pearls maritime strategy, granting China a permanent naval presence in the Arabian Sea. China is therefore relying on Pakistan to secure the vital corridors of its Belt and Road Initiative, specifically the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC).

This corridor connects China with the Pakistani port of Gwadar, near the Iranian Strait of Hormuz. The Pakistani military provides military protection for the Chinese infrastructure of this economic corridor, which Gulf states are seeking to invest in to connect their ports with Central Asia and China. Furthermore, the Pakistani military facilitates China’s naval presence in the region and the Gulf. Pakistani-Gulf maritime cooperation allows Chinese naval forces access to the region to secure trade routes, thus laying the foundation for a joint maritime security structure under Beijing’s auspices, with military assistance from the Pakistani capital, Islamabad.

Comment by Riaz Haq on March 27, 2026 at 8:23pm

China is moving to bolster its security presence in the Middle East through comprehensive partnerships, and the Pakistani-Chinese alliance serves as a bridge to elevate this partnership.
Dr.Nadia Helmy

https://moderndiplomacy.eu/2026/03/27/behind-the-gulfs-shift-to-bei...

This is coupled with the existence and coordination of the China-Pakistan military and defense alliance, where Pakistan relies on China for over 70-80% of its arms imports, including fighter jets, submarines, and air defense systems. This makes Pakistan a testing ground for Chinese military technology and a counterweight to Indian superiority. Pakistan also provides reciprocal diplomatic support to China, strongly backing China’s policies on issues such as the one-China policy, Xinjiang, and Taiwan, while China defends Pakistan in international forums like the UN Security Council and the Nuclear Suppliers Group. Furthermore, Pakistan serves as a bridge to the Islamic world for China, playing a role in enhancing China’s diplomatic and political influence in the Middle East and the wider Muslim world. However, despite the economic benefits of the relationship, this penetration faces security challenges, such as attacks on Chinese workers in several Pakistani cities, perpetrated by internationally funded terrorist groups.

Finally, Pakistan plays a diplomatic and military mediating role for China. Historically, Pakistan has successfully acted as a bridge between China and the West, and today it is repeating this role between Beijing and Riyadh, aiming to reduce reliance on traditional allies. Pakistan supports the Gulf’s move towards diversifying security partnerships, promoting China as a balancing power that does not impose complex political conditions on arms deals and military cooperation. Furthermore, there is the potential for China to provide Pakistan with a nuclear umbrella. The defense partnership between Saudi Arabia and Pakistan could pave the way for strategic nuclear cooperation in which China would play a technical role, thus strengthening the military weight of this emerging axis.

Comment by Riaz Haq on March 28, 2026 at 7:32am

Brian Allen
@allenanalysis
Trump on Saudi Arabia’s Crown Prince MBS today:

“He didn’t think he would be kissing my ass. He really didn’t. And now he has to be nice to me. He better be nice to me.”

This is how the President of the United States describes America’s most important Gulf ally.

The same Saudi Arabia that:

— Cut oil production by 6.7 million barrels

— Whose energy infrastructure Iran threatened to destroy

— Who the US needs to keep oil markets stable

— Who Trump is asking to join the Iran war

Diplomatic relationships are built over decades.

Trump just described the Crown Prince of Saudi Arabia as someone kissing his body parts — on camera — while asking him for military cooperation.

France got an 8 out of 10. Japan got Pearl Harbor. Saudi Arabia got this.

The isolation of America is not just a policy failure.
It is a daily practice.

https://x.com/allenanalysis/status/2037862348094894277?s=20

Comment by Riaz Haq on May 5, 2026 at 10:50am

Foreign Affairs Magazine

@ForeignAffairs

Gulf governments are now “rejecting an assumption, held by the United States and Israel, that Gulf states could be incorporated into a regional security architecture premised on Israeli dominance,” writes @hahellyer.


https://x.com/foreignaffairs/status/2051418933765312936?s=61&t=...

https://www.foreignaffairs.com/united-states/end-axis-abraham

——-

But within the last decade, some Gulf countries have normalized relations with Israel (or considered doing so) while sidestepping questions of Palestinian self-determination, thereby depriving Palestinian leaders of important leverage. For countries such as the United Arab Emirates, normalization came with access to advanced U.S. and Israeli military technology, commercial deals with Israel, and the chance to embed more deeply into Washington’s regional security architecture. The first Trump administration, for example, agreed to sell F-35 fighter jets to the UAE to sweeten its normalization deal with Israel. (The sale ended up stalling under the Biden administration, but the normalization agreement went ahead.) The United States was also in talks with Saudi Arabia to sign a defense pact on the condition that Riyadh normalized ties with Israel.

Nevertheless, even those Gulf capitals that were willing to normalize relations with Israel never embraced the idea that they could support Israeli dominance, either directly or indirectly. Israel already had poor relations with many Arab countries and its response to Hamas’s October 7, 2023, attack further eroded its standing in the region. Israel killed over 70,000 Palestinians in its campaign in Gaza, moved to annex the West Bank, bombed Lebanon and Syria, and launched incursions into both countries. In September 2025, Israel violated Qatari sovereignty by launching lethal strikes on a residence in Doha. Its goal was to kill Hamas members who were there to take part in U.S.-facilitated negotiations.

———

The Gulf should also improve its domestic defense industries, focusing on air defense in particular. Saudi Arabia and the UAE have already made efforts to form state-owned defense companies, such as Saudi Arabian Military Industries (which aims to localize 50 percent of the kingdom’s military spending by 2030) and Edge Group, an Emirati conglomerate that has already begun to produce large numbers of precision-guided munitions. But throughout the war, Gulf countries have faced acute shortages of interceptor missiles that no domestic industry can yet fill. Gulf countries also need to band together diplomatically to have enough weight—and enough leverage over Washington—to influence the decisions that determine their fate.

Washington has long framed its regional strategy around the claim that Israeli and Gulf security are complementary, and that U.S.-backed normalization produces stability. But the past year has exposed the hollowness of that assumption. The chasm between Netanyahu’s vision of a remade Middle East and the aspirations of Arab states is far too wide to bridge. What Gulf states want is a security order that takes their interests seriously on their own terms—not as a corollary of Israeli or Iranian ambitions

Comment by Riaz Haq on May 11, 2026 at 9:25am

Pakistan’s “Fatah-V” Shockwave: Suspected 1,000km Stealth Strike Rocket Could Rewrite India-Pakistan Military Balance - Defence Security Asia

https://defencesecurityasia.com/en/pakistan-fatah-v-stealth-strike-...

Pakistan’s emerging Fatah-V deep-strike precision rocket programme is triggering fresh strategic alarm across South Asia as analysts warn the low-observable 1,000km-range system could transform conventional deterrence, overwhelm air defences, and compress escalation timelines between two nuclear powers.


The emergence of Pakistan’s reported Fatah-V deep-strike precision rocket programme is rapidly intensifying strategic anxiety across South Asia because the system could provide Islamabad with a survivable conventional strike capability reaching nearly 1,000 kilometres into Indian territory without crossing the nuclear threshold.

(DEFENCE SECURITY ASIA) — The emergence of Pakistan’s reported Fatah-V deep-strike precision rocket programme is rapidly intensifying strategic anxiety across South Asia because the system could provide Islamabad with a survivable conventional strike capability reaching nearly 1,000 kilometres into Indian territory without crossing the nuclear threshold.
Pakistani media descriptions portraying Fatah-V as a low-observable, terrain-hugging precision weapon capable of evading radar horizons until late flight phases are now fuelling concerns that the region is entering a new era dominated by mobile, dispersed, precision-guided missile warfare rather than traditional force-on-force attrition.

Although no official confirmation has yet emerged from Pakistan’s Inter-Services Public Relations regarding testing schedules or operational specifications, the consistent appearance of Fatah-V within Pakistani strategic discourse suggests the Army Rocket Force Command is being positioned as a central pillar of Islamabad’s evolving non-nuclear deterrence architecture.

The projected 1,000km operational range would theoretically enable launch units operating deep inside Pakistani territory to threaten Indian airbases, logistics hubs, ammunition depots, command facilities, transportation infrastructure, and strategic support nodes without exposing launch platforms to immediate frontline counter-battery attacks.

Pakistani strategic commentators increasingly frame the Fatah-V programme as an indigenous technological equaliser capable of offsetting India’s larger conventional force structure through precision, survivability, mobility, and saturation attack tactics designed to complicate Indian operational planning.

The system’s reported emphasis on low-altitude trajectories and radar-evasive flight profiles has triggered speculation that Fatah-V could blur the line between guided rocket artillery and conventional cruise missile concepts despite the absence of official confirmation describing it as a dedicated Very Low Observable (VLO) cruise missile.

Analysts monitoring South Asian missile competition increasingly view the programme as part of a broader regional transition toward long-range conventional precision strike systems intended to create escalation options below nuclear employment while simultaneously compressing crisis decision timelines during future India-Pakistan confrontations.

The Army Rocket Force Command, established in August 2025, appears specifically structured to institutionalise Pakistan’s growing inventory of long-range conventional strike systems while deliberately separating those capabilities from nuclear assets controlled under the Strategic Forces Command.

If successfully developed and operationalised, Fatah-V could become one of Pakistan’s most strategically consequential conventional missile programmes since the introduction of the Babur cruise missile family because it potentially combines range, mobility, precision, and salvo-fire economics within a highly survivable operational framework.

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