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Since the dawn of the 21st century, the US strategy has been to woo India and to build it up as a counterweight to rising China in the Indo-Pacific region. Most beltway analysts agree with this policy. However, the current Trump administration has taken significant actions, such as the imposition of 50% tariffs on India's exports to the US, that appear to defy this conventional wisdom widely shared in the West. Does President Trump have a grand strategy guiding these actions? George Friedman, the founder of Geopolitical Futures, believes the answer is Yes.
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| George Friedman |
George Friedman is an American futurologist, political scientist, and writer. He writes about international relations. He is the founder and chairman of Geopolitical Futures. Prior to founding Geopolitical Futures, he was chairman of the publishing company Stratfor
In a recent podcast, Friedman said "India is not an essential country from the American standpoint". "They (Indians) are a useful ally, but precisely not indispensable and in fact, not really able to give us what we want", he added. "They do participate in the quad, but their naval force is not significantly needed. The quad being an alliance basically against China at sea. And simultaneously, it was discovered that their economic capacity is far below what we need. So it was not that they were dispensable, but at the same time, it was not something that we had to take into account greatly".
Getting tough with the Indians also allowed the US to "signal to the Chinese that we’re not going to be going to war with them, which they worried about India and to the Russians that we really are going to impose tariffs".
In answer to a question as to whether the Indians might feel the US is using them as "a tool as it tries to reach deals with Russia and China", Friedman said: "this is the problem of weaker nations trying to play games with very strong nations. They get used".
What Friedman has articulated runs counter to a quarter century of the US policy of boosting India to check China. Even some of India's friends in Washington are starting to acknowledge that India is no match to China. Ashley Tellis, a strongly pro-India analyst in the United States, recently wrote an essay for Foreign Affairs magazine titled "India's Great Power Delusions". Here is an excerpt from it:
"Although India has grown in economic strength over the last two decades, it is not growing fast enough to balance China, let alone the United States, even in the long term. It will become a great power, in terms of relative GDP, by midcentury, but not a superpower. In military terms, it is the most significant conventional power in South Asia, but here, too, its advantages over its local rival are not enormous: in fighting in May, Pakistan used Chinese-supplied defense systems to shoot down Indian aircraft. With China on one side and an adversarial Pakistan on the other, India must always fear the prospect of an unpalatable two-front war. Meanwhile, at home, the country is shedding one of its main sources of strength—its liberal democracy—by embracing Hindu nationalism. This evolution could undermine India’s rise by intensifying communal tensions and exacerbating problems with its neighbors, forcing it to redirect security resources inward to the detriment of outward power projection. The country’s illiberal pivot further undermines the rules-based international order that has served it so well".
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https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2025/dec/21/trumps-surprising-...
Analysts warned that Pakistan could face its “most severe” national security challenge in at least a decade and possibly since the 1990s. Yet by the end of 2025, Pakistan appears to have gone from pariah to partner. Few nations have experienced a reputational swing as swift or dramatic. Pakistan has emerged as a pillar of President Trump’s evolving foreign policy vision for South Asia.
Strategically, senior Trump advisers also regarded Pakistan with unease. Its close ties with China especially reinforced these concerns. Pakistani authorities often boast of a friendship with Beijing “deeper than the oceans, taller than the mountains.” The prevailing expectation among Mr. Trump’s emerging foreign policy circle was clear: Double down on India, strengthen the Quad as its Indo-Pacific anchor and, in India’s long-standing interests, sideline Islamabad.
Yet even as Washington leaned into an India-first posture, concerns were mounting about India’s trajectory, from its increasingly majoritarian domestic politics and constraints on civil liberties to its uneven military performance and growing reputation for diplomatic inflexibility. These issues, long ignored or downplayed, were beginning to cast doubt on India’s reliability as regional stabilizer.
The first sign that the icy relationship was beginning to thaw was a series of discreet counterterrorism exchanges, suggesting Islamabad was finally willing to engage in substantive cooperation. When Mr. Trump unexpectedly praised Pakistan’s efforts in a national address in March, Washington was taken aback. The remarks cut directly against long-standing policy, and the infamous “DC Blob” was faced with a new reality regarding Pakistan as a newer and stronger ally.
Islamabad seized the opportunity. Each small gesture of cooperation from Islamabad earned it unexpected credit in Washington, and that credit, in turn, encouraged more engagement. What had long been a brittle, transactional relationship began to take on greater importance as both sides realigned to the new realities.
Trump officials who once dismissed Pakistan now speak of it as responsive, useful, even flexible. A virtuous cycle emerged where more gestures led to more cooperation, cooperation prompted more praise, and the partnership deepened at a pace few in Washington would have believed possible just months earlier.
A decisive turning point came with Pakistan’s unexpected showing in its brief but intense May clash with India, an outcome that reportedly left Mr. Trump stunned. The conflict showcased a level of military discipline, strategic focus and asymmetric capability that Washington had thought unattainable. Officials in Washington who had casually written off Pakistan as a fading power began referring to it once again as a serious regional actor.
For Mr. Trump, the episode redrew the strategic map: Pakistan was now viewed as an emerging asset whose capabilities could anchor his broader South Asia vision.
Pakistan’s military modernization has gained additional momentum from this renewed relevance on the global stage. The armed forces’ command structure has been overhauled, introducing a new top-tier position, the chief of defense forces, now held by Field Marshal Asim Munir, who concurrently serves as army chief.
No less a factor was India’s dismissal and Pakistan’s gratitude for Mr. Trump’s intervention in brokering a ceasefire. To Mr. Trump, a leader who speaks of “ending wars rather than starting wars,” the Indian response to his efforts likely stung deeply. As India damaged its relationship, Pakistan’s stock in Washington soared.
Trump’s Anti-India, Pro-Pakistan Stance Part Of Longtime U.S. Policy
History is repeating itself in India’s neighbourhood, maybe in a more virulent form, thanks to the continuing hostility of the Americans
By Nitin A. Gokhale -
https://stratnewsglobal.com/dont-miss/trumps-anti-india-pro-pakista...
President Donald Trump’s stand in supporting Pakistan and his administration’s hostility towards India, after Operation Sindoor, may have come as a surprise to many casual observers but Washington’s policies in the sub-continent have always been designed to contain India, historical documents show.
While this report, based on a recently published, peer-reviewed paper holds the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) responsible for inciting the 1962 war between India and China, many other actions during pre- and post-1971 also demonstrate constant efforts by the US to undermine India.
When Kao Flagged U.S. Position
An official correspondence between RN Kao, the founder of India’s external intelligence agency, the Research and Analysis Wing (R&AW), and then Indian Army Chief Gen (later Field Marshal) Sam Manekshaw in June 1972, reveals how the U.S. was determined to help a defeated Pakistan to maintain an ‘equilibrium’ in Asia. The top secret note from Kao to Manekshaw gives a detailed assessment of the US intentions. Kao’s note was in response to a missive shared by Gen Manekshaw based on information sent by India’s Military Attache in Washington.
As Kao writes: “U.S.A. wants a strong Pakistan as a counterbalance against India to the extent possible and as a source of stability, particularly in the Persian Gulf area.” The American policy (Richard Nixon was the President) was based on the new reality in the sub-continent in 1972. “It is the official US position that even before the December 1971 war, the military balance shifted decisively toward India between 1966 and 1971…they concede that India has emerged from this crisis as the dominant power in South Asia.”
Distinct Pakistan Tilt Of U.S.
In this context, Kao writes to Manekshaw: “Both China and the U.S.A. support Pakistan’s stand on Kashmir. Both are interested in keeping the issue alive as a means of pressure on India and as a bone of contention between India and Pakistan which ensures that the two countries remain at loggerheads.”
The final paragraph of the note, available in the Prime Minister’s Museum and Library (PMML) in New Delhi, could have been written in 2025. It reads: “This is not to say that either the U.S.A. or China is reconciled to India’s success… this period would be full of dangers to us. The U.S.A. would now seek to create a new balance in the region.
The main lines of this policy insofar as these can be discerned are as follows: a) military and economic aid to Pakistan with a view to restoring political and economic stability and rebuilding Pakistan as a strong military power; b) large-scale economic aid to Bangladesh to reduce Indian and Soviet influence; c) efforts to strengthen US influence in the smaller countries—Nepal, Bhutan, Ceylon (Sri Lanka), Bangladesh and Pakistan—as an antidote to India; d) efforts to increase separatist moves in India and to encourage dissatisfied minorities with a view to weakening India and reduce Soviet influence and e) increased U.S. naval presence to maintain a balance of military power.”
CIA’s Bngladesh Mission
In October 1972, PN Banerjee, then Joint Director of R&AW based in Calcutta (and one of the closest friends of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman), in a note to Kao, confirmed the prevailing suspicion about the CIA. The top secret note read, in parts: “Sheikh Mujibur Rahman repeatedly mentioned about the growing CIA activities in Bangladesh. He said that he had already alerted his Special Branch as well as the Director of External Intelligence Mr Monen Khan alias Mihir, who keeps discreet vigilance on CIA operators in Bangladesh and reports to him from time to time. He also solicited our assistance in curbing CIA activities in Bangladesh.”
Trump’s Anti-India, Pro-Pakistan Stance Part Of Longtime U.S. Policy
History is repeating itself in India’s neighbourhood, maybe in a more virulent form, thanks to the continuing hostility of the Americans
By Nitin A. Gokhale -
https://stratnewsglobal.com/dont-miss/trumps-anti-india-pro-pakista...
The CIA was not only infiltrating and financing anti-Mujib parties but were also ‘assiduously cultivating’ some of the high officials of the Bangladesh govt, Banerjee’s note added. The R&AW’s point person in Bangladesh, quoted the head of Bangladeshi External Intelligence, DIG Khan alias Mihir saying among the CIA contacts were Ruhul Kuddus, Principal Secretary to Prime Minister Mujib, Taslimuddin Ahmed, Home Secretary, Ibrahim, Director General, Security, Nurul Islam and Rahman Shobhan of the Planning Commission. Clearly, the Americans had managed to reach the inner circle of Shiekh Mujib within a year of the liberation of Bangladesh, during which the U.S. was supporting the Pakistan army openly.
The current anti-India sentiment currently sweeping among hotheads and radicals in Bangladesh should therefore not surprise anyone going by what happened even half a century ago. History is repeating itself in India’s neighbourhood, maybe in a more virulent form, thanks to the continuing hostility of the Americans.
@Clary_co
I’ve been in rooms with US officials far more times than I can count—including 3 years working as one. In twenty-plus years, I’ve never heard a US official articulate counterbalancing India as a goal of Pakistan policy. It’s possible US policy has this effect; it’s not a goal.
https://x.com/clary_co/status/2004892275399331872?s=61&t=mgTxrm...
———-
@nitingokhale
“U.S.A. wants a strong Pakistan as a counterbalance against India to the extent possible and as a source of stability, particularly in the Persian Gulf area.” If you think this is some current Indian official being quoted, you would be right. But in reality this is what RN Kao, founder of the R&AW wrote to Gen (later Field Marshal) Sam Manekshaw in June 1972. In reality, more than half a century later history is repeating itself in India’s neighbourhood, maybe in a more virulent form, thanks to the continuing hostility of the Americans: stratnewsglobal.com/dont-miss/trum… @StratNewsGlobal @Vikram_Sood @BharatShaktiBSI
https://x.com/nitingokhale/status/2004798974801395892?s=61&t=mg...
Happymon Jacob
@HappymonJacob
In this long piece for INDIA'S WORLD magazine, I make a case for ‘De-Americanising’ India’s Grand Strategy.
The Indo-US relationship may have thrived in the 2000s, but it was built on the back of a decade of threats, pressure and bullying.
India's most consequential relationship in the last quarter century was the by-product of a shared anxiety about a third party.
For nearly a quarter of a century, our grand strategy has been shaped by its convergence with Washington. As a result, our grand strategic questions once appeared to answer themselves and rather effortlessly.
Now we must go and find them, and this ensures that our relationship rests on choice rather than dependence.
This is how grand strategies are made. Or remade.
Hassan Aslam Shad
@HassShad
Happymon Jacob's article argues that India should begin "de-Americanising" its grand strategy because convergence with Washington has weakened India's strategic autonomy and encouraged reliance on American power. It's a provocative thesis, but it rests on several assumptions that simply don't hold up under scrutiny. 🧵
The biggest hole in the article is that it never actually proves its central claim: that India's strategic convergence with the US caused India to neglect indigenous capacity building. India's defence industrial weaknesses, procurement failures, technological gaps, and slow military reforms existed long before the US partnership deepened. These problems existed during non-alignment, during the Soviet era, and during periods when India was far less aligned with Washington than it is today. If the same weaknesses persisted across completely different strategic eras, how can American convergence be the primary explanation? The more obvious answer is that India's capacity deficits are rooted in domestic political and institutional failures, not in the existence of a partnership with the United States.
The article also claims that India increasingly viewed the world through a borrowed American lens, particularly regarding China. But this argument strips India of agency and ignores reality. India does not need Washington to tell it who China is. China occupies territory claimed by India, repeatedly challenges the status quo along the border, shields Pakistan diplomatically, arms Pakistan militarily, and seeks to expand its influence throughout India's neighbourhood. These concerns arise from India's own geography and security interests. To suggest that India's China policy is somehow a by-product of American thinking reverses the causal relationship. India and the US converged because both became concerned about China's behaviour, not because India outsourced its strategic judgment to Washington.
Another weakness is the article's suggestion that if Washington becomes more transactional, India should reconsider the logic of balancing China. But India is not balancing China for America's benefit. India is balancing China because China presents the most significant long-term strategic challenge to Indian interests. Even if the US withdrew from Asia tomorrow, India would still face an unsettled border, a growing Chinese military presence, and an increasingly capable China-Pakistan partnership. The China challenge does not disappear because US policy changes. The article implicitly treats India's China policy as derivative of US strategy when it is fundamentally rooted in India's own national interests.
The most striking contradiction in the article is that it argues India became "Americanised" while simultaneously describing a country that repeatedly ignored American preferences. If India's grand strategy was truly shaped by Washington, why did India maintain ties with Russia despite intense Western pressure? Why did it continue purchasing Russian energy? Why did it engage Iran? The evidence presented throughout the last two decades points toward strategic flexibility, not dependence. In fact, India's ability to cooperate with Washington while preserving ties with countries the US opposes is arguably evidence that strategic autonomy has been working rather than failing.
Ultimately, the article mistakes benefiting from American power for being dependent on American power. Those are not the same thing. Every rising power seeks to exploit favourable external conditions to advance its own interests. The real test is whether a country retains freedom of action when interests diverge. The stronger conclusion is not that India became excessively Americanised, but that India successfully leveraged a partnership with the US while maintaining independent decision-making. That is not a case for "de-Americanisation." It is evidence that India's strategy has been considerably more autonomous than the article acknowledges.
https://x.com/HassShad/status/2069140846872785212?s=20
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