Comment by Riaz Haq on December 22, 2025 at 8:47am

Trump’s surprising policy turn on Pakistan
Washington's India-first era has ended


By Brig. Gen. Mark Kimmitt

https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2025/dec/21/trumps-surprising-...

Analysts warned that Pakistan could face its “most severe” national security challenge in at least a decade and possibly since the 1990s. Yet by the end of 2025, Pakistan appears to have gone from pariah to partner. Few nations have experienced a reputational swing as swift or dramatic. Pakistan has emerged as a pillar of President Trump’s evolving foreign policy vision for South Asia.
Strategically, senior Trump advisers also regarded Pakistan with unease. Its close ties with China especially reinforced these concerns. Pakistani authorities often boast of a friendship with Beijing “deeper than the oceans, taller than the mountains.” The prevailing expectation among Mr. Trump’s emerging foreign policy circle was clear: Double down on India, strengthen the Quad as its Indo-Pacific anchor and, in India’s long-standing interests, sideline Islamabad.
Yet even as Washington leaned into an India-first posture, concerns were mounting about India’s trajectory, from its increasingly majoritarian domestic politics and constraints on civil liberties to its uneven military performance and growing reputation for diplomatic inflexibility. These issues, long ignored or downplayed, were beginning to cast doubt on India’s reliability as regional stabilizer.
The first sign that the icy relationship was beginning to thaw was a series of discreet counterterrorism exchanges, suggesting Islamabad was finally willing to engage in substantive cooperation. When Mr. Trump unexpectedly praised Pakistan’s efforts in a national address in March, Washington was taken aback. The remarks cut directly against long-standing policy, and the infamous “DC Blob” was faced with a new reality regarding Pakistan as a newer and stronger ally.

Islamabad seized the opportunity. Each small gesture of cooperation from Islamabad earned it unexpected credit in Washington, and that credit, in turn, encouraged more engagement. What had long been a brittle, transactional relationship began to take on greater importance as both sides realigned to the new realities.

Trump officials who once dismissed Pakistan now speak of it as responsive, useful, even flexible. A virtuous cycle emerged where more gestures led to more cooperation, cooperation prompted more praise, and the partnership deepened at a pace few in Washington would have believed possible just months earlier.
A decisive turning point came with Pakistan’s unexpected showing in its brief but intense May clash with India, an outcome that reportedly left Mr. Trump stunned. The conflict showcased a level of military discipline, strategic focus and asymmetric capability that Washington had thought unattainable. Officials in Washington who had casually written off Pakistan as a fading power began referring to it once again as a serious regional actor.
For Mr. Trump, the episode redrew the strategic map: Pakistan was now viewed as an emerging asset whose capabilities could anchor his broader South Asia vision.
Pakistan’s military modernization has gained additional momentum from this renewed relevance on the global stage. The armed forces’ command structure has been overhauled, introducing a new top-tier position, the chief of defense forces, now held by Field Marshal Asim Munir, who concurrently serves as army chief.
No less a factor was India’s dismissal and Pakistan’s gratitude for Mr. Trump’s intervention in brokering a ceasefire. To Mr. Trump, a leader who speaks of “ending wars rather than starting wars,” the Indian response to his efforts likely stung deeply. As India damaged its relationship, Pakistan’s stock in Washington soared.

Comment by Riaz Haq on December 27, 2025 at 7:37am

Trump’s Anti-India, Pro-Pakistan Stance Part Of Longtime U.S. Policy
History is repeating itself in India’s neighbourhood, maybe in a more virulent form, thanks to the continuing hostility of the Americans
By Nitin A. Gokhale -

https://stratnewsglobal.com/dont-miss/trumps-anti-india-pro-pakista...

President Donald Trump’s stand in supporting Pakistan and his administration’s hostility towards India, after Operation Sindoor, may have come as a surprise to many casual observers but Washington’s policies in the sub-continent have always been designed to contain India, historical documents show.

While this report, based on a recently published, peer-reviewed paper holds the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) responsible for inciting the 1962 war between India and China, many other actions during pre- and post-1971 also demonstrate constant efforts by the US to undermine India.

When Kao Flagged U.S. Position
An official correspondence between RN Kao, the founder of India’s external intelligence agency, the Research and Analysis Wing (R&AW), and then Indian Army Chief Gen (later Field Marshal) Sam Manekshaw in June 1972, reveals how the U.S. was determined to help a defeated Pakistan to maintain an ‘equilibrium’ in Asia. The top secret note from Kao to Manekshaw gives a detailed assessment of the US intentions. Kao’s note was in response to a missive shared by Gen Manekshaw based on information sent by India’s Military Attache in Washington.

As Kao writes: “U.S.A. wants a strong Pakistan as a counterbalance against India to the extent possible and as a source of stability, particularly in the Persian Gulf area.” The American policy (Richard Nixon was the President) was based on the new reality in the sub-continent in 1972. “It is the official US position that even before the December 1971 war, the military balance shifted decisively toward India between 1966 and 1971…they concede that India has emerged from this crisis as the dominant power in South Asia.”

Distinct Pakistan Tilt Of U.S.
In this context, Kao writes to Manekshaw: “Both China and the U.S.A. support Pakistan’s stand on Kashmir. Both are interested in keeping the issue alive as a means of pressure on India and as a bone of contention between India and Pakistan which ensures that the two countries remain at loggerheads.”

The final paragraph of the note, available in the Prime Minister’s Museum and Library (PMML) in New Delhi, could have been written in 2025. It reads: “This is not to say that either the U.S.A. or China is reconciled to India’s success… this period would be full of dangers to us. The U.S.A. would now seek to create a new balance in the region.

The main lines of this policy insofar as these can be discerned are as follows: a) military and economic aid to Pakistan with a view to restoring political and economic stability and rebuilding Pakistan as a strong military power; b) large-scale economic aid to Bangladesh to reduce Indian and Soviet influence; c) efforts to strengthen US influence in the smaller countries—Nepal, Bhutan, Ceylon (Sri Lanka), Bangladesh and Pakistan—as an antidote to India; d) efforts to increase separatist moves in India and to encourage dissatisfied minorities with a view to weakening India and reduce Soviet influence and e) increased U.S. naval presence to maintain a balance of military power.”

CIA’s Bngladesh Mission
In October 1972, PN Banerjee, then Joint Director of R&AW based in Calcutta (and one of the closest friends of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman), in a note to Kao, confirmed the prevailing suspicion about the CIA. The top secret note read, in parts: “Sheikh Mujibur Rahman repeatedly mentioned about the growing CIA activities in Bangladesh. He said that he had already alerted his Special Branch as well as the Director of External Intelligence Mr Monen Khan alias Mihir, who keeps discreet vigilance on CIA operators in Bangladesh and reports to him from time to time. He also solicited our assistance in curbing CIA activities in Bangladesh.”

Comment by Riaz Haq on December 27, 2025 at 7:37am

Trump’s Anti-India, Pro-Pakistan Stance Part Of Longtime U.S. Policy
History is repeating itself in India’s neighbourhood, maybe in a more virulent form, thanks to the continuing hostility of the Americans
By Nitin A. Gokhale -

https://stratnewsglobal.com/dont-miss/trumps-anti-india-pro-pakista...

The CIA was not only infiltrating and financing anti-Mujib parties but were also ‘assiduously cultivating’ some of the high officials of the Bangladesh govt, Banerjee’s note added. The R&AW’s point person in Bangladesh, quoted the head of Bangladeshi External Intelligence, DIG Khan alias Mihir saying among the CIA contacts were Ruhul Kuddus, Principal Secretary to Prime Minister Mujib, Taslimuddin Ahmed, Home Secretary, Ibrahim, Director General, Security, Nurul Islam and Rahman Shobhan of the Planning Commission. Clearly, the Americans had managed to reach the inner circle of Shiekh Mujib within a year of the liberation of Bangladesh, during which the U.S. was supporting the Pakistan army openly.

The current anti-India sentiment currently sweeping among hotheads and radicals in Bangladesh should therefore not surprise anyone going by what happened even half a century ago. History is repeating itself in India’s neighbourhood, maybe in a more virulent form, thanks to the continuing hostility of the Americans.

Comment by Riaz Haq on December 27, 2025 at 5:10pm

@Clary_co

I’ve been in rooms with US officials far more times than I can count—including 3 years working as one. In twenty-plus years, I’ve never heard a US official articulate counterbalancing India as a goal of Pakistan policy. It’s possible US policy has this effect; it’s not a goal.


https://x.com/clary_co/status/2004892275399331872?s=61&t=mgTxrm...

———-

@nitingokhale

“U.S.A. wants a strong Pakistan as a counterbalance against India to the extent possible and as a source of stability, particularly in the Persian Gulf area.” If you think this is some current Indian official being quoted, you would be right. But in reality this is what RN Kao, founder of the R&AW wrote to Gen (later Field Marshal) Sam Manekshaw in June 1972. In reality, more than half a century later history is repeating itself in India’s neighbourhood, maybe in a more virulent form, thanks to the continuing hostility of the Americans: stratnewsglobal.com/dont-miss/trum… @StratNewsGlobal @Vikram_Sood @BharatShaktiBSI

https://x.com/nitingokhale/status/2004798974801395892?s=61&t=mg...

Comment by Riaz Haq on June 23, 2026 at 5:58pm

Happymon Jacob
@HappymonJacob
In this long piece for INDIA'S WORLD magazine, I make a case for ‘De-Americanising’ India’s Grand Strategy.

The Indo-US relationship may have thrived in the 2000s, but it was built on the back of a decade of threats, pressure and bullying.

India's most consequential relationship in the last quarter century was the by-product of a shared anxiety about a third party.

For nearly a quarter of a century, our grand strategy has been shaped by its convergence with Washington. As a result, our grand strategic questions once appeared to answer themselves and rather effortlessly.

Now we must go and find them, and this ensures that our relationship rests on choice rather than dependence.

This is how grand strategies are made. Or remade.

https://x.com/HappymonJacob/status/2069067319767413172?s=20

Comment by Riaz Haq on June 23, 2026 at 5:58pm

Hassan Aslam Shad
@HassShad
Happymon Jacob's article argues that India should begin "de-Americanising" its grand strategy because convergence with Washington has weakened India's strategic autonomy and encouraged reliance on American power. It's a provocative thesis, but it rests on several assumptions that simply don't hold up under scrutiny. 🧵

The biggest hole in the article is that it never actually proves its central claim: that India's strategic convergence with the US caused India to neglect indigenous capacity building. India's defence industrial weaknesses, procurement failures, technological gaps, and slow military reforms existed long before the US partnership deepened. These problems existed during non-alignment, during the Soviet era, and during periods when India was far less aligned with Washington than it is today. If the same weaknesses persisted across completely different strategic eras, how can American convergence be the primary explanation? The more obvious answer is that India's capacity deficits are rooted in domestic political and institutional failures, not in the existence of a partnership with the United States.

The article also claims that India increasingly viewed the world through a borrowed American lens, particularly regarding China. But this argument strips India of agency and ignores reality. India does not need Washington to tell it who China is. China occupies territory claimed by India, repeatedly challenges the status quo along the border, shields Pakistan diplomatically, arms Pakistan militarily, and seeks to expand its influence throughout India's neighbourhood. These concerns arise from India's own geography and security interests. To suggest that India's China policy is somehow a by-product of American thinking reverses the causal relationship. India and the US converged because both became concerned about China's behaviour, not because India outsourced its strategic judgment to Washington.

Another weakness is the article's suggestion that if Washington becomes more transactional, India should reconsider the logic of balancing China. But India is not balancing China for America's benefit. India is balancing China because China presents the most significant long-term strategic challenge to Indian interests. Even if the US withdrew from Asia tomorrow, India would still face an unsettled border, a growing Chinese military presence, and an increasingly capable China-Pakistan partnership. The China challenge does not disappear because US policy changes. The article implicitly treats India's China policy as derivative of US strategy when it is fundamentally rooted in India's own national interests.

The most striking contradiction in the article is that it argues India became "Americanised" while simultaneously describing a country that repeatedly ignored American preferences. If India's grand strategy was truly shaped by Washington, why did India maintain ties with Russia despite intense Western pressure? Why did it continue purchasing Russian energy? Why did it engage Iran? The evidence presented throughout the last two decades points toward strategic flexibility, not dependence. In fact, India's ability to cooperate with Washington while preserving ties with countries the US opposes is arguably evidence that strategic autonomy has been working rather than failing.

Ultimately, the article mistakes benefiting from American power for being dependent on American power. Those are not the same thing. Every rising power seeks to exploit favourable external conditions to advance its own interests. The real test is whether a country retains freedom of action when interests diverge. The stronger conclusion is not that India became excessively Americanised, but that India successfully leveraged a partnership with the US while maintaining independent decision-making. That is not a case for "de-Americanisation." It is evidence that India's strategy has been considerably more autonomous than the article acknowledges.

https://x.com/HassShad/status/2069140846872785212?s=20

Comment by Riaz Haq on July 27, 2026 at 5:56pm

Pakistan’s Great Game

By Christophe Jaffrelot


https://www.institutmontaigne.org/en/expressions/pakistans-great-ga...




[3/3] Are my friends’ enemies my enemies? Not for Pakistan, which is capitalizing on its good relations with China and the United States. How should we interpret the recent rapprochement between Washington and Islamabad? What role does China play? The final installment of an analysis of Pakistan’s new foreign policy, by Christophe Jaffrelot.


The third level of analysis on which Pakistan’s strategy is based extends beyond the Middle East-even though it is centered there-as it concerns the relationships Islamabad is striving to maintain with the United States and China. While Islamabad has already appeared to be walking a tightrope between Iran and Saudi Arabia, its desire to maintain relations with both the United States and China seems even more of a balancing act. Yet this approach is part of a long-standing tradition.
The relationship between Pakistan and China is not the same as the one between Pakistan and the United States. China has, in fact, become and remained "an all weather friend" decade after decade since the 1950s.
Certainly, the relationship between Pakistan and China is not the same as the one between Pakistan and the United States. China has, in fact, become and remained "an all weather friend" decade after decade since the 1950s, without the two countries ever approaching a breaking point that would force them to rebuild ties afterward. In other words, it is a strategic relationship that is fueled by their hostility toward a common enemy, that is India. Pakistan-as we have seen-finds in China the ally that allows it to stand up to India (all the more so since Beijing helped it acquire the nuclear bomb), while China, by supporting Pakistan, has succeeded in pinning India down on its western border, guaranteeing itself free rein in Asia.

In the crisis stemming from the Iran War, Pakistan and China remain partners. The former, as is often the case, takes some of its orders from Beijing, while the latter uses the Pakistanis-and their effective diplomats with Washington’s ear-to hasten the end of hostilities. Even more so than other Asian countries, China is indeed paying a very high price for this war, which has caused its energy costs to skyrocket and is weakening an economy already shaken, among other things, by the rise of protectionism. That Pakistan has repeatedly "reported to Beijing" during the war is clearly evident from Deputy Prime Minister Ishaq Dar’s trips to the Chinese capital in late March and again from May 19 to 21. Five days later, it was Prime Minister Shabaz Sharif’s turn to visit Beijing, where he was congratulated by Xi for Pakistan’s mediation efforts. In fact, the head of the Pakistani military, Asim Munir, was in Tehran at the same time!
While Pakistan’s relationship with China is rooted in strategic logic, its relationship with the United States is more tactical in nature.
While Pakistan’s relationship with China is rooted in strategic logic, its relationship with the United States is more tactical in nature-and has been since the 1950s, when General Ayub Khan boasted of his ability to play "one lion against another" (referring to the United States and the USSR at the start of the Cold War). In its dealings with the United States, Pakistan has played the role of intermediary, or even "client," within a typical clientelist framework: in exchange for the services Islamabad provided to Washington, the United States provided Pakistan with substantial aid and agreed to sell it sophisticated weapons, and even to train its officers-a privilege greatly appreciated.

Comment by Riaz Haq on July 27, 2026 at 5:57pm

Pakistan’s Great Game

By Christophe Jaffrelot


https://www.institutmontaigne.org/en/expressions/pakistans-great-ga...



The first major service rendered by the Pakistanis to the Americans was none other than the intermediary role played by General Yahya Khan vis-à-vis Chairman Mao in the early 1970s, which led to the United States’ recognition of the People’s Republic of China. Over the following decade, Pakistan served as an intermediary between Washington and the mujahideen tasked with driving the Soviets out of Afghanistan. And in the 2000s, Pakistan was tasked by Washington with hunting down al-Qaeda-with much more mixed success this time, as evidenced by the discovery of bin Laden’s hideout in Abbottabad in 2011.
Whenever the United States no longer needed Pakistan-or even felt betrayed by it-it abandoned the country or even imposed sanctions on it.
Moreover, relations between the two countries had grown much more strained since then, following a classic pattern: whenever the United States no longer needed Pakistan-or even felt betrayed by it-it abandoned the country or even imposed sanctions on it. In 2017, Donald Trump decided to drastically cut the aid Pakistan received in connection with U.S. military operations in Afghanistan, to which Pakistan was supposed to contribute-something Trump was not convinced of.


Trump 2, reversing the mistrust he had felt toward Pakistan in 2017, instead bet on that country even before the war with Iran. This reversal can be explained by a diverse set of factors. As early as the beginning of 2025, the White House set its sights on Pakistan to serve as a regional security guarantor capable of combating Islamism in its area (particularly against the Taliban). In exchange, Pakistan was able to place orders for U.S. weapons that had previously been off-limits to it-much to the displeasure of New Delhi.

The blitzkrieg between India and Pakistan in the spring of 2025 dramatically accelerated the U.S.-Pakistan rapprochement. While New Delhi refused to acknowledge any role for the United States in the cessation of hostilities, Islamabad thanked Donald Trump for intervening to prevent an escalation (which Trump viewed as posing a nuclear risk). The U.S. president appreciated Pakistan’s attitude all the more because, in the wake of the conflict, Pakistan nominated him for the Nobel Peace Prize.


These goodwill gestures were accompanied by economic deals involving rare earth minerals-to which Pakistan agreed to grant the Americans access (particularly in Balochistan)-and cryptocurrencies. World Liberty Financial, the company owned by one of Trump’s sons and Zach Witkoff-the son of Special Envoy Steve Witkoff-signed an agreement with Pakistan in January 2026 to integrate the country’s payment system.

On the international stage, Pakistan also stepped up when Trump established a "Peace Council" for Gaza; its inauguration highlighted the close ties between President Trump, Marshal Munir, head of Pakistani intelligence, and Prime Minister Sharif. It was therefore only natural that Pakistan found itself in the role of mediator between the United States and Iran beginning in March 2026. On April 8, the country emerged as the facilitator that had made the conclusion of a ceasefire possible, and on April 11 and 12, Islamabad hosted the Iranian and American delegations, once again rendering effectively possible a dialogue-albeit indirect-that had been severed since 1979.


Pakistan’s role as a "good offices" mediator was praised by a large number of political leaders, including European ones. Last June, Kaja Kallas, the EU Vice President in charge of the Union’s international relations, on the occasion of the 8th Strategic Dialogue between Pakistan and the European Union in Islamabad, thanked Pakistan-"a major regional power"-for its efforts in helping to avert an "all-out war" in the Middle East.

Comment by Riaz Haq on July 27, 2026 at 5:58pm

Pakistan’s Great Game

By Christophe Jaffrelot

https://www.institutmontaigne.org/en/expressions/pakistans-great-ga...

Conclusion: A Temporary Return to Favor or a Structural Turning Point?
History has accustomed us to seeing Pakistan return to the forefront of the international stage in a more or less fleeting manner. In 1980, General Zia, who had been universally despised following the 1977 coup, suddenly became acceptable again following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. In 2001, General Musharraf, who had also been a pariah since his forceful seizure of power in 1999, experienced the same windfall following the September 11 attacks. In 2026, Pakistan appears useful once again, no longer to wage war against the USSR or terrorism, but to make peace. This puts it back in the role of mediator that it has also filled in the past between the United States and China.
In 2026, Pakistan appears useful once again, no longer to wage war against the USSR or terrorism, but to make peace.
Each time, these glorious episodes were very short-lived and came to an end due to criticism of the Pakistani regime’s authoritarianism - with the military always remaining in power, even when civilians are in the forefront; its ties to Islamists accused of terrorist activities - particularly in India; or accusations of nuclear proliferation. Will the same be true tomorrow, once the war in Iran is over and the United States no longer needs Pakistan?

Everything will, of course, depend on the outcome of the conflict and the role Pakistan plays in resolving it-for it will be harder to send Islamabad back home if the world owes it something resembling peace.

India’s ability to isolate Pakistan-the strategy Narendra Modi has pursued for more than a decade-is another important variable, though its significance may be undermined by New Delhi’s drift toward authoritarianism and ethnocracy, as well as by the economic and social crisis threatening the country.

A more significant factor entering the equation relates to regional balances of power: Pakistan will continue to serve as a "net security provider" for Middle Eastern countries such as Saudi Arabia if those countries continue to fear the rise of Israel - a potential regional hegemon - and if they doubt Washington’s intentions, or even its mere reliability. There is no doubt that Pakistan itself will do everything in its power to prevent Israel from asserting itself on the regional stage and to gain influence over Iran-which is what the Israeli-American plan for regime change in Iran might have entailed. At the very least, faced with the risk of Israeli hegemony based on force and repeated military interventions, Pakistan could emerge as the architect of a resistance front bringing together not only Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Egypt, but also Iran.

Alongside these hypothetical scenarios, one thing is certain: Pakistan has reached a turning point through the recognition of its military capabilities, as reflected in the mutual defense agreement it signed with Saudi Arabia. This point of no return is largely due to the close ties it has forged with China, to which Pakistan owes a significant portion of its strike capability. While the relationship between Pakistan and the United States remains subject to uncertainty due to its tactical nature, the relationship between Pakistan and China is strategic in nature. Since Iran is an important partner of China, in the short term, Pakistan will be all the more inclined to resist attempts to destabilize its neighbor-which it has feared from the very first day of the war anyway. While Islamabad welcomes Iran’s weakening and the setback to its nuclear program, maintaining the current regime is the lesser of two evils (especially since Tehran no longer trusts New Delhi as much as it once did).

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