Comment by Riaz Haq on March 12, 2025 at 9:56am

Indian Americans worried over US ties under Trump, survey reveals

https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cx2g4g9qp2no

Indian Americans are increasingly optimistic about India's future, but hold deep concerns about US-India relations under a second Donald Trump administration, a new survey finds.
The 2024 Indian-American Survey, conducted by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and YouGov in October, examined Indian-American political attitudes.
Two pivotal elections happened in India and the US last year, amid a deepening - but occasionally strained - partnership. Tensions between the countries flared over a US federal indictment of Indian billionaire Gautam Adani and allegations of a Delhi-backed assassination plot on American soil.

With more than five million Indian-origin residents in the US, the survey asked some key questions: How do Indian Americans view former president Joe Biden's handling of US-India ties? Do they see Donald Trump as a better option? And how do they assess India's trajectory post the 2024 election?
Here are some key takeaways from the report, which was based on a nationally representative online survey of 1,206 Indian-American adult residents.

Indian Americans rated the Biden administration's handling of US-India relations more favourably than Trump's first term.
A hypothetical Kamala Harris administration was seen as better for bilateral ties than a second Trump term during the polling.
Partisan polarisation plays a key role: 66% of Indian-American Republicans believe Trump was better for US-India ties, while just 8% of Democrats agree.
Conversely, half of Indian-American Democrats favour Biden, compared to 15% of Republicans.
Since most Indian Americans are Democrats, this gives Biden the overall edge.
During their February meeting at the White House, both Trump and Prime Minister Narendra Modi praised each other's leadership, but Trump criticised India's high trade tariffs, calling them a "big problem."

'Murder-for-hire' controversy
The alleged Indian plot to assassinate a separatist on US soil has not widely registered - only half of respondents are aware of it.
In October, the US charged a former Indian intelligence officer with attempted murder and money laundering for allegedly plotting to assassinate Gurpatwant Singh Pannun, a US-based advocate for an independent Sikh state, Khalistan.
This marked the first time the Indian government has been directly implicated in an alleged assassination attempt on a dissident. India has stated it is co-operating with the US investigation. In January, a panel set up by India to examine Washington's allegations recommended legal action against an unnamed individual believed to be the former intelligence agent.
A narrow majority of the respondents said that India would "not be justified in taking such action and hold identical feelings about the US if the positions were reversed".

Israel and the Palestinians
Indian Americans are split along partisan party lines, with Democrats expressing greater empathy for Palestinians and Republicans leaning pro-Israel.
Four in 10 respondents believe Biden has been too pro-Israel in the ongoing conflict.
The attack in October 2023 by Hamas fighters from Gaza killed around 1,200 people, mostly civilians, inside Israel and saw 251 people taken hostage. Most have been released in ceasefire agreements or other arrangements.
Israel's military offensive has killed more than 48,000 Palestinians in Gaza, mostly women and children, according to the Hamas-run health ministry.
Talks to prolong the fragile ceasefire, the first phase of which ended on 1 March, are expected to resume in Qatar on Monday.

Comment by Riaz Haq on March 13, 2025 at 1:31pm

How Europe’s Military Stacks Up Against Russia Without U.S. Support

https://www.wsj.com/world/europe/europe-military-compared-russia-wi...

Last month roughly 10,000 NATO troops carried out drills just miles from Ukraine’s border to test a new quick-reaction force created after Russia’s large-scale invasion of its neighbor. The show of military muscle was unusual for who was absent: the U.S.

That is leading some to ask a once-unthinkable question: If trans-Atlantic ties deteriorate further, could Europe be forced to defend itself against Russia without U.S. support? American military brass and officials who have served across the Atlantic say Europe would pack a strong punch in such a scenario.

Europe lacks important air-defense and intelligence capabilities, but its militaries together constitute a massive air force, giant navy and formidable army. Those land forces, which shriveled after the Cold War, are now gradually rebuilding and adding advanced equipment.

A fight would be deadly and hugely destructive—as Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has shown—and raise the risk of nuclear war. But in conventional combat, say strategists, Russia would struggle against Europe.
Now people in and around the North Atlantic Treaty Organization are wondering whether Europeans could handle more than just an exercise on their own. America’s commitment to NATO security guarantees is suddenly in doubt, even after the U.S. reinstated military support for Ukraine this week after Kyiv accepted a cease-fire and Moscow signaled it is in no hurry to end hostilities. American diplomatic outreach to Russia and the Trump administration’s frostiness toward Europe raise worries.

-------------------

Now Europeans are pondering what collective defense might look like without the U.S. A starting point could be NATO’s own battle plans, which are adaptable to varying force levels, alliance officials say.

The elaborate, flexible and detailed plans are classified. Still, NATO’s fundamental approach today, as during the Cold War, is to employ forces available in Europe to hold off Russian attackers until reinforcements arrive from the U.S.

Europe could still use NATO blueprints as a basis for its own defensive plans, even if they have gaps. Developing capabilities that could alleviate shortfalls if Washington declined to join a conflict is an undertaking that would balloon Europe’s bill for military modernization.

“You have to use the best tools available,” said Spatafora at the EU institute. “NATO’s plans are a good model because components of national armies are being put together for that.”

Comment by Riaz Haq on March 16, 2025 at 8:24am

From competing to beating US in numbers and tonnage, here’s how China built its shipping empire

PLA Navy now fields more warships than US Navy and is on track to deploy 425-ship fleet by 2030, sustained by industrial base capable of replacing, repairing vessels way faster than US yards.
SNEHESH ALEX PHILIP


https://theprint.in/defence/from-competing-to-beating-us-in-numbers...

New Delhi: The Indian Navy had plans to become a 200-ship strong force by 2027. But in 2019, it revised its target downwards to 170, citing an acute financial crunch. Contrast this to the Chinese. Over the past two decades, the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) has grown from a modest coastal force into a regional juggernaut with frigates, destroyers, submarines and aircraft carriers being constructed and commissioned at record speed.

As of 2022, the PLAN was operating a battle force fleet of 351 ships, surpassing the US Navy’s 294.

According to the Washington-based think tank Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), China has already overtaken the US Navy in terms of hull count, and is rapidly closing the gap in fleet tonnage and key technologies like Vertical Launch System (VLS) missile cells. By 2024, China’s surface combatants deployed half the VLS cells of their US counterparts, up from just a quarter in 2019.

This stark growth is compounded by the fact that China’s naval forces are primarily concentrated in the Indo-Pacific, whereas US forces are globally dispersed.

Since 2010, China has dramatically reduced the tonnage gap with the US from roughly 4 million tons to under 1.6 million tons.

China’s emergence as a global shipbuilding powerhouse began with key policy changes that were initiated in the early 2000s. Recognizing that the rapid growth of containerized maritime trade would be a boon for global shipbuilders, Beijing began developing ambitious plans to position Chinese firms at the forefront of the industry. In 2002, Zhu Rongji, China’s premier and chief economic architect at the time, visited the headquarters of CSSC, where he declared that China would seek “to become the largest shipbuilding country by 2015”.

--------

China’s shipbuilding dominance a national security risk for US: Report


https://www.defensenews.com/global/asia-pacific/2025/03/11/chinas-s...

In only two decades, China has grown to be the dominant player in shipbuilding, claiming more than half of the world’s commercial shipbuilding market, while the U.S. share has fallen to just 0.1%, posing serious economic and national security challenges for the U.S. and its allies, according to a report released Tuesday by the Center for Strategic and International Studies.

In 2024 alone, one Chinese shipbuilder constructed more commercial vessels by tonnage than the entire U.S. shipbuilding industry has built since the end of World War II. China already has the world’s largest naval fleet, the Washington-based bipartisan think tank said in its 75-page report.


“The erosion of U.S. and allied shipbuilding capabilities poses an urgent threat to military readiness, reduces economic opportunities, and contributes to China’s global power-projection ambitions,” the report said.


Concerns about the poor state of U.S. shipbuilding have been growing in recent years, as the country faces rising challenges from China, which has the world’s second-largest economy and has ambitions to reshape the world order. At a congressional hearing in December, senior officials and lawmakers urged action.

Last week, President Donald Trump told Congress that his Republican administration would “resurrect” the American shipbuilding industry, for commercial and military vessels, and he would create “a new office of shipbuilding in the White House.”



“We used to make so many ships,” Trump said. “We don’t make them anymore very much, but we’re going to make them very fast, very soon. It will have a huge impact.”

Comment by Riaz Haq on March 16, 2025 at 10:27am

India (8.3%) is the second largest importer of arms over the last 5 years (2019-2024). Ukraine (8.8%) is first. Pakistan (4.6%) 4th, according to SIPRI.

India's arms imports mainly from Russia, France and Israel.

Ukraine's from US, Germany and Poland.

Pakistan's from China, Netherlands and Turkey


https://www.sipri.org/media/press-release/2025/ukraine-worlds-bigge...

https://indianexpress.com/article/trending/top-10-listing/top-10-la...

--------------

Chinese arms made up 81 per cent of Pakistan’s weapons imports in the past five years, as Islamabad buys more advanced systems from its long-standing Asian defence partner, according to data from Swedish think tank SIPRI.

https://www.scmp.com/news/china/military/article/3302515/china-supp...

That was up 7 percentage points from the previous five-year period to 2019, when 74 per cent of Pakistan’s arms imports came from China, the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute database shows.

The boost comes amid a huge push in China to improve self-reliance in its defence industry – from aircraft carriers to sixth-generation fighter jets – which has also seen it expand the range of weapons it can offer to its strategic partners.

--------

“The apparent willingness of China to supply or at least talk about supplying some of its more advanced weapons to Pakistan shows China’s trust in Pakistan,” said Siemon Wezeman, a senior arms transfers researcher at SIPRI.

China has been Pakistan’s primary arms supplier since the 1990s. But Pakistan’s tensions with India – especially since a series of border skirmishes broke out in 2016 – have prompted Islamabad to increase defence spending, and that has drawn it closer to Beijing.

Beijing avoids formal alliances but Wezeman said it could be seen as “Pakistan’s only real ‘ally’, the only one to depend on when dealing with India”.

At the same time, Pakistan plays a similar role for Beijing and is “the only one that at this moment could give China a secure access to a base on the Indian Ocean and near the Middle East”.

In April last year, China launched the first of eight Hangor II submarines to be delivered to Pakistan in a deal worth around US$5 billion – one of the most valuable military contracts China has signed.

According to the SIPRI database, some of Pakistan’s key orders in the past five years include the country’s first spy ship, the Rizwan, more than 600 VT-4 battle tanks, and 36 J-10CE 4.5-generation fighters.

The first delivery of multirole J-10CE fighter jets arrived in Pakistan in 2022, adding to its JF-17 fighters – a backbone model that makes up the bulk of Pakistan’s fleet.

The fourth-generation JF-17 was jointly developed by Pakistan Aeronautical Complex and China’s Chengdu Aircraft Industry Group in a programme that dates back to 1999.

The Block III version of JF-17 – featuring an active electronically scanned array radar – was inducted by the Pakistan Air Force in 2023.

Song Zhongping, a military commentator and former PLA instructor, said China might also export its fifth-generation fighter jet, the J-35, “if Pakistan requests it”.

He said that since India was considering adding the American F-35 or Russian Su-57 fifth-generation fighter jets to its fleet, Pakistan was likely to be considering its options too.

China also delivered a range of surface-to-air missiles and defence systems to Pakistan between 2020 and 2024, according to SIPRI. They included a long-range HQ-9 system with around 70 missiles, some 200 medium-range LY-80s, and about 890 low-altitude portable FN-6 missiles.

Comment by Riaz Haq on April 2, 2025 at 8:12pm

Riaz Haq
@haqsmusings
#Trump #Tariffs: #Vietnam (46%), #Thailand (36%), #Bangladesh (37%), #India 26%, #Pakistan (29%), and #SriLanka (44%) hit with steep new duties under sweeping trade order | Business Upturn

https://x.com/haqsmusings/status/1907541298971898015

---------

Trump's list of countries facing reciprocal tariffs, including Bangladesh, India, Pakistan and Sri Lanka

https://www.cnbc.com/2025/04/02/trump-reciprocal-tariffs-countries-...


Vietnam (46%), Thailand (36%), Bangladesh (37%), Pakistan (29%), and Sri Lanka (44%) hit with steep new duties under sweeping trade order

Vietnam: 46%
Thailand: 36%
Bangladesh: 37%
Pakistan: 29%
Sri Lanka: 44%
South Africa: 30%
Trump said, “We will charge them approximately half of what they are and have been charging us — this includes all forms of tariffs, non-monetary barriers, and other trade manipulations.”

The full list also includes:

China: 34%
European Union: 20%
Japan: 24%
India: 26%
South Korea: 25%
Taiwan: 32%
Malaysia: 24%
Indonesia: 32%
Switzerland: 31%
Israel: 17%
Philippines: 17%
United Kingdom: 10%
Brazil: 10%
Singapore: 10%
Chile: 10%
Trump emphasized this was not a full one-to-one tariff match but rather a proportional measure intended to rebalance trade relations. “This is going to be our Golden Age,” he declared.

The tariffs are expected to take effect immediately, with the auto and parts sectors seeing 25% duties starting Thursday, and additional product categories expected to follow.

Comment by Riaz Haq on July 21, 2025 at 8:34pm

Christopher Clary
@clary_co
“Trump has thus ended—or at least paused—the U.S. policy of strategic altruism. If successive U.S. leaders refrained from asking, ‘What can India do for us?’ the current administration is shouting this question from the rooftops.”

https://x.com/clary_co/status/1947341177919050202

-------------------

Milan Vaishnav
@MilanV
In a new
@ForeignAffairs
essay, I argue that Washington’s era of “strategic altruism” toward India is over. Now, in a more uncertain world, it is India that must take the long view—and extend strategic altruism toward the United States

https://x.com/MilanV/status/1945525287489265753

-------------

How India Can Placate America
In a Reversal, It’s Time for New Delhi to Be Generous With Washington

Milan Vaishnav

https://www.foreignaffairs.com/south-asia/how-india-can-placate-ame...

Over the past quarter century, few countries have commanded as much sustained attention from U.S. foreign policy officials as has India. Since the George W. Bush administration, the United States has placed India not just at the heart of its approach to Asia but at the center of its global strategy.

This enduring partnership rested on an unspoken doctrine of strategic altruism. U.S. policymakers believed that supporting India’s rise—economically, militarily, and diplomatically—would pay dividends for the United States in the long term. A stronger, more prosperous India would open markets for American companies, bolster regional deterrence against China, and serve as a democratic counterweight to authoritarianism in Asia. India’s ascent was perceived not as a threat but as an opportunity. Because India’s rise aligned with American goals, Washington made substantial investments in India without demanding immediate returns. That long-term bet endured across both Democratic and Republican administrations—including President Donald Trump’s first term.

But Trump’s return to office could mark the end of this approach. The second Trump administration is driven not so much by transactionalism as it is by an insatiable desire to burnish its dominance in virtually all its foreign relationships. Its dealings with India have been no exception.

To preserve the relationship, it now falls to India—not the United States—to practice strategic altruism: making concessions to, generating deliverables for, and limiting what it asks of a U.S. administration primarily concerned with maintaining the upper hand. For a country committed to strategic autonomy and “multialignment,” this is an uncomfortable proposition. Nevertheless, it may be India’s best bet for weathering Trump’s second term and positioning itself for a more favorable future.


IN A GIVING MOOD
The United States’ policy of strategic altruism toward India was most clearly articulated in Foreign Affairs in 2019 by former U.S. Ambassador to India Robert Blackwill and the South Asia scholar and former National Security Council member Ashley Tellis. Blackwill and Tellis argued that, beginning at the turn of the century, U.S. foreign policy officials realized it would be inherently beneficial for the United States if India emerged as a fast-growing, democratic, and militarily capable power in Asia. With Beijing emerging as a strategic competitor, Washington came to see New Delhi not only as a natural partner but as an Asian power with a shared interest in preventing China from dominating the region and undermining the rules-based international order. A stronger, more prosperous India could serve as a counterweight to an assertive, authoritarian China.

Comment by Riaz Haq on July 21, 2025 at 8:35pm

How India Can Placate America
In a Reversal, It’s Time for New Delhi to Be Generous With Washington

Milan Vaishnav

https://www.foreignaffairs.com/south-asia/how-india-can-placate-ame...

U.S. foreign-policy makers believed that the long-term strategic convergence with India outweighed the inevitable frictions the two countries might experience on other issues, such as climate change, trade, or reform of the multilateral system. As the authors wrote: “Generous U.S. policies were not merely a favor to New Delhi; they were a conscious exercise of strategic altruism. When contemplating various forms of political support for India, U.S. leaders did not ask, ‘What can India do for us?’ They hoped that India’s upward trajectory would shift the Asian balance of power in ways favorable to the United States.”

To preserve the relationship, India must now be generous to the United States.
Although strategic altruism was never enshrined in official doctrine, it underpinned U.S. policy toward India for two decades. To be sure, successive U.S. administrations placed their own stamp on the budding partnership. The George W. Bush administration prioritized a landmark civil nuclear deal in 2005 that was approved by the International Atomic Energy Agency in 2008, eventually removing India from the ranks of nuclear pariahs. The Obama administration perceived India as a linchpin in its “pivot to Asia” and a crucial protagonist in its vision of a “free and open Indo-Pacific.” Trump’s first term, despite its volatility, maintained continuity. Following China’s reckless incursions in 2020 along the disputed border in the rugged Himalayan region separating the two countries, India began to shed long-standing caution about antagonizing Beijing. This paved the way for the rejuvenation of the Indo-Pacific partnership known as the Quad (bringing together Australia, India, Japan, and the United States) and expanded bilateral defense and diplomatic collaboration between India and the United States. The Biden administration strengthened these partnerships and added a new element—an ambitious new framework for collaborating with India on critical and emerging technologies that resulted in joint initiatives on semiconductor manufacturing, codevelopment and coproduction of sensitive defense systems, and increased collaboration on space exploration and research.

Strategic altruism encountered speed bumps in the first Trump administration, when the president’s “America first” rhetoric left little room for magnanimity. But Trump’s penchant for transactionalism was tempered by several factors. First, several cabinet officials in the first Trump term were members of the traditional Republican foreign policy elite for whom the challenge posed by China, and India’s intrinsic utility to the United States in helping deal with that challenge, were hugely important. Their presence insulated India from the full brunt of Trump’s mercurial tendencies.

Second, the COVID-19 pandemic suspended normal diplomatic activity, drawing attention away from points of friction in the bilateral relationship that might have received more attention in the Trump White House. Instead, India’s generic pharmaceutical industry emerged as a critical asset during the pandemic and made New Delhi a more sympathetic partner for Washington, especially given that India also experienced significant pandemic-related deaths and dislocation.

Third, China’s risky 2020 border gambit offered a pretext for India and the United States to deepen cooperation in the sensitive areas of intelligence sharing, defense coproduction, and space collaboration. After years spent nudging India to align its cautious public messaging about China with its more strident private rhetoric, the United States found it was pushing on an open door. U.S.-Indian relations emerged from Trump’s first term in better shape than U.S. ties with many (if not most) other countries—reinforcing the notion that Democrats and Republicans agreed on India even when they agreed on little else.

Comment by Riaz Haq on July 21, 2025 at 8:35pm

How India Can Placate America
In a Reversal, It’s Time for New Delhi to Be Generous With Washington

Milan Vaishnav

https://www.foreignaffairs.com/south-asia/how-india-can-placate-ame...

WHAT’S IN IT FOR ME?
With Trump’s victory in the November 2024 presidential election, many in India believed the country was well positioned to manage his return, given the experience of his first term. It has slowly become clear to Indian policymakers, however, that while Trump 1.0 was unpredictable, Trump 2.0 is unbound.

The second Trump administration is driven by an unyielding conviction that the United States has been badly taken advantage of, especially by its so-called allies and partners. Trump and his lieutenants claim that the United States has borne a disproportionate share of the burden in its myriad partnerships with little reciprocal benefit. Unlike its first iteration, this administration has fewer foreign policy veterans who believe in India’s intrinsic value as a bulwark against China.

In addition to skepticism about partnerships, the current administration’s incoherence about China has left India on uncertain ground. Although it is still early days, this Trump administration’s China policy is strikingly muddled. In Washington, it is an open secret that the administration has not one China strategy but many. Competing factions and schools of thought vie for influence. Trump’s team includes skeptics who downplay the China threat, hard-liners who champion Biden-era curbs on investment and technology, and dealmakers (possibly including Trump himself) who dream of a personal détente with Chinese leader Xi Jinping. In New Delhi, Indian officials struggle to parse the mixed signals.

In this Trump administration, few officials believe in India’s intrinsic value.
Trump has thus ended—or at least paused—the U.S. policy of strategic altruism. If successive U.S. leaders refrained from asking, “What can India do for us?” the current administration is shouting this question from the rooftops. Indeed, it is instructive that the administration has conditioned a broader dialogue with New Delhi on India acceding to several key demands.

First, as part of its policy of “reciprocal tariffs,” the Trump administration has threatened India with an across-the-board 26 percent tariff unless it delivers generous trade and market access concessions. India has emerged as one of the most enthusiastic suitors of a trade pact with the United States, with a tentative deal expected to be reached before the president’s new, arbitrary August 1 deadline. Although this “early harvest” deal may outline only basic terms, officials on both sides hope for a formal pact by this fall’s Quad summit in New Delhi.

Second, the administration has publicly pressed India to increase purchases of U.S.-made defense equipment. Although India has long relied on Russian arms imports, it has meaningfully diversified its portfolio of new purchases over the last decade, increasing the military equipment it buys from the West—notably from France, Israel, and the United States. In a February meeting with Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, Trump floated the possibility of granting India access to buy cutting-edge F-35 stealth fighter jets, an offer normally restricted to the closest U.S. allies. India currently buys more arms from Russia and France than from the United States. Although it is unlikely that the United States could become India’s preferred military supplier even if New Delhi were so inclined—cost considerations alone would rule this out—Trump’s team believes India has been slow to accelerate the purchase of U.S. weapons.

Comment by Riaz Haq on July 21, 2025 at 8:36pm

How India Can Placate America
In a Reversal, It’s Time for New Delhi to Be Generous With Washington

Milan Vaishnav

https://www.foreignaffairs.com/south-asia/how-india-can-placate-ame...

Finally, the administration has also implored India to do more on energy. It wants India to buy more U.S. liquid natural gas and oil, and India seems to be complying. In 2025 alone, India has more than doubled its oil imports from the United States. Washington is also lobbying New Delhi to amend its liability laws to allow for foreign firms to invest in the country’s civilian nuclear sector—the prime reason why the celebrated U.S.-Indian civil nuclear deal has never been consummated. Although the ink on the bilateral accord has long dried, India’s onerous regulations regarding liability issues continue to stymie American investment in Indian nuclear reactors.

RETURNING THE FAVOR
With strategic altruism in Washington on ice, India faces a new reality: New Delhi may have to swallow the bitter pill of making sacrifices today for the promise of security and prosperity tomorrow. In this reversal, it is India—not the United States—that must embrace delayed reciprocity, delivering tangible benefits without expecting short-term returns. For a country that has long prized strategic autonomy, this posture is an uncomfortable departure, although perhaps a necessary one. In the short term, it allows India to withstand the Trump storm in the hopes that either the current administration tempers its transactionalism or that it is eventually followed by a more traditional, strategically minded administration. Over the long run, India’s need for a strategic partnership with the United States remains as vital as it has been for the past quarter century.

That is because India requires significant foreign capital to help finance its ambitious domestic transformation. Although India’s trend growth of roughly 6.5 percent is robust by global standards, it is inadequate given the country’s development goals and the urgent needs of its burgeoning, young, and rapidly urbanizing workforce. To realize the Modi government’s vision of attaining developed-country status by 2047—an aspiration that implies a $30 trillion economy—India will require a massive influx of investment. At present, foreign direct investment inflows into India are muted; last fiscal year, India recorded its lowest level of net FDI inflows in at least two decades. For India to return to double-digit growth rates, renewed investment from the United States will be paramount.

India also needs American support in matters of security. The conflict with Pakistan in May underscored that India was fighting not one neighboring adversary but two; Pakistan used Chinese weapons systems to repel Indian attacks, relied on Chinese satellite imagery of Indian assets, and received real-time intelligence from Beijing on battlefield movements. India’s strategic vulnerability to China has only grown in recent years. Both countries remain locked in an unresolved standoff in the mountains of Ladakh, China has expanded its military infrastructure in the border region, and Beijing continues to encircle India through economic and military advances across South Asia. Despite its rhetoric of strategic autonomy, India cannot deter China alone; its defense posture and economic resilience hinge on American partnership to varying degrees.

Comment by Riaz Haq on July 21, 2025 at 8:36pm

How India Can Placate America
In a Reversal, It’s Time for New Delhi to Be Generous With Washington

Milan Vaishnav

https://www.foreignaffairs.com/south-asia/how-india-can-placate-ame...

So, too, do India’s technological ambitions. India boasts world-class engineering talent, but it lacks the necessary resources and infrastructure to be an industry leader in the rapidly expanding field of artificial intelligence. In February 2026, India will host the next global AI summit. U.S. officials have privately suggested that this gathering could be an opportunity for large U.S.-based tech giants to unveil major investments in state-of-the-art AI infrastructure across India. Indeed, much of India’s tech talent has found a home not in India but in the United States. Often dismissed as a source of “brain drain,” the migration corridor between the two countries—the sixth largest globally—also brings substantial gains. In the last fiscal year alone, India received over $135 billion in remittances from around the world, nearly 30 percent of which originated in the United States.

DOMESTIC PRESSURES, GLOBAL IMPERATIVES
Within India, adopting a policy of strategic altruism toward the United States does carry risks. Modi’s ruling Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) has long cultivated a muscular, nationalist image in contrast to the dovish, secular Indian National Congress. Concessions to Trump risk undercutting that image, especially given recent accusations that Modi yielded to White House pressure to finalize a cease-fire with Pakistan in May.

On the substance of its concessions, here, too, India will have to tread carefully. Energy and defense purchases may not be the stuff of mass political campaigns, but issues related to farmers and agriculture are. If India makes significant market access concessions to cater to American agricultural interests, Modi’s government will come dangerously close to touching the third rail of Indian politics. This is why India is more likely to offer the United States tariff relief on products such as ethanol, almonds, wine, and spirits rather than on staples such as rice, wheat, or dairy products.

With India’s economy punching below its weight, however, Modi’s inner circle realizes the status quo is no longer tenable. In recent years, India has raised tariffs, steadfastly remained outside mega-regional trade pacts, and subsidized domestic industry to stimulate investment. Collectively, these protectionist measures have failed to trigger an economic takeoff. If Modi can deftly use Trump as a foil—framing domestic tariff cuts as a tactical move to placate a capricious U.S. president—he can unlock trade reforms that better integrate India into global supply chains and yield long-term economic gains.

If anybody has the latitude to make such concessions to a bullying Washington, Modi does. Although the Modi-led BJP suffered a temporary setback in last year’s general elections, it remains dominant. In regional elections held over the past year, the ruling party decisively defeated opponents in key states, defying predictions of “peak Modi.” Few elected leaders enjoy Modi’s political space to take the high road with Trump. If he does so, he might succeed in insulating the U.S.-Indian relationship from the tumultuous present to reap the benefits of a more congenial future.

Some Indian strategists rightly worry that it takes a dangerous leap of faith to bet on the United States returning to moderation in 2028. But the alternative—strategic estrangement—could come at an even greater cost. In an era of global uncertainty, strategic altruism may be the highest form of self-interest India can exercise.

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