Comment by Riaz Haq on September 11, 2026 at 9:29am

@IndiasWorld_mag

#LongRead | “Over fifty years later, it can be argued that the Pakistan Navy’s submarines and anti-ship missiles are the key factors that make compellence for the Indian Navy a questionable pursuit.”




While the Indian Navy retains conventional superiority over the Pakistan Navy in both fleet strength and technology, it falls short in fundamental ways to actualise its stated compellence strategy at the tactical level in a future high-escalation ladder conflict scenario.

Can India’s naval superiority translate into sustained compellence?

Read our new article by @auro508 here:


https://x.com/indiasworld_mag/status/2098312151777907121?s=61&t...

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Following Operation Sindoor, the Indian Navy transitioned its naval strategy from simple deterrence to active compellence against Pakistan. This strategic shift involved aggressive forward deployments and force expansions, though constraints such as Pakistan's growing submarine fleet continue to influence operational limits. Read the full analysis by Araudra Singh at India's World. [1, 2, 3, 4]

https://indiasworld.in/long-read-assessing-indian-navys-compellence...

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The former Chief of Naval Staff (CNS) Admiral Dinesh Tripathi was recently engaged in a slew of interviews, focusing on Operation Sindoor, Pakistan, Indian Navy’s (IN) submarine capability and its future combat posture. Similar to his comments days after Operation Sindoor, the CNS reiterated IN’s domination of Pakistan Navy (PN) during the conflict, while stating that “the forward deployment of a Carrier Battle Group and our aggressive operational posture in the Northern Arabian Sea forced the Pakistan Navy to remain confined to their ports or close to the Makran coast”. On future force posture, he added that the IN remained on course to become a 200-plus ship force by 2035 and had “significantly expanded maritime surveillance networks, underwater

Comment by Riaz Haq on September 13, 2026 at 9:39am

Mohsin Ali
@Mohsin_o2
Indian Navy Vice Admiral (R) says Pakistan’s eight Hangor-class submarines will be a “massive headache” for India.

“Pakistan’s eight Hangors are going to be a BIG headache for us. I would love to be the operational commander on the Pakistani side.”

— Vice Admiral (Retd.) Sanjay Mahindru

https://x.com/Mohsin_o2/status/2099077809209803157?s=20

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Defence Insider
@defence_insider
The Indian Navy has long viewed Pakistan 🇵🇰 Navy’s submarine modernisation with serious concern, and the Type 039B Hangor programme is clearly raising the stakes.

Eight Hangor class submarines, alongside the AGOSTA 90B modernisation, will significantly strengthen Pakistan 🇵🇰 Navy’s undersea warfare capability.

Just wait and see what weapon systems and combat capabilities Pakistan 🇵🇰 Navy has procured alongside its new submarines. The undersea balance in the Arabian Sea could look very different in the coming years. https://x.com/mohsin_o2/status/2099077809209803157/video/1

https://x.com/defence_insider/status/2099081389509693510?s=20

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Ramandeep Bajwa
@Ramandeep_Bajwa
Neglect of air force saw unpleasant surprises in 2019 and 2025 when lack of critical assets like AWACS, aerial tankers, electronic warfare aircraft, missing multiple domain warfare capability allowed the adversary to hold its own against much larger numbers.

https://x.com/Ramandeep_Bajwa/status/2099062064912470384?s=20

Comment by Riaz Haq on September 27, 2026 at 5:36pm

Habibullah Khan
@Huk06
India has a real Hangor problem now. Concurrently 5 advanced submarines will always be in the ocean submerged and undetectable. All of them with nuclear weapons.

Again as everything Pakistan does all of these are connected to multi domain operations web Pakistan has built. Allowing them to feed off of superior targeting data.

The cost of sea denial because of these sophisticated submarines on both operational and cost front just went up exponentially for India. Basically in any conflict these subs will keep India guessing because of their longer submerged times of 3 weeks. And with Pakistan’s tactical nuclear capability and willingness to strike first with them, most conflicts with India will not go that long. 3 weeks means they can easily pop up in the Bay of Bengal. No Indian deep water port is safe from them.

We spend very little compared to India. But because Indian military strategy and procurement is dominated by kickback driven politicians, it is fragmented, lacks efficacy and is less than the sum of its parts. Pakistan’s is focused on kill chains, integrated multi domain operations and is data driven so is always more than the sum of its parts.

https://x.com/Huk06/status/2104156123280601593?s=20

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Pak's new Chinese Hangor submarine test-fires missile, India's sub plans still hang fire

https://www.newindianexpress.com/india/2026/Sep/27/paks-new-chinese...

NEW DELHI: Even as India's long-delayed P-75(I) project for six new-generation submarines continues to hang fire, Pakistan on Sunday announced that its newly inducted Chinese-built AIP submarine had successfully test-fired an anti-ship cruise missile in the North Arabian Sea.

The Pakistani military's media wing ISPR said PNS/M Hangor "accurately engaged" a long-range target during the firing, witnessed by Pakistan Navy chief Admiral Naveed Ashraf. It did not identify the missile, specify its range or say when the test was conducted.

Sources in the Indian defence establishment, however, said the missile was the Chinese YJ-18, assessed to be derived from the Russian Klub family, with a claimed strike range of up to 540 km in some variants.

The test comes just 12 days after a Pakistani naval vessel and an Indian warship collided in the North Arabian Sea on September 15. India had lodged a strong protest, holding that PNS Hunain approached the Indian warship at high speed and manoeuvred in an unsafe manner. Islamabad had disputed the Indian account. The Indian warship continued with its mission, while PNS Hunain had to return to port.

The real concern for the Indian Navy, however, is the platform itself.

Comment by Riaz Haq on October 2, 2026 at 5:35pm

The Pakistan Navy operates an expanding submarine fleet . [1, 2, 3]

Current Submarine Fleet Overview

• Hangor-class (Type 039A/041 Yuan-class derivative):
  • Status: 1 commissioned (PNS/M Hangor, inducted in April 2026), with 7 more on order (4 built in China, 4 built locally at Karachi Shipyard) as part of a $5 billion program expected to be completed by 2028.
  • Features: Equipped with Air-Independent Propulsion (AIP) for extended underwater endurance, advanced sensors, torpedoes, and anti-ship cruise missiles (which conducted a live-fire strike in September 2026). [1, 2, 3, 4, 5]

• Agosta-90B class (Khalid class):
  • Status: 3 active units (PNS Khalid, PNS Saad, PNS Hamza).
  • Features: French-designed diesel-electric attack submarines featuring modern combat and AIP or upgraded systems.

• Agosta-70 class (Hashmat class):
  • Status: 2 active units (PNS Hashmat, PNS Hurmat).
  • Features: Legacy French-built diesel-electric attack submarines. [1]

• Cosmos class (Mini-submarines):
  • Status: 3 active MG110/Cosmos-class midget/mini-submarines used for specialized shallow-water and special operations. [1]

Fleet Expansion & Roadmap

• Once all 8 Hangor-class submarines are completed and commissioned by 2028, Pakistan's active major submarine strength will scale up significantly to 13 primary combat submarines (alongside mini-submarines), strengthening its sea-denial and minimum credible deterrence posture in the Arabian Sea.[1]

Comment by Riaz Haq on October 7, 2026 at 9:05am

Pakistan’s Eight Hangor Submarines Could Strain India’s Navy, Former Admiral Warns

Former Indian vice admiral Sanjay Mahindru warns that Pakistan’s planned eight-boat Hangor fleet could force India to devote more ships, aircraft and sensors to tracking concealed threats.


https://defencesecurityasia.com/en/pakistan-hangor-submarines-india...


India’s Delayed Submarine Replacement Magnifies the Hangor Window
Pakistan’s first Hangor entered service eleven years after the 2015 order, while India’s Project 75I programme for six air-independent propulsion submarines remained unsigned by mid-2026, illustrating how acquisition tempo can alter regional risk before fleet totals decisively change.

Project 75I has spent roughly two decades in planning and negotiation, with German Type 214-derived proposals widely discussed, but even a near-term contract would likely place the first completed Indian submarine around 2032–2033 under optimistic industrial and testing assumptions.

Meanwhile, several Sindhughosh-class Kilo and Shishumar-class HDW submarines are approaching retirement, creating a late-2020s readiness window in which hull availability, refit schedules, and crew pipelines may matter more than nominal Indian fleet strength displayed on paper

India’s six Kalvari-class Scorpène submarines provide modern conventional capability, but they entered service without air-independent propulsion, while plans to integrate an indigenous AIP plug during future refits remain subject to engineering validation, schedule risk, and availability costs.

This mismatch explains Mahindru’s “lost decade” description because submarine construction cannot be accelerated instantly; specialised steel, pressure-hull fabrication, combat-system integration, sea trials, certification, crew training, and dockyard capacity impose long lead times after political approval.Explore History

Simply ordering more boats would therefore leave an immediate surveillance deficit, whereas investments in seabed sensors, unmanned underwater vehicles, deployable arrays, maritime patrol aviation, and networked processing could improve detection coverage before new Indian submarines become operational.

India must also protect anti-submarine warfare availability by maintaining P-8I mission systems, stocking sonobuoys and lightweight torpedoes, expanding MH-60R support, and ensuring surface combatants possess reliable towed-array sonars, trained operators, and sufficient operational flying hours.

Force posture becomes central because sensors concentrated near major bases may leave patrol gaps elsewhere, while widely dispersed systems require secure communications, common acoustic libraries, automated correlation, and command arrangements capable of converting detections into timely operational decisions.ASW technology training

Pakistan faces parallel constraints, including Chinese CHD620 diesel-engine reliability after German export restrictions blocked planned MTU engines, local construction delays, infrastructure expansion, crew generation, and the challenge of sustaining high readiness across eleven eventual AIP-equipped submarines.

The undersea balance will consequently depend less upon ceremonial commissioning totals than deployable boats, trained crews, maintenance throughput, weapon readiness, sensor integration, and each navy’s ability to regenerate patrols after failures, losses, or prolonged wartime operations.

(CLICK HERE): India’s 200-Warship Surge Targets China as Pakistan’s Hangor Submarines Reshape the Indian Ocean
Underwater Domain Awareness Will Decide Whether Hangor Changes the Balance
Mahindru’s proposed remedy places underwater domain awareness above platform-for-platform competition because a submarine that can be continuously detected becomes containable, whereas an unlocated boat can influence fleet behaviour, harbour activity, and political decision-making without firing a weapon.Submarine fleet analysis

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